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Editor's Note
In response to the 1972 recommendations of the National Commission
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, most states substantially
broadened coverage and increased benefits for injured workers. The cost
increases associated with these reforms have brought workers' compen
sation to the forefront in the debate over labor market regulatory policy.
Substantial changes to workers' compensation continue, although the at
tention has shifted from the relatively straightforward issues of coverage
and benefit levels to subtle and difficult matters such as permanent par
tial disability benefit arrangements, disease compensation, ad
ministrative efficiency, and competitive rate-making.
One of the alleged virtues of workers' compensation is the flexibility
and learning from others afforded by the decentralized state-run pro
grams. Unfortunately the ongoing reform debate in virtually every state
is taking place in isolation from the experiences and lessons of others.
The papers in this volume begin to fill that void by reporting and analyz
ing a range of workers' compensation issues that are key to every state's
disability income policy. The emphasis is on what can be learned from
the experience of other jurisdictions. The papers were presented at a con
ference held at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, in 1983.
James Chelius
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The Status and Direction
of Workers' Compensation
An Introduction to Current Issues
James R. Chelius
Institute of Management and Labor Relations
Rutgers University

The substantial increase in injury rates during the 1960s
that gave rise to widespread federal involvement in occupa
tional safety and health also spawned a period of significant
change in the workers' compensation system. The Occupa
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 provided for a national
commission to study workers' compensation. 1 This commis
sion recommended that the states broaden coverage and in
crease benefits. Eighty-four specific suggestions were made,
19 of which were deemed essential to the commission's no
tion of a well-functioning workers' compensation system. If
the states did not meet the 19 essential recommendations, the
commission urged that federal standards be issued and the
states forced to comply. Most states responded to either the
commission's vision of the appropriate way to improve the
workers' compensation system or perhaps to the threat of
federal involvement. Substantial changes were made in both
coverage and benefit levels. These changes, however, were
not sufficient to meet all of the 19 essential recommenda
tions. Several bills mandating federal standards were in
troduced in Congress but none passed.
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The substantial changes of the 1970s in workers' compen
sation coverage and benefits, together with increased system
usage by workers, resulted in dramatic increases in employer
costs. Burton and Krueger (see chapter 7) estimate that
workers' compensation costs as a percentage of payroll in
creased over 80 percent from 1972 through 1978, approx
imately double the increase from 1950 through 1972.
Whereas the initial response to the commission's recommen
dations was a series of relatively straightforward changes in
coverage and benefit levels, the resulting cost increases
generated pressure for attention to the more subtle aspects of
workers' compensation.
Issues such as eligibility for permanent partial benefits,
pricing regulation, and administrative arrangements that
were largely ignored in the initial round of reform following
the commission's report became the focus of a second wave
of reform that continues. Workers' compensation,
therefore, is an increasingly important and changing aspect
of the labor market regulatory environment. Every indica
tion is that this importance and fluidity will continue.
Evaluation of any regulatory policy is desirable; however,
it is usually difficult. One source of difficulty, particularly
for recent labor market regulatory initiatives such as OSHA,
is that they are uniformly applied throughout the country.
Such a universal policy, whatever its advantages as a
regulatory technique, does not provide for ready com
parisons. One of the advantages of the state-based workers'
compensation system is that one can compare the various
state laws and evaluate their effectiveness and efficiency.
This potential advantage of the state systems has not been
utilized to any significant degree. The workers' compensa
tion laws of each state tend to operate and even change in
isolation from the experiences of others.
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The conference from which this book arose is the first in a
series examining the workers' compensation system. The
goal is to provide scholars and practitioners with the insights
of the workers' compensation experience in a variety of
jurisdictions.
There are three main themes examined in this review of
current issues in workers' compensation. We first describe
and analyze the process of reforming workers' compensation
with papers on a variety of states that have recently
undergone attempts at significant change. While only some
of these efforts have resulted in comprehensive change, there
is much to be learned from failed as well as successful at
tempts. Of course, the process of change is not distinct from
the attempted or actual outcome of the reform process.
Several of the papers primarily focusing on the process of
reform give us significant insight into the nature of the
workers' compensation system in these states. A second
group of papers examines the ongoing operation of several
key states. These essays specifically examine the regulation
of insurance rates, the differences in employer costs, and the
administrative structure of New Jersey, New York, and Con
necticut. The third section of the book deals with one of the
most difficult of workers' compensation issues—occupa
tional disease. These papers address how workers' compen
sation currently deals with this problem and suggest
guidelines for directing future change.
In addition to these three basic themes, a final essay
broadens our perspective by presenting information about
the unusual accident compensation scheme used in New
Zealand.

The Process of Workers' Compensation Reform
The difference between reform and tinkering seems to de
pend on whether one is for or against the changes. Virtually
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every state makes some changes in its compensation statute
annually; however, without getting more specific, the notion
of reform as used here is of a fairly major change in the
system with no connotation as to the desirability of the
change.
The papers on the reform process examine a range of state
experiences—California (Alan Tebb), Michigan (H. Allan
Hunt), Minnesota (Steve Keefe), Florida, Louisiana, New
Mexico, Delaware, and Alaska (John Lewis). While the
political process is never a tidy one, several themes do
emerge. First, research and the resulting insights into the
specific problems of a state's system provide a necessary
beginning to the reform process. Second, educating a wide
range of individuals, including study commission members,
key employer and labor leaders, and legislators, is also
critical. Finally, substantive communication among the
leaders of the various interest groups cannot be completely
replaced by dialogue among their specialized representatives.
The necessary research for reform need not be
sophisticated scholarly treatises; often the only requirement
is that it adequately document what is happening in the
system. The recurrent theme of research as a precondition
for substantial change is well-illustrated by the Minnesota
experience described by Keefe. For several years the high
cost of workers' compensation made it an important
political issue. However, no response to industry complaints
was forthcoming, in part because the only publicized
evidence for high costs was a series of anecdotes on
payments to undeserving individuals. Only when credible
data were developed, indicating that Minnesota was indeed a
high cost state, did the reform effort develop momentum.
Interestingly, the most cogent basis for cost comparison was
with neighboring Wisconsin—a key competitor for many
Minnesota industries. The research effort also pointed to the
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primary reason for the high costs. Whereas early reform pro
posals focused on general benefit levels, the analyses
demonstrated that it was the amount of disability compen
sated rather than benefit levels that made Minnesota costs
high.
The analyses documented that in Minnesota compared to
Wisconsin: (1) the rate of permanent total disability per losttime injury was 20 times higher; (2) the average duration of
temporary total disability was 50 percent longer; (3) the fre
quency of permanent partial disability cases was 60 percent
higher; (4) the average payment for partial disability was 20
percent higher even though the scheduled benefits were
similar; and (5) the average medical cost per case was 50 per
cent higher. Based on these findings, it became obvious that
the fundamental cost problem with the Minnesota system
was not a high benefit schedule per se. The importance of
such fundamental research is retold in the successful reform
efforts of Florida and Louisiana and the failures of
Delaware and New Mexico.
Educating key actors in the reform process is also crucial
to success. One of the first requirements is to educate
members of the ubiquitous study commissions as to the fun
damentals of workers' compensation. Without such
knowledge, commission members tend to get locked into the
specific proposals of the groups they represent. As events
change and bargaining intensifies, such rigidity frequently
blocks useful compromises. Legislators comprise another
group that invariably requires such attention. An attempted
workers' compensation reform that tries to reduce the long
time frequently required for education is likely to be unsuc
cessful.
A closely related issue is the requirement of dialogue
among the leaders of the affected interest groups. While this
is perhaps obvious, the papers reviewing recent state changes
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reveal several interesting points. Because of the complexity
of workers' compensation in general, and in particular the
obscurity of the currently debated nonbenefit issues, many
affected parties have delegated their role in the reform pro
cess to specialists. While this is typically not a problem, the
papers note that in several states, labor unions frequently
turned to their workers' compensation attorneys for advice
on reform. However, since many of the proposed reforms in
clude attempts at reducing the amount of litigation, the at
torneys have an inherent conflict of interest and have often
been a source of organized labor's opposition to reform. A
similar delegation of authority on the employer's side was
one of the reasons cited by Tebb as contributing to the
languishing of reform efforts in California during the 1970s.
Apparently senior management relied solely on trade
associations to represent their interests just at the time when
the associations lost many of their senior lobbyists. The
point, therefore, is that it is desirable for leaders of business
and labor to understand and communicate on workers' com
pensation.
One must not be so naive as to assume that once the
"right" people begin a dialogue, all roadblocks to reform
will be erased or even smoothed. However, there are many
aspects of reform that can yield gains for both employers
and employees. Taking advantage of these potential mutual
gains, and fashioning optimal compromises on other aspects
where both gains and losses are necessary, is greatly
facilitated by the direct involvement of key leaders. Unfortunatly such attention is frequently lacking.
These papers on the reform process give us many insights
into the dynamics of the states described, as well as pro
viding evidence for the broad theme of what brings about
reform. Anyone with an interest in substantial workers'
compensation change must be prepared to deal with the
issues addressed by these authors.
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The Regional Experience in Workers' Compensation
Given the joint sponsorship of the conference by univer
sities in the States of New Jersey, New York, and Connec
ticut, it was appropriate to focus the attention of one session
on the operation of workers' compensation in these states.
The issues addressed—cost differences, pricing regulation,
and administration—are important concerns in all jurisdic
tions. The general context of the issues represents the bulk of
the analysis, with the three states serving as examples.
The importance of thorough and well-documented
research has already been noted. An excellent example of
such analysis is the interstate cost comparison data presented
by John F. Burton, Jr. and Alan Krueger. They begin by
describing some inappropriate measures of cost differences
among the states (earned premium-to-payroll ratios and
average premiums per state). While the incorrectness of these
measures may seem obvious once their inadequacies are
demonstrated, such measures are in fact frequently used.
The reason for the scarcity of valid data on costs becomes
apparent upon examining the Burton and Krueger technique
for constructing such measures—it is very complicated. The
authors make a convincing case as to why such an elaborate
procedure is necessary. Without attempting to summarize
their technique, it should be noted that they take into ac
count factors such as industry mix, payroll limitations,
premium discounts, dividends, experience rating, expense
and loss constants, and schedule rating.
The resulting cost data, across years and states, are then
reviewed to demonstrate some of their more important uses.
For example, it is noted that from 1950 through 1983
workers' compensation costs as a percentage of payroll
almost tripled, with a particularly large increase in the period
from 1972 through 1978. The apparent increase in the in
terstate variation of workers' compensation costs over time
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and even since the National Commission's recommendations
is also an interesting finding, particularly in light of the com
mission's goal of greater equality across states.
While a formal statistical analysis of the reasons for these
cost differences is beyond the scope of their paper, Burton
and Krueger present some preliminary evidence on this im
portant issue. Using New Jersey, New York, and Connec
ticut as examples, they compare the relative costliness of
these states over time with the level of benefits available to
injured workers. They conclude ". . . that changes in
benefit levels are an important determinant of changes in the
employers' costs of workers' compensation. ..." The im
portance of other potential factors such as coverage, use of
state insurance funds and self-insurance, and administration
of the law are left for future analysis.
This paper also yields an interesting insight into a key
aspect of the reform process. Certainly one of the important
phases of this process is to determine changes that can yield
gains for both workers and employers. Unfortunately, at
least in the short run, many changes simply benefit one party
at the expense of the other. However, data on the cost
response to the New Jersey reform of 1979 indicate that
benefits to most injured workers increased while employer
costs declined. The thrust of the reform was to de-emphasize
the role of minor permanent partial disability payments by
requiring objective evidence of disability. While fewer
workers are now receiving such benefits one would not im
agine that, given the standard of eligibility, this is a signifi
cant problem for deserving individuals. Interestingly, the
general level of benefits increased at the same time as relative
employer costs were decreasing. This concern about the
handling of permanent partial benefits is a key aspect of the
reform debate in many states, including several of those
discussed in the first section.
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The paper discussing pricing is also quite timely as these
issues are currently being debated in many states. Reflecting
the general deregulatory trend in other lines of insurance as
well as other sectors of the economy, the fundamental ques
tion is the appropriate role of competition in the pricing of
workers' compensation insurance. Arthur Williams first pro
vides a very readable account of the rate determination pro
cess—a review necessary for all but those thoroughly steeped
in this arcane subject. The rate regulation process—ranging
from prior governmental approvals to open competition—is
then described. A final section of the paper summarizes three
of the specific issues forming the heart of the debate on price
regulation of workers' compensation insurance: the
arguments for and against open competition, the ap
propriate role of investment income in regulated rates, and
the use of excess profit statutes.
While most of the arguments for and against open com
petition are the same as those used in other areas of regula
tion, from bus fares to liquor prices, the unique aspect of the
workers' compensation debate concerns whether the data
base used to calculate rates will be less reliable under com
petition. Opponents of deregulation are concerned that com
petition will lead to a withering away of the rate-making data
base pooled from most insurance companies. It is difficult to
imagine why insurance companies would not want to main
tain such a valuable pricing tool even if it were not mandated
by regulation; however, in the spirit of neutrality, Williams
chooses not to reveal his interpretation of the validity of the
arguments.
The role of investment income in regulated rate-making is
significant in workers' compensation because of the time
lapse between collection of premiums and the dispersal of
benefits. While the role of income earned on such in
vestments would be moot under genuine open competition,
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its importance in the various regulated price environments
will continue. The difficulties of determining a fair or effi
cient price without significant help from the marketplace are
well illustrated by the debate on the appropriate role of in
vestment income.
The final issue addressed by Williams is that of excess pro
fits statutes. While only a minor part of the workers' com
pensation system, with only Florida currently having such a
law, the issue may become more important if more states
deregulate workers' compensation insurance. Such statutes
can be used as a mechanism for easing into more competition
in rate-making by serving as a guarantee that the deregulated
firms will not generate "windfall" profits.
The efficient administration of workers' compensation is
an important but extremely difficult issue addressed in the
paper by Monroe Berkowitz. He reflects on the frustration
of developing guidelines for how workers' compensation
should be run, echoing the common theme of the "overuse"
of litigation. It is ironic that most commentaries on workers'
compensation emphasize the inefficiency of its extensive use
of lawyers, while many other legal areas point to the
"streamlined" workers' compensation system as a model to
be emulated. Unfortunately, the characteristics of efficient
administration remain illusive; Berkowitz, however, offers
the hope that ongoing conferences and resulting books such
as this one can provide a vehicle for invigorating the search
process. Certainly excellent essays on the operation of
workers' compensation such as the ones contained in this
section will foster the process by which those concerned
about workers' compensation will learn from the views and
experiences of others.

Occupational Disease
One of the most significant of workers' compensation
problems is how to deal with occupational disease victims.
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Unfortunately, the magnitude of the problem has only
recently been appreciated. For many years occupational
disease was seen largely as a phenomenon of the past with
the major problems resolved. 2 The growing awareness of
work-related health problems and in particular the asbestos
issue have intensified the search for an effective and efficient
mechanism to deal with these issues. There is currently a
series of bills before Congress that propose to circumvent the
state workers' compensation system by establishing a federal
occupational disease compensation program.
The papers presented at the conference demonstrate the
inadequacies of the current system as well as the difficulties
of coming up with a solution. Donald Spatz illustrates the
nature of the compensation problem with its most visible
manifestation—asbestos. Most state workers' compensation
laws have significant roadblocks that make it quite difficult
for victims or survivors to collect benefits. These "artificial
barriers" include recency of employment rules and statutes
of limitations that are frequently inconsistent with the laten
cy periods of occupational disease. The performance of
workers' compensation within a state with no such barriers
(New Jersey) illustrates that even at its best, the current
system does not appear to be fairly compensating victims.
The data on three groups of workers clearly indicate that the
problem goes well beyond the law per se. Fewer than half of
the victims or survivors of asbestos-associated diseases even
filed a claim. The failure to claim benefits was particularly
striking among a group of workers with typically short term
exposures in a factory that closed in 1954. Only nine sur
vivors of the 87 workers who died from asbestos-associated
diseases filed workers' compensation claims. Apparently,
the lack of recognition of the association between asbestos
and disease was not as limiting a factor as was the lack of
knowledge that the survivors were potentially eligible for
benefits. Even among those filing claims, the settlements
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were frequently delayed and severely compromised. It is dif
ficult to come to any other conclusion than that the workers'
compensation system has difficulty coping with occupational
diseases.
The papers by Donald Elisberg and Peter Earth present
guidelines and suggestions for how the problem of occupa
tional disease can be handled. Even if one does not agree
with their solutions, the systematic discussion is very helpful
since it presents the agenda with which any reform must
cope.
Elisberg reviews five basic elements of any effective oc
cupational disease compensation system. One of the issues
that must be addressed is the appropriate role of the federal
government. Elisberg argues for a federal preemption of
disease compensation based on the advantages of uniformi
ty, the difficulty of communicating complex issues of disease
causality to state agencies, and the political problems of get
ting comprehensive legislation in many states. A second
basic element is the appropriate role of presumptions for
determining whether particular diseases should be
automatically considered to arise out of and in the course of
employment. Such presumptions are designed "... to
eliminate the concept that in each individual case an entire
system of proof need be offered to establish both the illness
and its causal relationship to employment." It is argued that
presumptions have gotten a bad name because of their
politicization under the Black Lung law but that such subor
dination of medical criteria need not occur.
Another basic element of occupational disease compensa
tion is benefit levels. Elisberg argues that pain and suffering
should be compensated since work disincentives are not like
ly to be as troublesome as they are with injuries. It is then
argued that claims handling could be made simple by the use
of impartial medical panels to determine causality and the
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degree of disability. Adjudication would be further minimiz
ed under this proposal by funding the program with a
mechanism such as a tax that does not give employers an in
centive to challenge claims. Elisberg is concerned that any
kind of an insurance mechanism would encourage employers
or their associations to challenge legitimate claims in the
hope of holding down premiums.
In addition to addressing some of the same basic issues,
Earth raises several others, including the problem of ex
clusive remedy. Surely any occupational disease reform that
bars tort suits must make the workers' compensation system
"... more accessible to potential users." Barth feels such a
quid pro quo is a useful element of disease compensation
reform. One of the problems with achieving such a com
promise—the reliance of organized labor on the advice of
their attorneys—surfaced in the earlier discussion of the
reform process. "The trial bar has no apparent interest in
having future lawsuits by workers or survivors barred in
disease cases. Any promise of a more effective workers'
compensation system holds less interest for them than main
taining and expanding the right to sue." Whatever one's
view of the optimal role of litigation, it is clearly an issue that
needs to be addressed if victims and their survivors are to be
fairly compensated.

The New Zealand Experience
The final paper broadens our perspective on workers'
compensation issues by reviewing the radically different New
Zealand system. Barbara Mclntosh begins her analysis by
describing the legal arrangements by which all individuals
are covered for 24 hours a day. The results of a survey of
employer perceptions about the system are then analyzed.
Three government funds are used to finance compensa
tion—the Earner's Fund for all employed and self-employed
persons (on and off the job), the Motor Vehicle Fund for all
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persons injured in motor vehicle accidents (including on-thejob injuries) and a Supplementary Fund for all others. The
Earner and Motor Vehicle Funds are essentially selfsupporting from levies on employers and vehicle owners
respectively. The Supplementary Fund is financed from
general tax revenues. The employer levies for work injuries
and diseases vary by industry although they are sharply con
strained by minimums and maximums. The quite minor
Safety Incentive Bonuses are the only version of experience
rating used. The costs of earners' nonwork injuries are
spread among all employers. Benefits are generous, with 100
percent of earnings up to $600 (NZ) per week currently
covered.
The results of extensive interviews with New Zealand
senior executives indicate that the compensation scheme is
not perceived as a key factor influencing safety decisions.
More significant influences were government safety rules,
employee concerns, and local union demands. While the ex
ecutives did not feel the legislation was a hindrance to their
operations, they did feel that more accidents are reported
and longer time taken off as a result of the compensation
scheme.

Conclusion
The very fact that workers' compensation has lasted for
over 70 years indicates it has strengths as a device for dealing
with an important social problem. Similarly it is hard to deny
that it has significant weaknesses. Whatever one's view of
the balance of these strengths and weaknesses, the papers in
this volume will provide insights into the current state and
desirable directions for workers' compensation.
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NOTES
1. The Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's Com
pensation Laws (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972).

2. A classic study published in 1954 stated ". . . for industry as a whole,
problems of air pollution, industrial poisoning, silicosis, dermatitis, or
other occupational health hazards are less pressing today than disability
and absenteeism due to general illness." Herman Somers and Anne
Somers. Workmen's Compensation (New York: John Wiley, 1954) p.
218.

The Minnesota Experience
with Workers' Compensation Reform*
Steve Keefe
Commissioner, Department of Labor and Industry
State of Minnesota

The Problem and the Political Environment
From 1975, when it first became a hot political issue, the
debate over workers' compensation in Minnesota has been
characterized by more heat than light. Employers' com
plaints about high costs were initially supported mainly by
anecdotal information about abuses in individual cases, and
proposed solutions were more intuitive than based on any
particular strategy of addressing high cost impact areas.
Upon examination, anecdotal stories of abuses frequently
turned out to have been exaggerated. One collection of 25
"horror stories" presented by employers to a legislative
committee in 1977 as evidence of the excessive liberality of
Minnesota judges led to an investigation which discovered
that 14 of the 25 cases had never been before judges but had
rather been decided without litigation by insurance com
panies on their own motion. Intuitive solutions frequently
turned out, upon adoption, not to have any substantial im*This paper was originally scheduled to be presented at the conference, however, the final
legislative debate on the reforms coincided with the conference and Mr. Keefe was unable
to make the presentation.
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pact on costs of the system. A list of proposals by the in
surance industry in 1979 had all been adopted by 1981
without any apparent substantial impact on costs. While
complaints tended to focus on payments to undeserving in
dividuals, proposed solutions tended to focus on across-theboard benefit cuts.
By the early 1980s, analytical understanding of what was
different about the Minnesota system and whether that
system was actually more costly began to become available.
A legislative study in 1979, 1 a study by the insurance division
in 1981, 2 and a study by the Citizens League in 19823 began
to point at key aspects of the nature of Minnesota's workers'
compensation problem. In addition, the studies identified
another problem, perhaps equally severe, of poor service to
injured workers.
Comparisons of average workers' compensation rates
from state to state were at first used to determine the degree
of the Minnesota problem. It was quickly discovered that
these comparisons were misleading because of the important
effects of differences in industrial mix from state to state and
from socio-economic differences which lead to differences in
litigation and system utilization from state to state. Further
more, parallel state-to-state comparisons ignored the real
competitive problems which individual businesses face. Na
tionwide average workers' compensation rates are far less
important to employers than the actual workers' compensa
tion rates in similar classifications in states where the
employers' competition is found.
More detailed examination of rates on a classification-byclassification basis by Insurance Commissioner Michael
Markman in 1981 4 showed that Minnesota workers' compen
sation rates were indeed substantially higher than rates in
surrounding states, even though not particularly higher than
rates in some more heavily industrialized states on the East

The Minnesota Experience

19

and West Coasts. In fact, the study showed workers' com
pensation rates averaging 70 percent higher in Minnesota
than in our neighboring state of Wisconsin, which has a
quite similar industrial and socio-economic mix as well as a
somewhat similar average benefit level. Furthermore, the
Markman study showed that differences in compensation
rates tend to be more pronounced in those industries with the
highest rates, particularly in classifications containing large
numbers of small businesses. This creates particular
economic problems because those are the very businesses
which find their competition in the neighboring State of
Wisconsin, and in which workers' compensation rates are a
more important competitive factor. For example, the
lumbering industry, found heavily in both northern Min
nesota and northern Wisconsin, has a workers' compensa
tion rate of almost $50 per $100 of payroll in Minnesota.
Although the average increase in Minnesota over Wisconsin
rate levels is 70 percent, a number of rate classifications had
differences of as much as 200 or 300 percent.
Analysis of the reasons for these differences in Minnesota
as compared to Wisconsin turned up interesting information
about the impact of benefit levels. Maximum weekly benefit
levels in both states are quite similar. The Citizens League
study showed that scheduled awards for various bodily parts
turned out to be quite similar for an average wage earner in
each state, although there is a broader range and therefore a
higher maximum (and a lower minimum) in Minnesota than
in Wisconsin. The Minnesota cost-of-living escalator turns
out to have an impact on rates of only approximately 1 per
cent or 2 percent once investment income is taken into con
sideration as it is in the Minnesota rating structure (although
not yet in the Wisconsin rating structure).
The 1977-79 legislative study5 suggested one reason for
these differences when it found a strong correlation between
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average workers' compensation rate levels and litigation
rates in various states, including Minnesota and Wisconsin.
As of 1979, the Minnesota litigation rate was approximately
three times that of Wisconsin (petitions for hearing
amounted to approximately 10 percent of first reports of an
injury in Minnesota as opposed to barely 3 percent in
Wisconsin). The Markman report zeroed in more precisely
on the reasons for the substantially higher costs in Minnesota
when it discovered that the Minnesota system has the follow
ing important differences from Wisconsin in frequency and
severity of disability:
• The rate of permanent total disability cases per lost time
injury is approximately 20 times as high in Minnesota as
it is in Wisconsin (63 permanent total cases per 10,000
lost time injuries in Minnesota as opposed to 3 in
Wisconsin).
• The average duration of temporary total disability in
Minnesota is approximately 50 percent longer than it is
in Wisconsin.
• The frequency of permanent partial disability cases is
approximately 60 percent higher in Minnesota than it is
in Wisconsin.
• The average payment for partial disability is 20 percent
higher in Minnesota than it is in Wisconsin (in spite of
the apparent similarity in the two state schedules).
• The average medical cost per case is approximately 50
percent higher in Minnesota than it is in Wisconsin.
Analysis of the two state systems seems to show that the
major reason for the difference in the cost of compensation
for work-related disability in Minnesota as compared to
Wisconsin is not the level of compensation so much as it is
the amount of disability compensated.
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In order to determine the reasons for the difference in the
amount of disability actually being compensated in Min
nesota, a great deal of attention has been given to com
parisons of the state's system with that used in the State of
Wisconsin and to the methods used by a number of
businesses in Minnesota that have managed to substantially
reduce the costs of their own workers' compensation pro
gram within the structure of the existing Minnesota laws and
benefit levels by changing their internal company practices.
In Minnesota, a significant number of private companies,
usually larger self-insuring employers (although larger com
panies purchasing insurance have also enjoyed these im
provements), have recently reformed their internal workers'
compensation programs and accomplished savings of
anywhere from 20 percent to 50 percent of their workers'
compensation costs. These company-sponsored programs
usually contain an important safety component. Companywide commitments to preventing accidents in the first
place are extremely effective in dealing with the workers'
compensation costs.
More modern loss control methods adopted after the fact
also seem to have a substantial impact on reducing the actual
disability that needs to be compensated. By instituting
vigorous early intervention and return-to-work programs,
aggressive Minnesota employers have found that they can
substantially reduce the disability resulting from even serious
injuries. Such programs also seem to result in improved
employer-employee relations and substantially reduced
litigation rates.
The State of Wisconsin seems to accomplish similar results
by having an active early intervention philosophy of state ad
ministration of the workers' compensation law. This ad
ministration seems to accomplish the same kinds of substan
tially better return-to-work rates and substantially lower
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litigation rates that are accomplished individually by certain
companies in Minnesota. 6
This analysis of the workers' compensation problem in
Minnesota suggests a possible solution to the political prob
lem surrounding workers' compensation as well as to the
policy problem of how to control workers' compensation
costs for employers and, incidentally, how to improve the
system from the point of view of workers at the same time.
Since attention to the amount of disability in the system
seems to offer much more promise for controlling workers'
compensation rates, and since the level of disability is just as
much a problem for employees and, therefore, their union
representatives, it should be possible to develop a coalition
of business and labor support for certain programs designed
to both reduce costs and improve service.
This political strategy was suggested by the Citizens
League study in Minnesota and adopted by the new ad
ministration of Governor Rudy Perpich, elected in
November 1982, which, incidentally, hired the chairman of
the Citizens League study as Commissioner of Labor and In
dustry to take responsibility for the administration's
workers' compensation legislative program.
The strategy adopted by the administration was to develop
a workers' compensation program which would reform the
workers' compensation system in order to improve service,
reorganize the benefit structure to encourage return-to-work
programs, both on the part of employers and injured
employees, and reduce the costs to the employers by reduc
ing the amount of disability that needs to be compensated.
The point was to change the conception of the system from a
closed, win/lose system where, if premiums are to go down,
benefits must go down, to an open system where a win/win
solution is possible with premium costs going down while in
jured workers enjoy an increase in the sum of benefits and

The Minnesota Experience

23

wages as a result of less frequent and severe duration of
disability.
It was believed that the amount of political warfare that
had been engaged in over the past several years over the
problems in the system was actually contributing to the prob
lem by exaggerating the perception of employers and
employees of the system as an adversary system where
employees and employers are necessarily at odds. Successful
workers' compensation administrators insisted on the
necessity of good employer-employee relationships and a
mutual sense of trust in order to accomplish effective
rehabiliation and return-to-work programs, particularly in
the case of serious or difficult injuries such as back condi
tions.
Although major reform legislation was adopted by the
legislature7 incorporating the concepts recommended by the
administration, a major part of that political strategy, that
of getting business-labor agreement in support of the
changes, was a failure, at least in part. The state's major
labor organization actively opposed the legislation, at least
its key provision, and few other labor organizations were
willing to come forward in any public way to support the
legislation. At first, however, prospects seemed much better.
The initial strategy was begun by seeking out a wide variety
of key leaders among business, labor, insurance, legal,
medical, and rehabilitation groups and trying to sell the con
cept of a reorganization of the system based on good activist
management like that of Wisconsin and a redesign of the
benefit structure which would maintain overall benefit levels
but provide increased incentives for employers to provide
return-to-work programs and for employees to accept jobs
offered. The relatively good credibility of the recent studies
of workers' compensation and the implications of their
analyses of the nature of the Minnesota problem were par-
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ticularly helpful in gaining business and insurance support
for the administration strategy.
The studies were viewed with a great deal more suspicion
by organized labor, but preliminary agreement with the
strategy of developing a business-labor compromise pro
posal was obtained from that quarter as well. Various service
groups involved in workers' compensation, i.e., defense at
torneys, rehabilitation consultants, medical personnel, and
so on, were particularly receptive to the approach suggested
by the administration with the exception of the Trial
Lawyers Association, which viewed proposed changes in
benefit structure with suspicion.
In an attempt to follow the Wisconsin model, the
Workers' Compensation Advisory Council was reactivated
and populated with appointments representing key leaders
from business, labor and insurance groups as well as a
sprinkling of expertise from the medical and legal com
munities. This group spent many hours working over detail
ed proposals to reform and improve administration, in
troduce nonadversarial means of resolving disputes and pro
vide more objective means for establishing compensation for
permanent partial disabilities. This commission was not,
however, able to face in any constructive way the very dif
ficult benefit issues that most students of workers' compen
sation felt needed to be addressed in order to accomplish a
major reform of the system. The public nature of the ad
visory council forum, combined with the high degree of
hostility and mistrust engendered by recent bitter political
battles, seemed to make it impossible for the Advisory Coun
cil to come to grips with these issues.
As a result, talks were opened between a key spokesman
for business and a key spokesman for labor in an attempt to
put together a compromise package on the benefit issues that
would make the rest of the compromise being worked on by
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the Advisory Council acceptable to both sides. These talks
proceeded productively for some time but eventually broke
down over a fundamental quandry in the political positions
of the two groups. Labor felt obliged to resist any benefit
cuts but was prepared to make moderate compromises if it
could accomplish in the same legislation a state compensa
tion insurance fund. Business was vigorously opposed to the
idea of a state compensation insurance fund but was willing
to consider it if substantial benefit reform was offered.
Labor was unable to face substantial benefit cuts even in
return for a state compensation insurance fund.
The solution proposed at that time by the administration
was a recommendation of the Citizens League study design
ed to be a major reform in the benefit structure without be
ing a major cut in benefit levels. This so-called two-tiered
benefit system (an attempt at a synthesis of the strong points
of wage loss compensation for permanent partial disability
and more traditional schedule-type systems) was first con
sidered of academic interest only. It became clear, however,
that it provided the only possible solution to the fundamen
tal political problem of business demanding major benefit
change and labor unable to agree to major benefit cuts.
Talks proceeded on the details of the two-tiered benefit
structure system for some time, with most parties hopeful
that some solution could be reached. At one point most peo
ple believed an agreement over the whole package had been
reached, but when the parties sat down the next morning to
ratify the agreement, it turned out that labor was not
prepared to accept the two-tiered system without a further
substantial benefit increase which was clearly unacceptable
to the administration as well as to business and insurance in
terests.
It was widely believed at that time that vigorous opposi
tion to the two-tiered benefit structure system from the
plaintiffs' attorneys was instrumental in convincing labor of
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the inadvisability of supporting that concept. Although in
vited by the administration to participate in the development
of the two-tiered system, plaintiffs' attorneys refused and in
stead fought it vigorously, mainly by lobbying key leaders in
organized labor. Although AFL-CIO leaders denied being
influenced by attorney pressure, it was well known that the
key labor spokesman had been embarrassed two years earlier
when trial lawyers used their wide influence in local unions
to attack a business-labor compromise bill.
Even without labor support, business groups approached
the administration and offered to support the administra
tion's compromise package as a balanced approach to solv
ing the workers' compensation problem. The governor and
significant majorities in both houses in Minnesota are
Democrats, and it was believed that even though a com
promise could not be reached with labor, any legislation
would have to be perceived as moderate and friendly to labor
in order to have a chance at passage.
As a matter of fact, the administration-sponsored legisla
tion with the support of business and insurance groups as
well as the medical association and other support organiza
tions, not only passed both houses by overwhelming votes,
but actually received a majority of the Democratic votes in
each house as well as all of the Republican votes. Some
smaller union groups expressed public and private support
for the so-called compromise legislation, including the most
radical steelworkers' union on the Minnesota Iron Range,
home territory of Governor Perpich.
Although labor vigorously opposed the two-tiered system
for compensating permanent partial disability, they did con
tinue to support the rest of the bill, including some modest
benefit reductions, and the state compensation insurance
fund which passed in separate legislation. Although the bat
tle to pass the legislation was extremely hard-fought and at
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times quite bitter, there seemed to be a general agreement to
avoid tampering with the noncontroversial sections of the
bill as long as the political dispute could be limited to the
two-tiered system. As a result, the product of the Workers'
Compensation Advisory Council, even though not formally
agreed on by them, was maintained essentially intact.

The Two-Tiered System for Compensating
Permanent Partial Disability
The most controversial and unusual aspect of the legisla
tion finally passed in Minnesota was the new two-tiered
system for compensating permanent partial disability which
developed out of the Citizens League study of workers' com
pensation completed in 1982. The system attempts to be a
synthesis of the advantages of wage loss systems and tradi
tional schedule systems for compensating permanent partial
disability.
In my view, a view ultimately shared by the Citizens
League study committee which I chaired, the most compel
ling arguments for wage loss systems are the equity
arguments raised against schedule systems. Studies of the
amount of workers' compensation benefits paid as com
pared to actual economic losses in wages and medical costs
by various workers in certain states have clearly shown that
some employees are compensated much more than their ac
tual economic loss while others are compensated much less.
This inequity tends to be consistent in that those employees
with the most serious injuries and the highest economic
losses are paradoxically those who are most undercompen
sated by typical schedule systems.
On the other hand, rehabilitation experts argue that
systems for compensating disability of any sort tend to con
tribute to the degree of disability by reducing the normal
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economic incentives for return to work. Schedule systems
seem to offer an advantage over wage loss systems in that
they discontinue the dependency relationship between the
worker and the insurance company at the earliest possible
opportunity. That minimizes the effect of compensation on
functional overlay and incentives for return to work.
Schedule systems also minimize the necessity for insurance
companies to maintain relatively large numbers of open
reserves against the potential of future wage loss, a very ex
pensive proposition in the current insurance rating system.
Wage loss systems are also touted as reducing litigation by
eliminating the attraction of large lump-sum payments to
litigants and their attorneys.
These claims have not been established in practice as yet.
It is still too early to assess the impact of wage loss on
Florida's litigation problem. Michigan and Pennsylvania,
two states which have had wage loss systems for some time,
have not enjoyed low litigation rates although the litigation
problems in those states may be, in part, the result of socioeconomic factors. Litigation rates tend to be higher in more
heavily industrialized, urbanized areas as compared to
socially conservative rural areas. 8 Nevertheless, wage loss
has not resulted in low litigation rates in those states. It can
be argued that the ongoing dependency relationship between
the insurance company and the claimant inherent in the wage
loss system creates an endless source of reasons for litiga
tion. If the only way of preventing that litigation is by not
providing adequate money to support fees for the claimant
to hire expert help, that is not a fair way to control litigation.
The state that has the best success at avoiding litigation,
given its socio-economic makeup, is probably the State of
Wisconsin, with a relatively high degree of industrialization
and a startlingly low litigation rate. 9 The Wisconsin system
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benefits from a very detailed set of disability schedules which
avoid litigation over degree of disability by minimizing the
grounds for dispute over degree of disability.
The Minnesota two-tiered system for compensating per
manent partial disability attempts to resolve the equity issues
raised against scheduled systems by wage loss supporters.
John Burton, for example, has shown that in Wisconsin,
Alabama and Florida (before wage loss), with systems
similar in structure to permanent partial disability systems,
workers with more serious injuries tend to have their actual
economic losses less well-compensated than those with less
serious injuries. The new Minnesota system attempts to cor
rect this equity problem by distinguishing between minor and
serious injuries, and by distinguishing between those workers
who are able to return to employment quickly and easily and
those who are unable to do so.
Litigation control is accomplished through authority of
the Department of Labor and Industry to develop detailed
disability schedules to eliminate causes for dispute.
Testimony from the medical community indicates that
disputes over degree of disability tend not to reflect disputes
over diagnoses but rather differences in medical opinions
over what disability results from a given medical condition.
The Medical Association is providing substantial support to
the Department in developing schedules which will list
specific conditions (e.g., laminectomy with good result—15
percent) by the effective date of the Act—January 1, 1984.
The system provides better equity for more serious injuries
through a sliding scale of compensation for degree of
disability (see appendix 1). As a result, 60 percent disability
of the body pays substantially more than four times as much
as 15 percent of the body.
In addition, the employer is liable for a lower permanent
partial disability award if he makes the employee a suitable
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job offer within 90 days after the date of maximum medical
improvement. The job offered need not be the employee's
old job, but it must meet rehabilitation standards which in
clude such aspects as permanency, benefits, salary levels and
so on. The basic rehabilitation test is that the new job help
the employee to recover an economic status as close as possi
ble to the one that he enjoyed before the accident. Tem
porary partial disability payments to make up partial wage
loss are available indefinitely. The job offered need not be
with the old employer. Any job found by the employee dur
ing a 90-day period after maximum medical improvement
qualifies.
If the job offer is made within the prescribed time period,
the employee is entitled to an impairment award which is
somewhat smaller than the current permanent partial
disability award. The impairment award is based on a dollar
amount for the whole person, with no difference resulting
from differences in wage levels. This provides the same com
pensation for a rich person's hand as a poor person's hand if
each is able to return to his old job or another job like it.
If the job offer is not made during the prescribed time
period, the employee is entitled to a substantially larger
economic recovery benefit which is based on the degree of
disability and his wage at the time of the injury. That benefit
vests on the expiration of the 90-day period and the
employee is entitled to it regardless of whether he finds a job
or not in the future.
On the other hand, either the impairment or the economic
recovery benefit is paid to the employee as a lump sum only
when he goes to work (the impairment benefit when he ac
cepts the job offer, the economic recovery benefit when he
finds a job on his own). If the employee does not choose to
go to work for whatever reason, he begins receiving either
award as a weekly benefit replacing temporary total disabili
ty payments.
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Under the old Minnesota system, temporary total disabili
ty benefits continue for an unlimited period of time as long
as a worker suffers disability as a result of his injury. This
gives Minnesota, in effect, a wage loss system in addition to
a fairly generous schedule system. Cost control is only ac
complished by insurers working with employees to make sure
that they continue to make a diligent effort to seek work.
Lack of cooperation with a rehabilitation plan or lack of a
diligent effort to seek work is grounds for termination, but
suits over termination of benefits are frequently lost by
employers and insurers. This system results in a constant
train of cutoffs followed by litigation followed by reinstate
ment followed by cutoffs, making effective rehabilitation
unlikely and contributing to the relatively high incidence of
permanent total disability and the relatively long duration of
temporary total disability in Minnesota as compared to
Wisconsin.
The new two-tiered system replaces the stick of the
employer's threats to cut off benefits with the economic in
centive of lump-sum payment when the employee finds a job
on his own. Rehabilitation services are available to the
employee during that time, but the insurance company no
longer has any substantial economic interest in forcing the
employee to look for work. The employee's incentive to look
for work is the same as the incentive which makes most of us
work—simple financial gain.
The details of the Minnesota two-tiered benefit system are
discussed in more detail in the Appendices.

Other Major Provisions in Minnesota Legislation
Medical Monitoring System
To get control of medical costs and medical utilization
under the workers' compensation system in Minnesota, a
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substantial system of medical monitoring has been establish
ed based on peer review systems in use in other sectors.
A panel consisting of medical providers, employer
representatives, employee representatives, and the general
public will review charges for medical services as well as
utilization of those services, and relative quality of clinical
results, and establish standards which will serve as maximums for what insurance companies will be required to
reimburse. Providers who are found to be abusing the
system, either by overcharging or overtreating without good
clinical results, will be disqualified from reimbursement by
the system.
Medical testimony over degree of disability in litigated
cases will be submitted by report only unless the workers'
compensation judge orders the doctor to testify in court.
Standardized medical report forms will be designed which
provide the information necessary to determine where the in
jury fits in the disability schedules to reduce the need for
substantial judgmental issues to be considered in court.

Mandatory Rehabilitation in Minnesota
Under the new law, insurers will be required to do an
assessment of whether there is a need for rehabilitation after
60 days of lost time in the ease of most injuries and 30 days
of lost time in the case of back injuries. A study of the
rehabilitation system had shown that a number of fairly
serious back cases were going one to two years before being
referred to rehabilitation as a result of conservative treat
ment practices by inexperienced providers. Any employee
who is not able to return to his former job will be entitled to
rehabilitation services. When there is a dispute over primary
liability, rehabilitation services will be provided by the state
and charged to the insurer if primary liability is established.
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Nonadversarial Methods
of Resolving Disputes
Substantial increases in staffing of the Department of
Labor and Industry patterned after staffing levels in Wiscon
sin will provide much more extensive assistance to injured
employees, employers and claims adjusters who require help
under the new law. Department employees, both compensa
tion specialists and rehabilitation specialists, will be trained
in mediation techniques so that they can help to resolve
disputes. Departmental attorneys who had filed claims peti
tions against employers on behalf of employees will be phas
ed out over a period of years and replaced with nonadversarial support for injured workers. Employees whose
disputes with insurance companies cannot be resolved by
normal departmental procedures will be referred to a new
full-time mediation department which will attempt to ac
complish settlement. Settlement judges will examine claim
petitions submitted for cases where settlement out of court
seems probable, and will require the parties to come in to set
tlement conferences even before the normal pre-trial con
ferences. The major emphasis upon nonadversarial methods
of resolving litigation is intended not only to avoid the cost
associated with litigation but also to avoid the bitterness
engendered by adversarial methods and their resulting
detrimental effects on rehabilitation and return-to-work pro
grams.

Deregulation of Workers' Compensation
Insurance Rates
Effective January 1, 1984, there will be no further state
regulation of workers' compensation rates. The new system
is essentially a "file and use system" similar to the regulation
system for other lines of insurance in Minnesota. This
deregulation is a result of a phased-in process that began two
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years ago as a result of 1981 legislation. The Workers' Com
pensation Rating Association (Minnesota's industrysupported rating bureau) will not be permitted to publish
proposed rates. Normal anti-trust laws will apply to the in
surance industry in spite of federal exemptions, and infor
mation available from the Rating Association will be limited
to pure premium determinations. Competition between in
surance companies under partial deregulation has already
resulted in substantial discounts to more attractive
employers. It is widely believed that the increased competi
tion resulting from deregulation will encourage insurers to
experiment in rehabilitation and return-to-work programs,
as well as to reward those employers who are successful with
such programs with lower premiums.
There is considerable evidence that these effects are pre
sent already. Testimony from employers to legislative com
mittees in 1983 indicated that a wide variety of discount
plans are being offered by insurers in an attempt to gain
market share. Over 20 insurers have filed plans offering dis
counts of from 5 to 20 percent off manual rates, and more
are expected to do so.
Conclusion
There is no question that it is easier politically for organiz
ed labor to oppose reforms in workers' compensation
systems designed to control costs. Workers' compensation is
a complicated technical area, and most laymen assume that
costs and premiums are directly linked. Although that is not
necessarily true, as the experience in Wisconsin has clearly
shown, it is certainly easier for labor to oppose those changes
which offer promise of reducing costs. Such opposition has
the side effect of increasing the credibility of the legislation
with businessmen who also assume that benefits must be cut
in order to save premium dollars.
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In spite of the relatively acrimonious political debate over
workers' compensation in Minnesota, there is some reason
to believe that the initial strategy of developing a rapproche
ment between business and labor may still be possible. The
Workers' Compensation Advisory Council is being con
sulted extensively by the department in the development of
administrative rules to implement the new act, and there is
some reason to hope that the substantial improvements in
service to injured workers may win friends in organized
labor as the act becomes effective.
The two-tiered system may be of some interest to students
of workers' compensation in other states as an attempt to
meet the equity issues so correctly raised by wage loss pro
ponents as well as providing a system which minimizes its
contribution to the total disability to be compensated.
Even if the theory of the two-tiered system is sound, it may
not work unless case law decisions are consistent with the
philosophy of the new system. Having noticed that previous
Supreme Court decisions relied heavily on a law review arti
cle by Senate Counsel after the passage of the major 1979
legislation, the Department of Labor and Industry is prepar
ing a detailed law review article with a wide variety of
hypothetical cases in order to provide guidance both for
practitioners in the field as well as (we hope) for judges faced
with difficult precedent-setting decisions. 10
It is hoped that the new system will offer a way that the
state can provide a generous system of compensation for in
jured workers at a cost which permits its employers to be suf
ficiently competitive with their counterparts in other states,
that they can maintain the jobs for those employees, both
before and after they have been injured.
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Appendix 1
Overview of the 1983 Workers' Compensation Law
H.F. No. 274*
This summary deals with the major provisions of Minnesota Laws 1983,
Ch. 290, the amendments to Minnesota's Workers' Compensation Law.
The 1983 amendments are intended to restructure and redistribute
benefits, to improve the administration of the system, and to lower the
workers' compensation costs of Minnesota employers. A schematic of
events and benefits is presented in appendix 2.

Permanent Partial Disability
Sections 44-64. Economic recovery compensation and impairment com
pensation replace permanent partial disability benefits and eliminate
temporary total benefits after maximum medical improvement is reach
ed. Whether impairment or economic recovery is payable for permanent
partial disability depends on whether the employer makes a job offer
meeting statutory criteria. Impairment compensation is paid if a job of
fer is made; the payment is a lump sum if the offer is accepted, and is
weekly if the offer is rejected. Economic recovery compensation is paid
weekly if no job offer is made. The total economic recovery compensa
tion payable is intended to be greater than the lump-sum impairment
compensation, creating an incentive for the employer to make a job of
fer. The new system does not become effective until the Commissioner of
Labor and Industry has promulgated rules for establishing the percent
age of loss of function to a body part. Greater detail is provided in the
section-by-section analysis which follows.
Section 59. Economic recovery compensation for permanent partial
disability is payable where no suitable job offer has been made within 90
days after the employee has reached maximum medical improvement or
has completed an approved retraining program. Temporary total com
pensation cannot be paid concurrently with economic recovery compen
sation. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3p.
Section 44. The amount of economic recovery compensation is 66 2/s per
cent of the weekly wage at the time of injury, subject to the statutory
*This summary was prepared by Joan Volz, vice president and general counsel, Workers'
Compensation Reinsurance Association.
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maximum. The number of weeks of compensation is determined by
multiplying the percent of disability to the body as a whole by the
number of weeks set forth in the new statutory schedule. The new
schedule is presented in appendix 3. For example, a 25 percent disability
is multiplied by 600 weeks to give 150 weeks of compensation. A 100 per
cent disability is multiplied by 1,200 weeks, giving a maximum of 1,200
weeks of economic recovery compensation. The amendment does not
become effective until the Commissioner of Labor and Industry has
adopted rules scheduling the percent of disability to the body as a whole
caused by the loss of particular members. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd.
3a.
Section 60. Economic recovery compensation is paid weekly. If an
employee who is receiving economic recovery compensation returns to
work for at least 30 days, remaining economic recovery benefits are paid
in a lump sum. The periodic payments are not subject to the annual ad
justment of Minn. Stat. § 176.645. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3q.
Section 48, 49, 65. Impairment compensation for permanent partial
disability is payable where a job offer meeting the statutory criteria has
been made. Temporary total compensation cannot be paid concurrently
with impairment compensation.
The job offer must be made within 90 days after the employee has reach
ed maximum medical improvement or has completed a retraining pro
gram. The job offered must be within the employee's physical
capabilities and must result in an economic status similar to that which
the employee would have had without the disability.
The job offer may come from an employer other than the employer at
the time of injury. If the job differs from the employee's old job, the of
fer must be in writing. The employee must act upon the job offer within
14 days. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3e. The job offer may be made
prior to reaching maximum medical improvement. Minn. Stat. §
176.101, subd. 3f. Whether a job offer meets the statutory criteria may
be resolved in an administrative conference. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd.
3v.
Section 45. The amount of impairment compensation is determined by
multiplying the percent of disability to the body as a whole by the
statutorily scheduled amount. The new schedule for impairment com
pensation is listed in appendix 4. For example, a 25 percent disability is
multiplied by $75,000, giving an impairment amount of $18,750. A 100
percent disability is multiplied by $400,000, making the maximum im-
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pairment compensation $400,000. As with economic recovery compensa
tion, the impairment compensation provisions are not effective until
rules have been adopted. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3b.
Section 50. Impairment compensation is paid in a lump sum 30 days after
the employee returns to work. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3g.
Sections 47, 48, 59, 63. Temporary total compensation is payable until 90
days after reaching maximum medical improvement or ending an ap
proved retraining program, whichever is later. It ceases when the
employee returns to work. If there is no permanent partial disability, the
employee receives 26 weeks of economic recovery compensation in the
absence of a job offer. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subds. 3d, 3e, 3p, 3t(b).
Sections 55-57. Refusal of a job offer affects the type and timing of
benefit payments. Impairment compensation is paid weekly rather than
in a lump sum, although a subsequent return to work entitles the
employee to a lump-sum payment of the balance. Temporary total com
pensation ceases. The amount of the weekly impairment compensation is
equal to the amount of temporary total compensation the employee was
receiving. An employee who refuses a job offer but later works at a lower
paying job cannot receive temporary partial compensation or rehabilita
tion. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subds. 31-3n.
Section 58. Permanent total disability entitles the employee to both per
manent total benefits and impairment compensation. The impairment
compensation is paid at the same interval and amount as permanent total
compensation. Impairment compensation ceases when the total amount
to which the employee is entitled has been paid. As under current law,
permanent total compensation under the new law is paid weekly and is
subject to annual escalation and the social security offset. The weekly
impairment compensation, however, cannot be escalated or offset by
social security. Permanent total compensation cannot be offset by any
impairment or economic recovery compensation the employee may have
received. Economic recovery compensation ceases when an employee is
determined to have permanent total disability. Minn. Stat. § 176.101,
subd. 3o.
Sections 52, 54, 63. Monitoring period compensation is payable to an
employee who accepts a job offer, returns to work, and is later laid off
because of economic conditions. The layoff must occur prior to the ex
piration of the monitoring period, which begins to run upon the
employee's return to work. The amount of weekly monitoring period
compensation is equal to the amount of weekly temporary total benefits
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the employee was receiving. The compensation is paid during the balance
of the monitoring period, or, if it is less, the monitoring period minus im
pairment compensation already paid. For this purpose, impairment com
pensation is converted to weeks by dividing it by the employee's compen
sation rate for temporary total disability. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subds.
3i and 3t(a). Where the layoff is due to seasonal conditions, the employee
may continue receiving temporary partial disability compensation and
may, if eligible, also receive unemployment compensation. Minn. Stat. §
176.101, subd. 3k.
Sections 46, 62. The maximum impairment and economic recovery com
pensation payable cannot exceed the maximum payable for a disability to
the body as a whole. After receiving maximum economic recovery or im
pairment compensation, an employee is entitled to further economic
recovery or impairment compensation only if a greater permanent partial
disability is sustained. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subds. 3c and 3s.
Section 63. The maximum economic recovery compensation is at least
120 percent of the impairment compensation that would be received if
impairment compensation were payable. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3t.
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Appendix 2
Summary of New Temporary Total, Permanent Partial,
and Permanent Total Benefits
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Appendix 3
Schedule for Economic Recovery Compensation
Multiply Percent of Disability by Scheduled Weeks
Weeks of
Percent of
compensation
disability
600
0-25
640
26-30
680
31-35
720
36-40
760
41-45
800
46-50
880
51-55
960
56-60
1,040
61-65
66-70
71-100

1,120
1,200
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Appendix 4
Schedule for Impairment Compensation
Multiply Percent of Disability by Scheduled Amount
Percent of
disability

Amount

0-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-55
56-60
61-65
66-70
71-75
76-80
81-85
86-90
91-95
96-100

$ 75,000
80,000
85,000
90,000
95,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
240,000
280,000
320,000
360,000
400,000
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The 1982 Changes in California
Alan Tebb
General Manager
California Workers' Compensation Institute

Background
It is my pleasure to discuss the 1982 amendments to the
California workers' compensation law. The planning com
mittee has asked that I summarize those changes and
describe why the law was amended, the short term results of
the legislated changes, and the potential long-range conse
quences of that action.
It is inappropriate, however, to characterize the 1982
legislative changes in California as "reform," the central
theme of this conference. There were changes in the Califor
nia law—indeed, massive changes—but with minor excep
tions, the 1982 amendments did little to make the California
compensation program more equitable, effective, or effi
cient. Instead, my remarks might more properly be labeled,
"The Political Realities of Workers' Compensation
Reform," an object lesson in what happens when employees
and employers abrogate their responsibility to participate in
the establishment of public policy in the workers' compensa
tion arena.
By way of background, the California law extends to
about 600,000 employers employing 11 million covered
45
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workers. Compensable injuries approximate 1.3 million an
nually, of which 375,000 are "disabling," i.e., one or more
days lost time, and of that latter number perhaps 70,000
work injuries result in permanent residual impairment. The
state agency's role has been essentially passive, in large part
limited to adjudication after a dispute has developed, and
the bulk of its $30 million-plus budget pays for 120 referee
teams resident in 23 offices throughout the state. Given this
emphasis, litigation is pervasive in the California workers'
compensation system, marked by a high degree of involve
ment by attorneys and forensic physicians.
California Workers' Compensation Institute research
studies establish that the costs of workers' compensation
litigation in California exceeded $350 million in 1981. That
total includes attorneys' fees for employee and employer, ex
penses of medical testimony and other direct out-of-pocket
costs incident to the litigation, but excludes benefits paid to
workers. My purpose in mentioning this is to underscore the
interests of other players when workers' compensation
reform is considered, and the difficulty in making any
changes that are perceived to affect these interests.

The 1982 Amendments
The 1982 amendments to the California workers' compen
sation law were the first substantive changes in 10 years.
There had been some procedural modifications during this
period, but attempts at major revision were frustrated by the
balance of power among the special interest groups. The
practical effect was that organized labor's drive for higher
benefits could be stalled by the employer lobby unless labor
accepted the employers' demand for a quid pro quo, which
labor was unwilling to do. Similarly, changes sought by the
employer community were not possible without including a
substantial benefit package, and the dominant employer
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groups thought the price too high. Both labor and manage
ment had veto power and exercised it.
The balance shifted in 1982, due more to the entry of some
additional players, specifically, the trial bar, than any
change in political power, and the result was enactment of a
workers' compensation benefit-reform package. The most
visible feature of the package is a sharp increase in benefits.
Over a two-year period, benefit levels will rise $660 million,
while costs to employers will increase by nearly $1 billion.
That represents the largest benefit increase in California
history, if not the largest benefit increase in the history of
workers' compensation.
I have no particular problem with the size of the benefit in
crease, but I do have concerns with its distribution. More
than 90 percent of the new benefit dollars will increase in
demnity levels for permanent partial disability—the benefit
sector most fraught with litigation and, accordingly, most
fruitful for trial attorneys and forensic doctors—while leav
ing maximum weekly benefits for total disability, both tem
porary and permanent, woefully inadequate (i.e., less than
60 percent of the statewide average wage). The 1982 benefit
increases magnify the maldistribution of California workers'
compensation benefits, a maldistribution I feel confident in
predicting will require wrenching change within the current
decade.
The reform part of the package—the quid pro quo for the
employer community—included enactment of a provision re
quiring factual issues in litigated claims to be determined by
a preponderance of the evidence. Trial judges and the ap
pellate courts over time had accepted the liberal construction
imperative too literally in the view of many employer
observers, and this change was an attempt to restore balance.
The law still must be construed liberally, but the facts must
be determined by a preponderance of evidence.
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Second, the legislation provided a statute of limitations on
the vocational rehabilitation benefit. In 1974 California
became the first state to adopt mandatory vocational
rehabilitation as part of its workers' compensation law. The
1974 enactment, however, was something less than a
paragon of clarity, and there was a substantial question as to
whether the benefit was open-ended or had to be exercised
within a specific period of time after the injury. The benefitreform package opted for certainty.
The most important of the reform elements was a buttress
ing of the exclusive remedy doctrine. A series of court deci
sions held that the employment relationship did not shield an
employer from civil liability if the employee's injury was at
tributable to the employer's other "capacity," e.g., as a
manufacturer. Thus, a California employee injured in the
course of employment by a defective product produced by
the employer was entitled to workers' compensation benefits
and, additionally, could bring a civil action for damages
against the employer as a manufacturer. The 1982 legislation
overturned these holdings, restoring the reciprocal conces
sions of employees and employers to their original
balance—and, according to one estimate, saving employers
$1 billion in additional costs over the next five years.
That in general was the package. It resulted from the in
terplay of a number of factors:
No significant benefit increases in 10 years;
A series of adverse appellate decisions;
The growing political influence of the trial bar;
The decline in the legislative muscle of the employer
community and, to a lesser degree, statewide labor;
• Sharp differences in the priorities of the principal
players and an inability to resolve the differences.
•
•
•
•

It was an interesting exercise in pragmatic politics, albeit one
which requires looking backward.
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The Politics of Workers' Compensation
In 1971, the dominant employer organization and the in
surance industry were instrumental in negotiating a signifi
cant revision to the California workers' compensation
system through an "agreed bill" that granted substantial
benefit increases in exchange for major concessions by
organized labor. Five years later, in 1976, another modest
reform package was enacted, but this time the negotiating
parties were limited to organized labor and the insurance in
dustry. No employer group was actively involved in the ef
fort—not because employers didn't have a stake, but mainly
because of a collective inability to agree upon any pressing
reforms in exchange for increased benefit levels.
What had happened in that five-year period? At the risk of
oversimplifying, the major change was the end of involve
ment by chief executive officers and other senior manage
ment types representing employers. For whatever reason,
responsibility for social insurance issues was transferred to
middle level managers and, ultimately, the entire subject was
left in the hands of the institutional employer organizations.
At the same time employers who had been legislatively active
(and their trade associations) lost their senior professional
lobbyists to death and retirement and thus lost their input to
legislative leaders.
Organized labor's role also underwent a change with the
legislative emergence of local unions. Many of the locals
relied heavily upon the advice of local compensation
claimants' attorneys whose interests, vis-a-vis labor's, were
not always consonant in workers' compensation issues.
Statewide labor was still a force, but its positions were in
creasingly muted or neutralized by what local unions were
telling legislators.
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Some indication of the shifting in relative strength came in
1977 when the insurance industry secured passage of con
troversial legislation that altered the allocation of liability
among multiple defendants in cumulative injury and occupa
tional disease claims over the combined opposition of the
employer community and organized labor. The key to its
enactment may have been that the economic interests of the
trial bar were unaffected.
By the 1980 session, the employer community had become
inflexible. In theory, employers continued to adhere to the
strategy of no benefit increases without commensurate
reform. In reality, however, they had become entrenched
around a policy of no change whatsoever. So the insurance
industry and statewide labor, with the governor's office as
marriage broker, began discussions leading to a major
overhaul of the compensation system. The package included
substantial benefit increases (totaling only about half the
cost of the 1982 bill) in exchange for building more certainty
and objectivity into the determination of permanent partial
disability, and thereby sharply curtailed the system's
dependence upon lawyers and forensic doctors. It was a
game but unsuccessful effort because the trial bar, working
through local union officials, was able to present the ap
pearance of a divided labor camp; because employers were
unwilling to pay higher benefits; and because of the
unreconstructed egos of some of the parties.
Nevertheless, the pressure continued to build. The courts
began to respond to benefit inadequacy through a series of
decisions eroding the exclusivity of workers' compensation.
During the 1981 legislative session, the employer and insurer
lobby introduced a measure to restrict the courts' expanded
definition of the "dual capacity" doctrine. It passed the
Senate, but the Assembly Speaker would not permit its
passage without a large increase in benefits, a price
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employers were unwilling to pay. In November, after the ses
sion recessed, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Bell vs. Industrial Vangas, 30 Cal 3d 268, which
transmuted dual capacity into double jeopardy for
employers.
As the 1982 session opened, the real parties weren't talk
ing. Organized labor refused to consider an amendment to
the dual capacity issue "because that's not a comp issue."
Employers were reluctant to negotiate with labor without
dual capacity being considered, and were unwilling to
negotiate directly with the trial bar because of the magnitude
of the benefit increases being advanced. That left the in
surance industry and the trial bar as the only players with an
ostensible community of interest, so their discussions began.
Originally the insurer representatives functioned as sur
rogates for the employer groups, keeping them informed of
developments while attempting to convince them of the need
for movement, given the Assembly Speaker's commitment to
pass a benefit bill—with or without other reforms. Over
time, however, the insurer-employer relationship broke
down because of a series of economic decisions made by the
employer association:
• First, a decision not to support the permanent partial
disability reforms proposed by the insurance industry
(and bitterly resisted by the trial bar) because the ex
pected savings couldn't be quantified. Throughout, the
thinking seemed to be, "If benefits are increased by X
million dollars, we need Y million back in reforms."
• Second, a decision to forego legislative repeal of the
dual capacity doctrine and wait until the next session
when the political climate might be more favorable, a
wistful vision that never came to pass. This approach
conflicted with the priorities of compensation insurers
which felt, I think correctly, that the real reason for
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backing off was the high price tag associated with dual
capacity repeal.
• And, finally, the employer trade associations were
limited in the amount to be included in the benefit
package. They couldn't make the ante. And in politics,
as in poker, the rules dictate that when you fold your
hand, you don't get any more cards.
With employers dropping out of the game, a series of
amendments were drafted by the remaining principals, incor
porated into an Assembly-passed bill in the Senate, and
enacted into law within two weeks after surfacing.

The Impact of the Amendments
The immediate results—good news or bad news, depen
ding upon your perspective—include containment of the
dual capacity doctrine and removal of a threat to the legal
underpinnings of the workers' compensation system, a
change that will result in significant savings in loss and legal
costs. The limitation on the vocational rehabilitation benefit
similarly will save some unnecessary expense and permit in
surers and employers to close files. Binding the trier of fact
to a preponderance of evidence test has the potential to make
workers' compensation more professional by introducing a
standard of judicial objectivity where one didn't exist
before. And the upgrading of disability benefits may con
vince the civil courts that it isn't necessary to create legal fic
tions to accomplish substantial justice for injured workers.
On the other hand, California employers are faced with
escalating costs, upwards of 30 percent, without any mean
ingful substantive change in the workers' compensation law.
More litigation, fueled by higher benefit levels, can be ex
pected. Minimum weekly benefits were adjusted dramatical
ly and the result may be longer periods of disability for the
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low wage earner. Moreover, the higher benefits may signal a
change in benefit utilization and an acceleration in the asser
tion of so-called "stress" claims once the economic recovery
is achieved.
The long term consequences of the 1982 legislation are
more difficult to divine. All I can do is speculate, but I
believe there will be at least two observable effects—or
noneffects, as the case may be.
• First, no real changes in the California workers' com
pensation system in the immediate future, despite the
extant inequities, leakages and waste. Legislators have
an excuse—"we dealt with comp last year"—and many
find compensation legislation politically unattractive.
Absent an agreed bill, comp is a "bad" vote for one or
more of a legislator's constituencies. Legislators
generally would prefer to avoid the issue unless they're
pushed, and there's no one pushing them—which brings
me to my second, equally dour projection.
• There will be no meaningful changes until the real
stakeholders—organized labor and employers—initiate
the movement.
Organized labor, in many instances, has permitted its role
to be co-opted by attorneys. The complexities of workers'
compensation are little understood by labor leaders, par
ticularly at the local union level, and there is a tendency in
what appears to be a highly legalistic system to yield to the
"expert," that is, a lawyer. The interests of organized labor
in workers' compensation legislation are not always conso
nant with the interests of claimants' attorneys, protestations
of the latter to the contrary notwithstanding. Unfortunately,
the dichotomy hasn't been recognized, much less
acknowledged.
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The other factor in the formula, the employer community,
is at least as troubling. Today employers complain about be
ing frozen out of the legislative negotiations, but the truth is
that they voluntarily isolated themselves. Unless they
demonstrate a willingness to participate in the political arena
where the workers' compensation policy decisions are made,
the legislative decisions will continue to be dictated by the
scorekeepers and linesmen.

Conclusion
Obviously, my remarks are pertinent only to California. I
suggest, however, that the 1982 experience in California may
have application to other jurisdictions, and the differences
are more of degree than substance.
If there is a lesson, it is that workers' compensation is a
statutory creature. Changes, no matter how well-reasoned
and researched, cannot be accomplished in academe, by
studies, or by the imprimatur of blue ribbon commissions.
Real change requires legislative action in a political environ
ment. Until that lesson is accepted, reform—that is, im
provement—of the workers' compensation system cannot be
realized.

Two Rounds of Workers'
Compensation Reform in Michigan
H. Allan Hunt
Manager of Research
W. E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research

By the mid-1970s Michigan's workers' compensation
system for workers disabled by injuries or illnesses arising
out of their employment was approaching a crisis. 1 Relative
to neighboring states, Michigan's workers' compensation in
surance rates had risen alarmingly after 1958 according to
John Burton's employer cost statistics. Table 1 shows that
from 1958 to 1975 workers' compensation insurance rates
nearly tripled in Michigan, while they doubled in Illinois and
Ohio and held relatively constant in Wisconsin and Indiana.
Over this period Michigan's rates rose from 20 percent below
average to 35 percent above average for the 28 states for
which consistent data are available. 2
Of course there was another reason to be considering
reform in workers' compensation systems in the mid-70s.
The Report of the National Commission on State
Workmen's Compensation Laws was published in 1972. The
appointment of that National Commission had reflected
substantial congressional dissatisfaction with the status of
55
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state workers' compensation systems. The Commission,
after due consideration, found that state laws generally did
not provide adequate, prompt, or equitable systems for com
pensating disabled workers. It offered a set of 84 recommen
dations for the improvement of these systems; 19 of these
were deemed so important as to be "Essential Recommenda
tions." The National Commission urged that if the states
had not complied with this restricted list by July 1, 1975,
Congress should take steps to guarantee compliance. 3
Table 1
Standardized Insurance Manual Rates for
Workers' Compensation Insurance, East North Cental States
1958-19753
State

1958

1962

1965

1972

1975

Illinois ........
Indiana .......
Michigan ......
Ohio..........
Wisconsin .....

.514
.410
.450
.627
523

.609
.398
.694
.813
.556

.624
.430
.715
.820
.603

.657
.385
.914
.885
.505

1.002
.417
1.238
1.109
.581

Region average15
28-state average0

.505
.571

.614
.630

.638
.676

.669
.692

.869
.914

SOURCE: John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Cost for Employers, Research
Report of the Interdepartmental Workers' Compensation Task Force, Vol. 3, U.S. Depart
ment of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, June 1979, table 12, p. 28.
a. For 45 selected insurance classes, weighted by U.S. payroll distribution. Entries repre
sent the standardized percentage of payroll that would be charged for workers' compensa
tion insurance coverage,
b. Unweighted.
c. Unweighted average for 28 states where NCCI data are available for each of the listed
years.

This reform atmosphere was reflected in the appointment
by William G. Milliken of a Governor's Workmen's Com
pensation Advisory Commission in 1974 to: (1) review the
report of the National Commission and other federal in
itiatives in the occupational safety and health area;
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(2) evaluate the adequacy of the Michigan system; and
(3) "recommend legislation to alter or amend the existing
laws to ensure a just, fair and equitable workmen's compen
sation program for Michigan." 4 Unfortunately, it did not
prove to be a feasible assignment. The letter of transmittal
from Dean St. Antoine, Chairman of the Governor's Ad
visory Commission, began with the following paragraph:
It is with regret that I must inform you that your
Workmen's Compensation Advisory Commission
has been unable to reach agreement upon a com
prehensive set of recommendations for the im
provement of workers' compensation in Michigan.
Every effort was made, but the obstacles were in
surmountable. 5
In essence, the report of the Commission consisted of a
discussion of the issues, accompanied by recapitulations of
the positions adopted by employer and employee represen
tatives. The document does not suggest a "near miss" on
negotiating workers' compensation reform; the parties were
far apart on issues ranging from the definition of disability
to the statute of limitations.
After this failure to negotiate reform in face-to-face con
frontations on the Governor's Advisory Commission, ef
forts to forge a labor/management compromise on workers'
compensation reform continued in the legislature. The most
notable of these was Senate Bill 1285, introduced in
December 1977 after extensive private discussions. This
bipartisan proposal made a broad attack on alleged abuses
of workers' compensation as well as altering the benefit for
mula to reflect after-tax earnings and instituting a retrospec
tive inflation adjustment plan. However, the compromise
coalition eventually collapsed when the Senate Labor Com
mittee began amending the package, and no legislation was
enacted. As will be seen later, this bill contained many of the
elements of the eventual reforms enacted in 1980. 6
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Assessing the situation as it existed in 1978, a number of
observations can be made. First, the cost of workers' com
pensation in Michigan was very high. According to Pro
fessor Burton's results displayed in table 2, Michigan ranked
3rd highest nationally in standardized workers' compensa
tion insurance rates for manufacturing employers, more
than 80 percent above the average figure for other states. For
a group of general employers (table 3), Michigan ranked 7th
highest, 44 percent above average. 7
Manual rates are sometimes viewed with suspicion in
Michigan because of the large proportion of self-insureds in
the state. In recent years, approximately 40 percent of in
demnity payments have been made by self-insured
employers. For that reason, it is also valuable to look at total
benefit payments in the workers' compensation programs.
Table 4 shows that according to data published by Daniel
Price of the Social Security Administration on actual
benefits paid by all employers in the various states, Michigan
ranked 12th in benefit cost relative to payroll, 21 percent
above the average for the nation as a whole. 8 The cost of
workers' compensation in Michigan was undeniably high.
Ironically, Michigan's benefit schedule in 1978 was quite
low. In that year, the maximum benefit available to
Michigan claimants (if their earnings and number of
dependents were sufficient to warrant it) was $171 a week.
As shown in table 5, this maximum benefit ranked 28th
highest among the states, i.e., lower than the median. When
the maximum benefit is expressed as a proportion of each
state's average weekly wage, Michigan actually ranked even
lower, 39th in the nation. 9 Results from the Michigan Closed
Case Survey (an Upjohn Institute data base of 2,200
Michigan workers' compensation cases closed in 1978) con
firm these figures on income replacement levels in
Michigan's system. The average weekly payment case in 1978

Reform in Michigan

59

received 58 percent of weekly earnings, not the nominal 67
percent called for in the statute. 10 Thus it is also undeniable
that benefit levels in Michigan, at least as measured by week
ly payments, were low.
Table 2
Adjusted Manual Rates (per $100 of payroll)
25 Types of Manufacturing Employers-1978

Rank

Adjusted
manual rate
($)

Ratio to
unweighted
average

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

36
20
5
25
6

1.674
2.857
4.548
2.479
4.241

0.60
1.03
1.64
0.89
1.53

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida

23
21
19
1
4

2.590
2.816
2.906
6.612
4.701

0.93
1.02
1.05
2.39
1.70

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

28
8
30
27
47

2.366
4.149
2.307
2.431
0.910

0.85
1.50
0.83
0.88
0.33

Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

33
35
17
13
18

1.734
1.690
3.064
3.302
2.929

0.63
0.61
1.11
1.19
1.06

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

26
15
3
7
39

2.476
3.226
5.035
4.167
1.561

0.89
1.16
1.82
1.50
0.56

State
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Table 2 (continued)

Rank

Adjusted
manual rate
($)

Ratio to
unweighted
average

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

41
31
45
29

1.452
2.280
1.290
2.364

0.52
0.82
0.47
0.85

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

12
16
9
46
-

3.484
3.138
3.836
1.077
-

1.26
1.13
1.38
0.39
-

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

22
11
2
24
14

2.697
3.542
6.430
2.563
3.262

0.97
1.28
2.32
0.92
1.18

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

34
42
32
10
37

1.717
1.414
1.918
3.557
1.640

0.62
0.51
0.69
1.28
0.59

Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

38
43
44
40
-

1.637
1.349
1.313
1.519
-

0.59
0.49
0.47
0.55
-

State

Unweighted average

2.771

SOURCE: Calculated from Martin W. Elson and John F. Burton, Jr., "Workers' Com
pensation Insurance: Recent Trends in Employer Costs," Monthly Labor Review, March
1981, table 1.
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Table 3
Adjusted Manual Rates (per $100 of payroll)
79 Types of Employers-1978

Rank

Adjusted
manual rate
($)

Ratio to
unweighted
average

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

35
11
4
25
5

1.062
2.070
3.023
1.560
2.655

0.62
1.20
1.75
0.90
1.54

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida

28
19
1
3

1.486
1.755
4.181
3.086

0.86
1.02
2.42
1.79

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

29
6
24
22
44

1.340
2.650
1.608
1.649
0.585

0.78
1.53
0.93
0.96
0.34

Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

30
34
16
13
21

1.286
1.064
1.816
1.934
1.671

0.74
0.62
1.05
1.12
0.97

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

26
17
7
8
32

1.526
1.776
2.493
2.296
1.096

0.88
1.03
1.44
1.33
0.63

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

41
20
42
27

0.932
1.692
0.834
1.517

0.54
0.98
0.48
0.88

State
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Table 3 (continued)

Rank

Adjusted
manual rate
($)

Ratio to
unweighted
average

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

12
18
10
43
-

1.983
1.775
2.164
0.680
-

1.15
1.03
1.25
0.39
-

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

15
14
2
23

1.839
1.880
3.772
1.641

1.07
1.09
2.18
0.95

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

36
39
31
9
33

1.055
1.002
1.177
2.220
1.083

0.61
0.58
0.68
1.29
0.63

Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

38
37
40
-

1.039
1.052
0.963
-

0.60
0.61
0.56
-

State

Unweighted average

1.727

SOURCE: Calculated from Martin W. Elson and John F. Burton, Jr., "Workers' Com
pensation Insurance: Recent Trends in Employer Costs," Monthly Labor Review, March
1981, table 1.

Table 4
Workers' Compensation Benefit Costs by State

1978 UI
wage and salary
payments2
($1,000)

Absolute
cost

Rank

Cost relative
to U.S.
average

$84,624
56,924
87,162
56,283
1,246,813

$10,879,577
2,305,023
7,818,303
5,744,458
93,891,538

.0078
.0247
.0111
.0098
.0133

31
1
19
23
10

0.80
2.52
1.13
1.00
1.36

73,789
89,033
16,379
51,138
307,868

10,389,967
13,776,612
2,557,399
3,768,672
26,572,254

.0071
.0065
.0064
.0136
.0116

37
42
44
9
14

0.72
0.66
0.65
1.39
1.18

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

129,879
39,710
29,873
490,010
89,708

17,378,132
3,087,630
2,607,410
53,390,139
22,428,476

.0075
.0129
.0115
.0092
.0040

32
11
15
26
51

0.77
1.32
1.17
0.94
0.41

00
to

Iowa
Kansas

71,457
56,210

9,578,298
7,511,565

.0075
.0075

33
34

0.77
0.77
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State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida

1978 workers'
compensation
payments1
($1,000)
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Table 4 (continued)

State

1978 workers'
compensation
payments1
($1,000)

1978 UI
wage and salary
payments2
($1,000)

Absolute
cost

Rank

Cost relative
to U.S.
average

Reirform
H^

Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

102,594
198,838
44,494

10,392,526
13,786,265
2,906,767

.0099
.0144
.0153

22
8
4

1.01
1.47
1.56

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

133,186
191,494
496,987
173,523
42,074

13,222,553
23,051,196
41,928,554
15,112,317
5,902,652

.0101
.0083
.0119
.0115
.0071

21
29
12
16
38

1.03
0.85
1.21
1.17
0.72

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

92,170
29,403
28,129
50,379
30,914

18,005,281
1,992,955
4,570,370
3,478,725
2,885,609

.0051
.0148
.0062
.0145
.0107

49
6
45
7
20

0.52
1.51
0.63
1.48
1.09

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

268,441
36,638
496,606
93,668
12,856

30,298,748
3,226,503
71,151,726
18,358,568
1,601,984

.0089
.0114
.0070
.0051
.0080

28
17
40
50
30

0.91
1.16
0.71
0.52
0.82

g

O
er
d3'
PS3

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

531,518
82,865
224,398
407,135
36,027

45,356,196
8,859,462
9,290,901
45,071,677
3,172,627

.0117
.0094
.0242
.0090
.0114

13
25
2
27
18

1.19
0.96
2.47
0.92
1.16

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

52,192
9,058
95,890
506,255
28,394

8,799,377
1,528,375
14,723,793
51,710,551
4,057,701

.0059
.0059
.0065
.0098
.0070

46
47
43
24
41

0.60
0.60
0.66
1.00
0.71

Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

10,446
119,615
224,770
125,599
123,333
9,603

1,434,307
16,412,456
14,906,610
6,413,352
17,427,533
1,777,748

.0073
.0073
.0151
.0196
.0071
.0054

35
36
5
3
39
48

0.74
0.74
1.54
2.00
0.72
0.55

$8,086,352

$826,501,418

.0098

Total

SOURCES:
1. Daniel N. Price, "Workers' Compensation: Coverage, Benefits, and Costs, 1979," Social Security Bulletin, September 1981, Vol. 44, No. 9,
table 2.
2. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 41-80, Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1978, Taxable, p. 1, U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.
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Table 5
Maximum Weekly Benefit for Temporary Total Disability-1978

Rank

Maximum weekly
benefit1

UI average
weekly wage2

Maximum weekly
benefit ratio to
UI average
weekly wage

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

40
1
34
51
33

$128.00
607.85
153.85
87.50
154.00

$208.10
394.53
218.43
186.53
243.15

0.62
1.54
0.70
0.47
0.63

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida

25
36
32
2
41

173.60
147.00
154.50
367.22
126.00

226.99
243.61
257.87
264.82
199.41

0.76
0.60
0.60
1.39
0.63

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

46
16
47
3
43

110.00
189.00
109.80
321.50
120.00

209.22
208.00
206.25
259.54
242.65

0.53
0.91
0.53
1.24
0.49

Iowa
Kansas

4
39

265.00
129.06

215.94
211.27

1.23
0.61

State

MiRein
chfoigramn

Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

45
38
5

112.00
130.00
231.72

219.60
229.81
185.77

0.51
0.57
1.25

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

12
35
28
14
49

202.00
150.00
171.00
197.00
91.00

224.14
224.21
288.96
226.97
182.91

0.90
0.67
0.59
0.87
0.50

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

44
17
30
10
20

115.00
188.00
155.00
212.02
180.00

226.20
201.87
199.78
227.34
196.14

0.51
0.93
0.78
0.93
0.92

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

37
26
21
29
22

146.00
172.46
180.00
168.00
180.00

250.31
202.37
259.47
192.30
200.70

0.58
0.85
0.69
0.87
0.90

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

8
42
6
9
23

216.00
121.00
224.16
213.00
176.00

255.64
219.25
232.45
233.96
194.55

0.84
0.55
0.96
0.91
0.90
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Table 5 (continued)

Rank

Maximum weekly
benefit1

UI average
weekly wage2

Maximum weekly
benefit ratio to
UI average
weekly wage

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

27
31
48
50
15

172.00
155.00
100.00
91.00
197.00

192.01
175.99
201.23
230.93
211.85

0.90
0.88
0.50
0.39
0.93

Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

19
18
24
7
13
11

181.00
187.00
175.30
224.00
202.00
211.15

191.88
205.76
251.49
243.84
228.46
241.26

0.94
0.91
0.70
0.92
0.88
0.88

State

SOURCES:
1. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Division of State Workers' Compensation Standards, July 1978.
2. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 41-80, Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1978, Taxable, p. 1,
U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.
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Furthermore, since Michigan had experienced no major
changes in statute while other states had been moving to im
plement some of the National Commission recommenda
tions, Michigan's standing relative to those other states was
steadily deteriorating. In 1972, when the average state com
pliance score with the 19 essential recommendations of the
National Commission stood at 6.9, Michigan had complied
with 11 of the 19, ranking 4th among the states. Table 6
shows that by 1978 the average compliance score had risen to
11.7 and Michigan, still with only 11, had fallen to a rank of
27th. 11
By 1979, even those who might have preferred to do
nothing rather than moving in the direction of reform along
the lines of the National Commission recommendations were
frustrated. There was no shortage of opinions as to what
reforms were needed to cope with Michigan's problems. 12
What was missing was a spirit of compromise, or a feeling of
sufficient urgency to overcome old adversarial attitudes and
patterns.
When the Governor and the legislative leadership an
nounced a joint Workers' Compensation Reform Task Force
in May of 1979, it seemed that the lessons of the past would
enable the Task Force to effectively negotiate around the
shoals of previous failures and bring workers' compensation
reform to reality. Unfortunately it was not to be. Agreement
was reached on changes in the benefit formula and on maximums and minimums, but progress was ended when it could
not be established whether the savings from coordination of
benefits (which employers wanted) would truly offset the
cost of inflation protection (which organized labor sought
for employees). There were recriminations over the available
data and accusations about the fairness of the analysis; more
fundamentally there was insufficient sentiment for com
promise, and neither side could impose its will on the other.
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Table 6
Full Compliance Scores Based on the 19 Essential Recommendations
January 1,1972 through January 1,1980
1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

Mean score
Standard
deviation

6.9

8.6

11.2

11.7

12.1

3.07

3.03

2.96

2.42

2.40

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

2.00
5.50
7.50
2.50
7.00

6.00
5.50
13.50
2.50
7.00

9.00
14.00
11.50
3.50
11.00

9.00
14.00
11.50
8.50
11.00

9.00
14.00
11.50
7.50
12.00

Colorado
Connecticut

10.00
10.50
8.00

11.00
10.50
8.00

12.00
10.50
11.00

12.50
10.75
11.00

16.00
13.75
11.00

Columbia
Florida

11.00
5.00

14.00
6.00

14.00
6.50

14.00
6.50

14.00
10.50

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

5.00
12.00
9.00
4.00
7.00

8.50
12.00
9.00
4.00
7.00

9.50
14.50
9.00
14.00
11.00

9.50
14.50
9.00
14.00
11.00

9.50
14.50
9.00
14.00
11.00

8.50
1.00
6.00
1.50
9.00

11.50
1.00
8.50
1.50
10.00

14.50
9.50
9.50
10.75
13.50

14.50
9.50
11.50
11.25
13.50

14.50
9.50
11.50
11.25
13.50

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

8.50
6.50
11.00
6.75
7.00

10.75
9.00
11.00
8.25
7.00

14.25
9.50
11.00
10.50
7.00

14.25
9.50
11.00
12.50
7.00

14.25
11.50
11.00
12.75
7.00

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska

6.00
3.00
10.25

6.00
14.25
13.00

10.25
14.50
14.00

10.25
14.50
13.50

10.75
15.50
13.50

Delaware
District of

Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
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Table 6 (continued)
1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

6.9

8.6

11.2

11.7

12.1

3.07

3.03

2.96

2.42

2.40

Nevada
New Hampshire

3.00
11.75

8.00
13.75

14.00
18.50

14.00
18.50

14.00
18.50

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

10.50
2.00
9.00
3.00
8.75

10.50
8.00
9.00
6.00
8.75

10.50
8.00
9.00
12.50
13.75

10.50
9.50
10.00
12.50
13.75

10.50
12.50
10.00
12.50
13.75

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico

8.50
4.50
10.50
8.00
11.75

10.50
6.50
11.50
8.00
11.75

16.50
6.50
13.50
13.00
11.75

16.50
9.75
13.50
13.00
11.75

16.50
9.75
13.50
13.00
11.75

Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

10.00
3.00
6.50
2.00
4.50

10.00
4.00
8.50
4.50
9.50

13.50
8.00
9.00
5.50
9.50

13.50
11.00
9.25
8.50
9.50

13.50
11.00
13.25
8.50
9.50

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

8.00
5.00
3.50
10.00
6.00
10.50
7.00

11.00
7.50
7.50
10.00
6.50
10.50
7.00

12.00

12.00
11.75
10.50
9.00
14.50
15.00
9.00

12.00
13.75
10.50
9.00
14.75
15.00
9.00

Mean score
Standard
deviation

7.75

10.50
10.00
14.50
16.00
9.00

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Division
of State Workers' Compensation Standards, January 1981.
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After meeting intermittently from June through December
1979, the Workers' Compensation Reform Task Force col
lapsed as well.
During 1980 there were occasional rumors of progress,
especially when the Democratic Chairman of the Senate
Labor Committee announced that a new coalition of small
business and the AFL-CIO had agreed on a compromise
package. Hearings were held on this package, and it was
reported out by the Committee, but the lack of enthusiasm
from the state's largest employers and its largest union (i.e.,
the auto industry) doomed the effort. Finally, in December
of 1980, the Governor and the legislative leadership held a
series of closed-door meetings and hammered out a minimal
reform package very similar to old S.B. 1285 from 1977.
When this bill (S.B. 1044) was subsequently passed and sign
ed into law without major amendment, the long legislative
log jam in Michigan was finally broken. Round one was at
last completed.
The goal of the 1979-80 effort had been not simply to
reform Michigan's workers' compensation system, but to
make improvements in the system without imposing any
substantial cost penalty on Michigan's already burdened
employers. However, the 1980 package when evaluated by
the actuarial consulting firm of Tillinghast, Nelson & War
ren, was found to meet these goals only for those employers
who purchased commercial insurance coverage. Estimates
were that S.B. 1044 would increase the workers' compensa
tion costs for this group of employers by just 0.7 percent
overall. For larger employers who self-insure the increase
would be in the range of 25 to 35 percent. 13 This uneven im
pact resulted primarily from past inequities in income
replacement rates between high-wage and low-wage workers.
The old benefit formula severely capped weekly benefits for
high-wage workers while sometimes giving more than 100
percent wage replacement to low-wage workers. Thus when
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the benefit formula was rationalized, by making the replace
ment of lost wages at a more consistent rate for many more
workers, employers who had formerly been paying at the
relatively low maximums would experience the most signifi
cant cost increases.
This is demonstrated in table 7, developed from the
Michigan Closed Case Survey. It shows that 98 percent of
weekly payment cases from the big three auto producers
were paid the maximum benefit for their dependency class in
1978. Over 73 percent of other self-insured cases and 52 per
cent of carrier-insured cases also received the maximum
benefit. On the other hand, no big three cases at all received
the minimum benefit while 9 percent of other self-insured
and 22 percent of carrier cases qualified for minimum
payments.
As a result there was a massive outcry from employer
groups throughout the State of Michigan. Insistent demands
for workers' compensation cost reductions became an im
portant part of the political climate in 1981 in many
legislative districts. The pressure from employer groups,
together with the general pro-business swing in the nation
and in the state, resulted in another series of amendments to
the workers' compensation system at the end of 1981; most
of these were designed simply to reduce the cost of workers'
compensation coverage for all employers large and small.
These changes were enacted over the outraged objections of
both the UAW and AFL-CIO.
The reform coalition this time consisted of a unanimous
Republican caucus and a dozen or so "renegade" Democrats
who risked the wrath of organized labor to secure leadership
positions in this round of workers' compensation reform.
The result was that the legislative leadership for the 1981
reforms was almost totally new; the "old hands" at workers'
compensation issues were generally excluded from the pro-

Table 7
Benefit Rate by Insurer Type

Benefit rate

Total
Number Percent

Carrier
Number Percent

Insurer type
Big three
Number Percent

n
Z

Other self-insurers
Number Percent

546
719
2,244

15.6
20.5
63.9

467
551
1,110

21.9
25.9
52.2

0
8
470

0
1.7
98.3

79
160
664

8.8
17.7
73.5

Total
Missing cases

3,509
1,134

100.0

2,127

100.0

478

100.0

904

100.0

Grand total

4,642

Minimum benefit
Two-thirds of wage
Maximum benefit

Chi-square (unweighted) = 197.07** with 4 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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cess. Round two of reform in Michigan thus had a very dif
ferent flavor.
While these two separate reform packages had very dif
ferent objectives and mechanisms of attack, it seems ap
propriate to discuss all the new provisions together to pro
vide a better feel for the magnitude of change enacted in
Michigan's workers' compensation system. Most of these
new provisions went into effect either on January 1 or April
1, 1982. 14

Benefit Formula
The most significant change in the workers' compensation
system is clearly the change in the benefit formula. This will
have a direct impact on claimants and is also the single big
gest cost item of all the reforms. The old benefit formula
provided replacement of two-thirds of gross earnings (in
cluding fringe benefits not continued during disability). The
new law calls for a basic benefit of 80 percent of after-tax
earnings (deductions to include federal and state income tax
and OASDHI taxes). These 1980 changes were amended in
1981 to provide that fringe benefits are to be included in the
calculation of the benefit only if the level of the benefit is less
than the old maximum benefit. 15
Maximum Benefit
The old maximum benefit was two-thirds of the state
average weekly wage (SAWW), but less if fewer than five
dependents were claimed. As noted above, this resulted in a
majority of claimants receiving less than two-thirds replace
ment of their gross earnings in workers' compensation
benefits. 16 The new maximum benefit is set at 90 percent of
the SAWW without regard to dependency. Currently the
number of dependents influences the benefit level only
through its effect on deductions, and thus after-tax earnings.

76

Reform in Michigan

The net result is that most workers who earn more than the
SAWW will qualify for higher benefits than they would have
under the old law.

Minimum Benefit
The old minimum benefits (which were very high due to an
earlier court decision that indexed them along with the maximums) were eliminated. 17 There is now no minimum benefit
for general disability cases; low-wage workers simply receive
80 percent of their after-tax earnings. Exceptions are made
for fatality claims and specific loss claims, where minimum
benefit levels are set at 50 percent and 25 percent of the
SAWW respectively.
Coordination of Benefits
The second most significant area of reform is the coor
dination of benefits between different income maintenance
programs paid for, in part or in total, by the disabled
worker's employer. The basic approach here is to put the
workers' compensation benefit dollar last in the queue in
those cases where multiple benefits are received by the claim
ant. The Michigan approach is very broad; the offset against
other benefits applies to unemployment insurance, other
state workers' compensation benefits for the same condition,
private disability, wage continuation or pension plans, Old
Age and Survivor's Insurance (OASI), and "other" income
maintenance plans. It is also provided that, if and when it
becomes possible again, Michigan's workers' compensation
benefits will be coordinated with federal Disability Insurance
payments.
In each case, the workers' compensation benefit under
Michigan law is reduced by benefits in these other programs
according to the proportion of the benefit financed by
employer payments. Thus in the case of OASI, the employer
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is allowed a credit of 50 percent of the monthly OASI benefit
against the workers' compensation benefit, since the
employer provided 50 percent of the tax payments to the
OASI program. These benefit coordination provisions do
not apply to benefits for specific loss claims, or to payments
from disability pension plans that were in operation previous
to the effective date of the statute. However, the statute
specifically allows that such existing plans may be modified
to allow coordination if the parties wish. These coordination
of benefits provisions are expected to lead to significant cost
savings for Michigan employers, particularly larger
employers with extensive fringe benefit plans.

Retiree Claims
In addition to the coordination of benefits described
above, there was another attack on what many had regarded
as the most flagrant abuse of Michigan's workers' compen
sation system—claims from retired workers. The 1980
package introduced a new presumption of no loss of earn
ings or earning capacity on the part of a claimant who is
receiving nondisability pension or retirement benefits (in
cluding OASI). While this presumption can be rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence, it should help to reduce
claims from retired workers, especially when considered in
conjunction with the offset for other retirement benefits pro
vided under the coordination of benefits provisions.

Inflation Protection
The 1980 reforms also included the addition of a new
retrospective inflation protection plan applying to all cases
with injury dates before January 1, 1980. A state-financed
Compensation Supplement Fund was established for this
purpose. A benefit supplement equal to the increase in the
SAWW (not to exceed 5 percent for any year) is to be paid to
all continuing claims from these years. The benefit adjust-
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ment payments are made by the insurers directly to
claimants, with quarterly reimbursements from the Compen
sation Supplement Fund. This provision is an attempt to
maintain a major share of the original purchasing power of
workers' compensation benefits for existing long term
disability cases. There are no provisions for additional ad
justments in the future for these or other claimants, but the
Director of the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation
is ordered to conduct biannual studies of the general ade
quacy of benefits, specifically including the impact of infla
tion.

Statute of Limitations
Both the 1980 and 1981 reform packages addressed the
statute of limitations under the workers' compensation law.
The old statute of limitations had been rendered ineffective
by a requirement that if the employer did not give notice of
the injury to the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensa
tion, the time period did not begin to toll. The 1980 reforms
resurrected by the statute by striking the employer notice re
quirement and simply providing that the claim must be
entered within two years of the occurrence of the injury, the
date the disability manifests itself, or the last day of employ
ment. The 1981 reforms recomplicated this by adding a new
requirement that the employee must give notice to the
employer within 90 days of the injury. If this requirement is
not met, the employer can contest the case on the grounds
that the failure by the employee to provide notification of
the injury prejudiced the employer's defense against the
claim. 18
Definition of Disability
Both packages also attacked the issue of the definition of
disability. The 1980 reforms contained language designed to
tighten up on claims involving mental disabilities, conditions
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resulting from the aging process, and social and recreational
injuries. The 1981 reform went much deeper into the
substance of the law. It defined disability in terms of a
general field of employment, rather than a specific job as in
the old law. It also separated the issue of disability from that
of wage loss in an attempt to further tighten eligibility stan
dards. There is a new provision for disqualification if the
claimant refuses a bona fide offer of reasonable employ
ment. A significant complication was introduced concerning
reemployment and favored work. If an injured employee has
returned to work for more than 100 weeks and subsequently
loses that job, only partial disability payments can be paid.
If fewer than 100 weeks of new work experience are obtain
ed, full disability eligibility is maintained on the basis of the
original job.
There is also a requirement for notification to the
Michigan Employment Security Commission when disabled
workers are unemployed. That agency is directed to give
priority treatment to such referrals. The intent was to urge
partially disabled workers to return to work, but the statute
is so complex it will take some sorting out by the courts.
Meanwhile, the entire definition of disability section is slated
to expire at the end of 1984.

Logging Industry
The 1980 package expanded the Silicosis and Dust Disease
Fund to the Silicosis, Dust Disease, and Logging Industry
Compensation Fund (emphasis added). This imposes a
$12,500 insurer liability limit on each workers' compensation
claim arising in the logging industry. Any benefits above
$12,500 per claim will be paid by the Fund rather than the in
dividual insurer. This has the effect of transferring the
burden of expensive claims in the logging industry to the
general employer population, since the Fund is financed by
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proportional assessment on all employers. This special fund
is due to expire at the end of 1985.

Medical Costs
Another complicating provision is the imposition of a
medical cost regulation scheme into the workers' compensa
tion system. The Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensa
tion is directed to establish fee schedules for medical treat
ment under the workers' compensation statute. In addition,
they are to monitor the performance of providers of service
and establish utilization review procedures for individual
workers' compensation cases. This reflects the interest of
one of the major Democratic participants in the 1981 reform
coalition.
Redemptions
The 1981 reform package also included an outright pro
hibition of redemptions (compromise and release set
tlements) for any petitions filed after January 1, 1984. In
asmuch as 70 percent of all litigated cases are redeemed in
Michigan (settled with a lump sum), this provision could
have enormous significance for the way the Michigan
workers' compensation system really works. 19 No one is yet
able to predict what this will mean, however.
Rate-making
Last, but by no means least, reform of the workers' com
pensation insurance procedures should also be reported here.
Even though this provision was not enacted until 1982, it was
under discussion with the 1981 reforms, and everyone
understood it to be a part of the total package. The
legislature mandated a 20 percent rollback for the 1982
policy year in the average manual premium rate for workers'
compensation insurance coverage in the state. They also
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directed that Michigan should move to "open competition"
in workers' compensation insurance rates effective January
1, 1983.
Michigan's system provides for a "file and use" procedure
with a new public body, the Workers' Compensation Data
Collection Agency, responsible for collecting and
disseminating the pure premium data to be used by the in
dividual insurance companies to set their rates. Undoubted
ly, the way that workers' compensation insurance carriers do
their business will be altered; it is not clear exactly what im
pact this change in procedures will have on the system as a
whole. Those who promoted this reform felt that it would
lead to lower prices for workers' compensation insurance as
the competitive pressures of the free market were felt in the
insurance industry. 20
There are many smaller changes that have been omitted
from this discussion, some of which may turn out to have
greater significance than is evident now. The most important
point to make may be that many of these enactments will de
pend on court decisions for their specific content. Obviously,
it will be some years before the true impact of this entire set
of reforms will be apparent. At the moment, one must be
content to point out the significant changes that have been
accomplished: (1) the benefit structure has been rationalized
considerably; (2) some of the most serious abuses cited by
employer groups have been addressed; and (3) part of the
loss imposed on the long term disabled by inflation in the last
decade has been restored.
Early in 1982, commercial insurance carriers through the
Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection Association
of Michigan (WCRIAM) filed for a rate reduction of 22 per
cent in the average workers' compensation premium. As was
discussed earlier, this was not the result of an actuarial
evaluation, but was WCRIAM's response to a legislatively
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mandated rollback of at least 20 percent in premium levels.
Thus it is not at all clear that this represents the actual an
ticipated cost impact of the reforms.
Even if some of the reforms turn out to have been illadvised, any errors were the natural by-product of the
pressure-cooker legislative environment that was required to
break the stalemate that had developed in Michigan. It is to
be hoped that necessary updating will not prove as difficult
in the future. Taken as a whole, the two rounds of reform
appear to constitute a significant improvement in Michigan's
workers' compensation system.
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The Politics of
Workers' Compensation Reform
John H. Lewis
Attorney
Coconut Grove, Florida

According to the program, this presentation deals with
legislative efforts concerning workers' compensation laws in
the States of Louisiana and New Mexico. Both of these states
are a long way from Rutgers, and may appear to have little
relevance to a program the avowed purpose of which is to
focus on the workers' compensation systems of three north
eastern states. Relevance may now appear to take more of a
beating, since it is my intention to also discuss the States of
Florida, Delaware and Alaska, which are at least as remote,
in the political if not the physical sense, from the states
which are to be the subject of our concern as the two
previously mentioned.
Actually, the topic is better described as "Workers' Com
pensation Reform and How to Get It." Now, reform is a dif
ficult subject to discuss, since it is to a great extent in the eye
of the beholder. It may not even be excessively cynical or
egotistical to say that reform is what I do, as opposed to
whatever it is the rest of you do. However, to avoid con
troversy, for today's purposes, the term "reform" will refer
to significant changes in a workers' compensation law in85
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tended to provide long term solutions to perceived defects or
deficiencies in the system—as opposed to what is best
described as tinkering, which, unfortunately, is the usual
legislative response to workers' compensation problems.
Given this unilateral change of topic, the relevancy of the
states previously mentioned becomes apparent. All of these
states have been involved, or are involved, in workers' com
pensation reform efforts. The patterns of success versus
failure, and the events which led to the respective conclu
sions, are remarkably similar in these states, and as a result
highly instructive for any state wishing to institute the long
and difficult process of workers' compensation reform.
As distasteful and/or redundant as it may be to many of
you, the first portion of our discussion will deal with the no
longer recent Florida reform effort, which culminated with
the legislation passed in 1979. Most aspects of the Florida ex
perience have been talked to death and, fortunately, need
not even be mentioned. What is of importance is how the
forces in Florida arrived at what they believed to be a solu
tion to the state's workers' compensation problems.
Most people in the compensation community are aware of
the events of the 1979 Florida legislation session, and some
are aware of the efforts made during the 1978 session, which
resulted in some temporary patchwork and the famous
"sunset" provision, which, theoretically, would have
eliminated Florida's workers' compensation law in 1979 if
new legislation had not been passed. Very few are aware of
the years of work which went into preparing the state and the
legislature to deal with workers' compensation on a mean
ingful basis. A significant amount of research was perform
ed by a wide variety of groups and individuals, including Dr.
John Burton, Associated Industries of Florida, the Florida
Association of Insurance Agents, and myself. This research
furnished the bedrock for the reform effort, since it provided
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everyone involved in the process with factual information as
to what was going on in the system. In addition, the Florida
Workers' Compensation Advisory Council had spent several
years looking at the compensation system and discussing the
problems of all the interests involved, each of which was
represented on the Council by individuals who were initially
or took the time and trouble to become knowledgeable in
workers' compensation matters. The Council itself was
somewhat remarkable in that its activities were devoid of the
public posturing and recriminations which often mark
similar attempts at compromise. As a result, the Council was
able to deal with substance, rather than illusion, and virtual
ly all of its recommendations were adopted without internal
dissent.
Another ingredient in the process was education. Through
the activities of the trade groups mentioned above and
others, numerous newspaper articles, including an influen
tial series by the Miami Herald, a major legislative con
ference, and many months of study by a legislative joint
committee, the general public and many members of the
legislature were made aware of what the compensation
system was all about and how it was performing or failing to
perform. Most important, and perhaps by coincidence, one
member of each house of the legislature became extremely
well-educated as to the workings of the system, as well as the
various reform proposals and their probable impact. As a
result, they were able to provide leadership in legislative
discussions and to keep the basic reform program together
during the various committee and floor debates and through
the critical late-night negotiating sessions.
The final component of the reform process was the
cooperation between labor and management, which in terms
of political reality left the legislature and the governor with
little choice when the agreed upon package came to them for
approval, despite the opposition of other, usually powerful,
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interests. This coalition may not appear unique, but to the
extent to which it was based upon the best interests of the
two groups involved to the exclusion of peripheral interests
in the compensation system, it is unique. It is interesting to
note that many of the critics of the new Florida system fault
the act of cooperation by the AFL-CIO leadership, rather
than praise it. In reality, organized labor in Florida gained
far more than it lost in 1979, and certainly benefited from
the coalition, as compared to what most likely would have
happened had the bill been structured through normal con
frontation politics. In fact, if one compares what has hap
pened to the workers' benefit package as the result of less
publicized "reform" efforts in other states, the result in
Florida looks better and better for the injured worker.
By way of comparison, we can look at the State of
Delaware, which, in spite of significant political effort and
what I believe to be the best of intentions on the part of most
of those involved in the reform effort, repeatedly turned
back a proposal far more financially generous than that
which was passed in Florida, as well as in other states.
Delaware's reform effort grew out of an official study
commission, which, near the end of its deliberations, became
aware of the new Florida law and decided to emulate it. Un
fortunately, the effort did not include, nor, for reasons of
time, could it, the research and education portion of the
Florida experience. In addition, the proponents of the bill
which was drafted were faced with the knee-jerk reaction of
some interest groups to any proposal that even looked like
Florida's, which, as you well know, has been the subject of
some of the least informed criticism of any workers' com
pensation law in history. As a result, numerous mistakes
were made which, in retrospect, virtually guaranteed the
failure of the reform effort. Certain interest groups were
made to appear to be the source of all of the system's prob
lems, which insured their opposition. Because of the lack of
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factual information about the system and its shortcomings,
broad support for change did not develop. The business
community split, primarily as the result of internal political
maneuvering. Organized labor was equally as divided,
despite early support for the proposal, apparently because of
outside influences having little to do with the merits of the
legislative proposal. Finally, there was virtually no workers'
compensation expertise within the legislature, so that op
ponents were able to sway votes by actually asserting that the
only thing wrong with the system was the fact that insurance
companies were taking in around $50,000,000.00 a year in
premium, and paying out about $5,000,000.00 in benefits.
The lack of knowledge on the part of many of those involved
in the legislative debate was highlighted by Senate floor
debate, which included fierce opposition to portions of the
bill which merely recodified existing law, the very law which
they claimed was virtually fault free. All of these problems
and mistakes were probably aggravated by a political deci
sion to go right back to the legislature after the bill's initial
defeat instead of taking a year or two to do the basic work
required to make a strong case for reform and for the pro
posal. Against this background of success and failure we can
now look at and evaluate the recent developments in Loui
siana and New Mexico.

Louisiana
From a political standpoint, Louisiana is a very interesting
state in that virtually all aspects of government are highly
politicized, with administrative appointments on many levels
and virtually all legislative action based on interest group
pressure and power politics. Contrary to popular belief,
organized labor plays a significant role in this process and
often can lay claim to "owning" one or the other house of
the legislature, or both, as well as the governor's office.
Please understand that the use of the term "own" is in the
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political sense, and not the literal sense. The extent to which
this state of affairs affects the actions of those involved in
the political process was brought home to me on one of my
first trips to the state, for a meeting with a broad spectrum of
the business community. Several representatives of major,
national employers expressed reservations about a proposal
to create an administrative body to run the compensation
program, on the grounds that at some point the political
power held by "the other side" would result in a totally
employee-oriented administration. Although this view was
eventually rejected, it does illustrate how even major players
in the political arena can be inhibited in efforts to improve a
workers' compensation system.
The Louisiana effort, which was successful, parallels
Florida in many respects. The impetus for reform came from
the state's major business organization, the Louisiana
Association of Business and Industry (LABI). Unlike most
business associations, LABI is headed by an individual with
a strong background in research. As a result, any legislation
sponsored by LABI in areas such as workers' compensation
is based upon well-documented facts, rather than opinion or
gut-reaction. This was extremely important in two respects.
First, no public pronouncements were made until the dimen
sions and cause of the problem were known, and until the ef
ficacy of proposed solutions had been investigated. Through
this process, it was found that the perceived source of the
dual problems of high costs and low benefits was not the
area of permanent total disability benefits, but rather the
usual villain—permanent partial disability benefits. In addi
tion, the viability of an income replacement system as a
reform measure was confirmed, and the inadequacy of the
court-administered system, which resulted in virtually no ad
ministration and an overwhelming reliance on compromise
and release agreements to keep the system under control, was
demonstrated.
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Second, when the time for public and legislative debate
came, the LABI position could be defended on a factual,
rather than emotional, basis. As will be seen, this factor may
have been the most critical in the entire process.
Once it was determined that problems truly existed, and
that there were reasonable solutions available, LABI and the
business community committed themselves to a true reform
effort. Although there was legislation introduced rather
quickly without the long lead time employed in Florida, it
was with the understanding that it would almost certainly
take two legislative sessions (in reality it also took a special
session) in order to achieve the final goal. However, the first
session could also be used as part of the educational effort,
and it was. With the strong financial and political support of
the business community, the entire project was handled on a
professional basis, with the emphasis on establishing to the
satisfaction of the voters and the legislature the need for
change and the validity of the proposed reform. Both were
accomplished, partly because of research efforts previously
described, and partly because LABI did not take the all too
common approach of simply proposing a reduction in
benefits as a way to reduce costs. Instead LABI arrived at a
package of benefit and administrative changes geared
towards reallocating the premium dollar to areas in which it
was needed, avoiding duplication of benefits and decreasing
the cost of litigation. The latter was most significant in that,
unlike Florida, Louisiana was unable to put together a coali
tion of labor and management. While I cannot even attempt
to speak for organized labor in Louisiana, there is a widely
held belief that because of inaccurate comparisons of the
Louisiana proposal and the then recent Florida reform, as
well as long-standing ties with the trial bar which did stand to
lose if the proposals passed, labor could not, from a political
standpoint, afford to be perceived as having cooperated or
agreed with any management position. As a result, all at-
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tempts at compromise failed, and unfortunately the benefit
package eventually enacted into law was smaller than that
which could have been obtained through negotiation.
As you must have already surmised, the first legislative
proposal did not pass. As an aside, this "failure" was, in
retrospect, for the best, since later drafts were, in my opin
ion, far superior and better suited for local conditions.
However, the attempt did serve its purpose, since it brought
the issue of workers' compensation to the forefront and rais
ed the issues which would have to be faced. During the 10
months between legislative sessions, additional educational
efforts were made, with particular emphasis on the members
of the legislature. These efforts included a special legislative
conference with speakers from both inside and outside the
state, as well as special efforts with key legislators and poten
tial sponsors. As was the case in Florida, several members of
each house became totally conversant with the problems and
the proposed solutions, thereby maintaining control of the
debate process and influencing other, less knowledgeable
legislators.
The modified package passed the House on its second at
tempt, in the regular session of 1982, but was amended many
times in a labor-dominated Senate committee. Interestingly
enough, virtually all the amendments were stripped by the
full Senate, which was generally considered to be highly sym
pathetic to the labor/trial lawyer position. However, the
operative word was "virtually," since the failure to strip all
of the amendments meant that the bill had to go to con
ference committee. There, as a result of a weekend of
political maneuvering, a compromise was reached without
the consent of the business community and announced ap
proximately 15 minutes before the end of the legislative ses
sion. The compromise included language which had not been
previously offered, in areas not directly related to the reform
effort (third-party actions) apparently in the belief that
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LABI and the other backers of the bill would "settle" for
what was sure to pass. To their credit, the business com
munity stuck to its program of no action without a complete
understanding of all implications of the proposal. Since this
was impossible given the short time involved, the sponsors
asked the representatives who supported them to kill the bill,
and this was done. Once again, in retrospect this was the cor
rect step to take, but the decision was not unanimous, and
LABI was accused by some legislators and newspapers of be
ing "greedy." In fact, LABI had already compromised the
bill to a considerable extent on the basis of what might best
be described as informed consent. The attempt to add new
features at the last minute was a mistake from all stand
points. Last minute changes, if not properly evaluated, tend
to come back to haunt the authors, and experience in other
states and in federal programs such as the Longshore Act
clearly demonstrates the danger in this type of maneuver.
The final act in this drama was played out between July
1982, the end of the legislative session, and January 1983,
when a special session was called by the Governor to deal
with workers' compensation and unemployment compensa
tion. During that period, pressure on the legislature for
enactment of the bill became almost overwhelming, and it
became clear that the LABI proposal, or something very
similar, was going to pass or some legislators would not be
returning for a new term. In addition, the research and
educational efforts which had been undertaken began to pay
off to an even greater extent, with several key legislators who
normally might have opposed a management position
becoming active supporters. This included a Senator whose
opposition had caused much difficulty in the past and whose
eventual support did much to influence others, given the fact
that he was a trial lawyer and well-respected in such matters.
The bill was passed on January 14, 1983, and signed into law
a short time later.
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The new Louisiana workers' compensation law is substan
tially different from the old. For the first time there is an ad
ministration, with reporting of accidents and benefits
payments, an enforceable penalty structure, and an informal
litigation reduction system which in effect requires media
tion prior to entering the court system. The maximum week
ly benefit was increased, permanent total disability redefined
and limited to avoid the payment of such benefits to those
actually working or able to work, and a restructuring of the
permanent partial disability system to rely primarily on in
come replacement benefits, with significant impairment
benefits payable in the absence of income loss for those with
schedule injuries in excess of 50 percent loss of use of the
member, and a meaningful vocational rehabilitation pro
gram, mandatory for all parties.

New Mexico
New Mexico is perhaps the best example of a state in
which reform has stalled, despite the best of intentions on
the part of the participants. Unlike the discussions of the
other four states in this paper, much of what I will say con
cerning New Mexico is based upon hearsay, inference and
after-the-fact talks with those involved from the very begin
ning of the process, since I was only involved for the final
two months in early 1983. The effort began with the
deliberations of an official study commission of several years
duration. It appears that some of the first problems arose
during those deliberations and may have sealed the fate of
the legislation which was eventually introduced. It has been
stated that there has never been an effective study commis
sion. I must take issue with that statement, since I served
with two which led to the enactment of major legislation, but
I can sympathize with the feelings expressed. New Mexico's
experience may show why. Please keep in mind that this por
tion of the evaluation is based in part on the recollections
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and perceptions of some of the parties, some of which are
totally at odds with others. It appears that representatives of
the two interest groups directly involved in the workers'
compensation system—management and labor—were not
well versed in the operation and structure of the compensa
tion system. This is not a criticism. In fact it is to be expected
in most instances since the leaders of business and labor
organization usually have backgrounds and responsibilities
which make it extremely unlikely that they will be able to
come into a study commission with the requisite knowledge
to make major decisions concerning the system. In the past
this problem has often been "solved" by each side using
their lawyers as representatives. Once again without
necessarily implying criticism, it is a fact that the interests of
employers and defense lawyers in the compensation system
are not necessarily the same, nor are the interests of
employees and their lawyers. Because of this, much of the
early work of a study group should focus on educating those
of its members without workers' compensation expertise.
This was not done in New Mexico, nor does it appear to be
the case in most other states. As a result, it is my belief that
the labor representatives were left in the position of having
to accept either what was being told to them by the other side
(particularly the insurance industry, where the employer ex
pertise eventually came from) or what they were told by
representatives of the claimants' bar. The reasonable in
security brought about by this situation was probably
heightened by an interesting phenomenon which occurs dur
ing the work of most study groups—the impact of
"observers." Although there is usually an effort made for
study commissions to be balanced in their representation of
interest groups, their meetings are often attended by large
numbers of association representatives from business and
the insurance industry. This can give, and in New Mexico did
give, the impression of labor being outnumbered. In addi-
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tion, large numbers of people make it very difficult to have
frank discussions, and often lead to more public posturing
than meaningful discussions of real problems.
From the management standpoint, it appears that there
was somewhat of an educational effort through the in
surance industry and their attorneys. As an aside I might
mention, in all fairness, that there did appear to be a
legitimate effort made by the representatives of the insurance
industry to be candid and fair in their dealings with manage
ment, without any of the conflicts of interest of which the in
dustry is often accused. However, it seems that the real
educational effort was to a great extent limited to selling a
rather narrow legislative program, which left management
locked in to a somewhat inflexible program. Since any major
change in the proposed bill would have required a timeconsuming educational effort, it became virtually impossible
for the employer/insurance representatives to seriously con
sider proposals made after the legislative session began, even
though some of them may have been acceptable and might
have led to passage of a reform package.
Another factor which eventually led to defeat was a
perhaps inadvertent politicizing of a major issue, the perma
nent partial disability benefit package. Once again, an in
come replacement system was being considered. Such pro
posals are automatically tagged as "Florida wage loss,"
which is a distinct negative to most trial lawyers, and some
labor leaders, and immediately puts proponents on the
defensive. Unfortunately, some in the business community
talked about the proposal in terms which could lead one to
believe that it was punitive and antilabor, when in fact there
was no reduction in the total amount of benefits to be paid to
injured workers, but rather a redistribution. This put the
leadership of organized labor in an extremely difficult posi
tion, since accepting an otherwise favorable package could
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lead to charges of having given in to management interests.
Like politicians, labor leaders are elected and cannot afford
to be put in such positions if they wish to remain as leaders.
This result might have been avoided if more of the local
leadership had been brought into the process at an earlier
date, had the benefit of a short course in workers' compensa
tion and the effect of the proposed legislation, and been
given an opportunity to have any and all questions answered.
I do not know if this was possible from a political stand
point, but it would seem that more input from the rank and
file in all states might give the leadership broader support for
meaningful change.
As can be seen, the education process, or the lack of it, has
significance throughout the reform effort. Once again, it ap
pears that the New Mexico proposal was hampered by lack
of education on another level—that of the legislature. As I
mentioned previously, it is my belief that a major legislative
effort requires the informed backing of several members of
each house. Not only does this help to sway votes and avoid
debate over nonissues, it also provides a mechanism for
resolving conflict, since both sides are often better able to ac
cept a compromise if it originates, or at least seems to
originate, from a member of the legislature rather than from
a spokesman for an interest group. This cannot be ac
complished unless the legislative advocate knows what he or
she is talking about. It appears that for a number of reasons,
the legislation in New Mexico did not have the benefit of this
type of assistance.
The final missing ingredient was research. It is amazing
how little is known about the operation of most workers'
compensation systems, particularly the important items such
as who is getting the benefits and what it takes from a pro
cedural standpoint to get them. In the absence of factual in
formation, what one tends to get from the experts testifying
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at legislative hearings is myth rather than reality. What is
even more disconcerting is the fact that the same myths are
heard in every state, which makes for a lot of boredom for
those of us who do business in more than one state and must
attend what amounts to the same hearings, with what appear
to be the same witnesses, in a number of states. When you
have heard the same misstatements of fact in two different
states five thousand miles apart in the course of two days,
you tend to lose faith in the legislative process, or at least in
those who should know better than to say the things they do.
Neither side has a monopoly in this area, but in New Mexico
it was the opponents of the reform proposal who dominated
the arena, with the usual tales of how the only thing wrong
with the system was insurance company profits, how it was
humanly impossible for an administrative structure to han
dle minor problems more efficiently than the courts, and
how an income replacement system, no matter how it was
structured, was not only unworkable but virtually
guaranteed an 80 percent reduction in benefits paid to in
jured workers. None of these arguments was new, at least
not in other states, and with a year of preparation could have
easily been answered. It is possible that the fight was already
over by the time these arguments were raised in legislative
hearings (where the bill was killed), but had that not been the
case a factual defense would have been extremely helpful.

Conclusion
There should be a point to all this narrative and there is. In
fact, there may be several. I would like to start with mention
of the comment made earlier by Alan Tebb, that he would be
willing to pay in order to have someone from the labor side
to talk with. I believe that as that statement was in
tended—as an attempt to change an unfortunate but not
unexpected reality, rather than a criticism—it is true, but
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does not go far enough. It is good to have someone to talk to
on the labor side, but it is better to have an educated public,
business community and legislature, also. It goes without
saying that this means that the subject of discussion is fact,
rather than fancy, and that the necessary research is included
as part of the education, negotiation and compromise pro
cess. It also assumes a good faith effort by the parties, ex
cluding, to the greatest extent possible, controversies and
maneuvering unrelated to the merits of the workers' com
pensation program. As history now shows us, it is virtually
impossible to pass decent legislation without most of these
factors being present, particularly research and education,
and the more of these elements that come together, the better
the changes for real success.
This brings us to Alaska. Several years ago I had the good
fortune to come in second or third, I don't know which, in
the competition for a contract to investigate the ramifica
tions of open competition in the workers' compensation in
surance market. This loss enabled me to enter into a contract
with the State of Alaska to study and report on all aspects of
its workers' compensation system, including what happens
to injured workers after they receive permanent partial
disability benefits. Alaska is an excellent research subject in
that it has all the potential for real problems, due to extreme
ly high benefits (now approximately $1,000.00 for income
benefits), highly seasonal employment and a relatively tran
sitory workforce. At the same time, the state has a very small
population, around 400,000, so that it is possible to look at
the universe of workers' compensation cases rather than a
small sample. And it has a compensation community which,
for the most part, is willing to listen and learn. I am quite
proud of the resulting report and would like to take a minute
to quote a small, highly relevant portion of it.
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As can readily be seen, workers* compensation is
a complex subject and not an easy one for
employers, labor representatives, and an otherwise
burdened legislature to deal with in an intelligent
manner. Typically, matters are made worse by vir
tue of the fact that no matter how good their inten
tions, many interest group representatives do not
have a working knowledge of the compensation
system, and are familiar primarily with the 'horror
stories' that can be developed about any system.
The nature of the political process, in which
legislative hearings seem to demand highly emo
tional testimony, results in hearings which offer
legislators and the public little in the way of educa
tion, but instead rather extreme and emotional
arguments having little to do with the normal
operation of the compensation system, and having
even less to do with the real problems and issues at
hand. During the 1982 legislation session, a coali
tion of employer and labor representatives
developed a workers' compensation package which
was in part enacted into law. The package was
developed not as the result of confrontation politics
or the exercise of countervailing political forces,
but rather was the result of many hours of educa
tion, discussion and debate away from the
legislative forum. Hopefully this initial success will
be expanded into a commitment by the members of
this group to continue their efforts for an extended
period of time, using the freedom offered by the
private sector to discuss and investigate what might
initially be impossible to deal with in the
legislature, and to continue the education and
legislative process.
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If the legislature is to maintain its constitutional
responsibilities with regard to the legislative pro
cess, it cannot stay involved with the compensation
system simply through intermittent contact. Ob
viously, the entire membership of the legislature
cannot devote its time to learning how the workers'
compensation system operates and what changes
may be needed. However, if there is one common
thread running among the states which have had
success in controlling their workers' compensation
systems, it is the existence of a long-term commit
ment, not only by labor and management, but also
by a small number of legislators, all of whom have
taken the trouble to learn enough about the realities
of the system to make intelligent decisions which
benefit the system as a whole. While politics cannot
be totally taken out of a political issue such as
workers' compensation, the kind of cooperation
which leads to success minimizes totally partisan
posturing, and encourages well thought out com
promise. This is not the type of compromise which
is often found at the last minute on the floor of the
Senate or the House, of uncertain outcome. It is
compromise that recognizes that neither side can
for long totally dominate the compensation pro
gram, and that in fact the social and economic im
pact of the compensation system may make it
desirable for both parties to accept something less
than what might be in their short-run financial best
interests. 1
I am not a particularly naive person, at least not since 1979
when I quit the practice of law because of the lying, cheating
and stealing that one sees when involved in trial practice and
instead moved on to the pristine field of legislative work. I
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know it is naive to assume that in every state we can educate,
cooperate and get the legislature to look at the real problems
of the workers' compensation system. In some states this is
impossible, and power politics will continue to control the
fate of the compensation system. In the final analysis, it is up
to legislators and representatives of the business and labor
communities to learn, perhaps for the first time, what
workers' compensation is all about. States such as Florida,
Louisiana and Alaska can be copied, not as to their laws, but
instead with regard to the ways in which they went about ob
taining meaningful change. Their similarities can be sum
marized as follows:
1. Extensive basic research as to how the current system is
operating and where the benefits are going.
2. Continuous dialogue between labor and management,
with minimal interference by lawyers, doctors,
surance carriers and others with only a secondary in
terest in the system.
3. Education of the public and the legislature, with facts
rather than opinion and hyperbole.
4. Decisions on philosophy made before legislative draft
ing begins and before public positions are taken by the
major parties.
These states are good examples of this process, of how to
structure a bill and how to get it enacted into law. They are
examples of how to really reform rather than patch and how
to handle defeat and pressures for immediate action.
Workers' compensation is simply too important to be left to
any other course.
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NOTE
1. John H. Lewis, An Analysis of the Alaska Workers' Compensation
System. Report to the State of Alaska, Juneau, Alaska, June 1982.

Discussion of Papers
on Recent State Reforms
Michael Staten
Department of Economics
University of Delaware

The papers in this session offer an interesting geographical
and topical cross section of recent legislative efforts. Even
this small sample of the 50 states considered most of the ma
jor areas of reform, from wage loss to rate-making to re
vamping the exclusive remedy doctrine. However, it seems to
me that the session's most significant message transcends the
specifics of any of the proposed changes. I think a crucial
lesson resides in the collection of legislative stories related,
that is, in the descriptions of the reform process itself.
One can hardly read the four papers together without im
agining the legislative halls around the country as so many
war zones. This impression is not much affected by the
ultimate outcome—even successful efforts come with a
struggle. I suppose that is the nature of our democratic pro
cess. Much as we may wish it were otherwise, it remains true
that our system of collective rule-making is far from costless.
But the production of legislation is subject to the same prin
ciples that apply to production of all goods we value. That
includes the principle that a variety of recipes exist for pro
ducing any given final product. For any desired piece of
legislation there exist a variety of strategies for transforming
the basic idea to a final statute.
105
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An economist would view the problem as one of finding
the path of least resistance, the least-cost way of shepherding
the proposed bill through the production process in state
legislatures. Thus, how a bill is sold becomes nearly as im
portant as what is being sold. The experience of recent years
suggests that students and proponents of workers' compen
sation reform have paid too little heed to this proposition. I
find this all the more curious since workers' compensation
has been a statutory creature since its inception in the early
1900s. Participants in this area should be no strangers to
political haggling and regulatory tinkering. Yet as Alan Tebb
suggested of California, rather than master the vehicle which
affects them, the real parties involved—employers and
employees—"continue to abrogate their responsibility to
participate in the establishment of public policy in the
workers' compensation area." The events described in
Michigan and Minnesota confirm this observation.
How can we minimize the confrontation politics that have
plagued past efforts? Steve Keefe suggests that the usual
political warfare over proposed reforms exaggerates the
perception of an adversarial, employer versus employee rela
tionship. Too often the image has been that one party gains
from reform only at the other's expense. Labor interests
have opposed reforms geared to reduce system costs because
they expect the price tag will ultimately be a reduction in
benefits. Of course, "reform" does not have to be a zerosum game which precludes everyone from gaining. The prac
tical problem in Minnesota (as everywhere else) was one of
demonstrating that premiums could be lowered without cut
ting benefits. Certainly, premium reduction requires cost
reduction, but cost is not synonymous with benefits. A ma
jor point of Keefe's paper is that proposed legislation was
supported by studies that demonstrated just that. He sug
gests that the crucial key to successful reform effort is a
thorough, objective examination of prior and existing
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systems that illustrate how both business and labor interests
can get a fair shake from reorganization.
The natural confrontational atmosphere that surrounds
compensation bills is compounded when only anecdotal
evidence can be offered in support. I think this session sug
gests that the prescription for defusing this confrontation in
any given state is (1) to carefully research the state's existing
administration to clearly define the problems, and (2) armed
with these statistics, to educate the political participants. The
experiences related by the participants reveal that without a
concerted effort to research and educate, the initial percep
tions of a zero-sum game are difficult to dispel, with political
warfare as a result.
A related point deserves mention. The suggestions above
primarily address a strategy for smoothing the process of
getting legislation passed. It should go without saying that
the proposed reform itself should be based on research into
the state's own experience. Nevertheless, a major trend in
compensation reform, the wage loss movement, has ex
hibited a remarkable propensity for generating a bandwagon
effect. The approach has picked up national support among
business leaders as the ultimate solution to the problems with
permanent partial awards. Delaware's recent bout with the
fever of reform provides an example.
Delaware has a full slate of scheduled awards as well as
permanent partial awards for percentage loss of use and
disfigurement. Benefits are paid through an agreement
system, whereby both employer and employee must agree to
the offered settlement before payment is made. An employee
deals with the state's administrative personnel only in the
event of a contested claim. One problem that has evolved is a
relatively high incidence of contested cases and an average
six-to-eight-month delay before initial administrative review.
Of course, the greater the delay, or threat of delay, the
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greater the incentive for the injured worker to settle for a
smaller amount.
As seems to be the case everywhere, a special commission
was appointed in 1979 to bring together labor, business and
insurance interests in an effort to reach a compromise
reform package. Its report revealed that labor represen
tatives were concerned primarily with delays in benefit
payments, the prolonged hearing process and the agreement
system of payment. The level of benefits was not a major
concern. The reform effort of 1982 grew out of the commis
sion's recommendations. The thrust of the proposed legisla
tion was to streamline the claim procedure in order to
(1) speed payment, (2) reduce the potential for disagreement
over awards and consequently the incentive to contest
awards and (3) increase the predictability of the size of
award and when the issue would be resolved. Of course, the
hope was that in doing so premiums would fall.
I believe it is fair to say that the impetus for reform was
the concern over the cumbersome administrative process and
backlog of contested claims (with consequent higher costs).
Change in the benefit structure was an issue only because of
the presumption that the type of benefits (not the level) con
tributed greatly to the probability of contesting a claim.
Although it is never clearly stated, I suspect the rationale
behind the proposed solutions was the belief that abolition
of permanent partial awards was a necessary sacrifice for
streamlining the system, that effective administrative reform
was operationally impossible under the existing benefit
statutes. When framers of the proposed legislation were
briefed on Florida's new "wage loss" bill, they en
thusiastically seized the approach as the solution to
Delaware's problems. Nevertheless, the rationale for the
tradeoff was not effectively conveyed nor backed with
statistical evidence from Delaware, or anywhere else. In
stead, throughout the debate the image was that business was
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extracting a price (in the form of reduced benefits) for
reform.
Labor representatives had expressed dissatisfaction with
the old administrative framework, but once the proposed
legislation started moving toward a vote, this interest in
streamlining the program took a back seat to the perceived
benefit reduction. Opponents of the legislation were careful
to construct numerical examples showing injured workers
losing thousands of dollars in compensation under the wage
loss approach. The distrust over the permanent partial
removal overshadowed other dramatic changes, including a
proposed increase in the cap on benefits to 125 percent
SAWW.
The proposed changes failed to pass, due in no small way
to lack of the research and education effort advocated
above. But I also wonder if a careful examination of
Delaware's claim experience would yield the same recom
mendations that were proposed? Such a study was never
made. My point is that proponents of the move to wage loss
in Delaware were easily convinced of the validity of Florida's
legislation, without statistical support.
It has been suggested to me by several researchers that the
gain from a shift to a wage loss approach varies depending
upon prior state statutes, state workforce composition, and
the accompanying administrative framework. Moreover
(John Lewis' optimism notwithstanding), the papers in this
session clearly demonstrate that the political road to a wage
loss system is fraught with pitfalls and is potentially very
costly. With the experience of several states unfolding, I
would like to see a specific discussion of the feasibility of the
approach relative to less politically volatile alternatives. I
know of no published discussion at this time. Recognizing
the constraints imposed by the political process of reform, I
am wondering when the wage loss approach is the prescrip
tion for states grappling with their permanent partial
statutes, and when is it not.

Interstate Variations in the
Employers' Costs of
Workers' Compensation,
with Particular Reference to
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York*
John F. Burton, Jr.
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations
Cornell University
and

Alan B. Krueger

Economics Department
Harvard University

Introduction
State-by-state information on the employers' costs of
workers' compensation insurance has several uses. The in
terstate variations in costs can be examined to determine if
the magnitude is sufficient to influence plant location deci
sions. Also, insurance cost differences among states can be
compared to differences in benefit levels and other factors to
isolate the causes of the cost variations. These two topics
were examined in earlier studies we will identify for conve
nience as the Dissertation 1 and the Upjohn Study. 2 One con
clusion of these studies was that the interstate differences in
workers' compensation costs are unlikely to be a significant
factor in employer location decisions. Another conclusion
was that benefit levels are the major determinant of the costs
of workers' compensation insurance in a jurisdiction.
The method developed in these earlier studies was utilized
with minor modifications in connection with another use of
ill
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state-specific data on the employers' costs of workers' com
pensation, namely, as one factor in estimating the cost of
adopting the recommendations contained in The Report of
the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensa
tion Laws. 3 This topic was examined in a paper that will be
identified as the Supplemental Study. 4
Another use of data on workers' compensation costs in
various states is to examine the changes through time in the
costs and to consider the significance of the changes for the
efforts to reform the program. This topic was examined in
two studies. The first, Workers' Compensation Costs for
Employers, provided data through July 1, 1975, and was
published by the Interdepartmental Workers' Compensation
Task Force; we will identify this as the Task Force Study. 5
The second was published in the Monthly Labor Review and
will be referred to as the MLR article. 6 It provided workers'
compensation cost information as of July 1, 1978. Both the
Task Force Study and the MLR article found that the in
terstate differences in the employers' costs of workers' com
pensation had widened after 1972, when the Report of the
National Commission had been submitted. Both studies con
cluded this provided support for the Commission's case for
federal minimum standards for workers' compensation.
We recently prepared a report (which will be referred to as
the Ohio-Pennsylvania Study7) that represents still another
variation on the use of data on the interstate differences in
workers' compensation costs. As a result of the increased
costs of workers' compensation in the last decade,
employers, legislators, and other interested parties have
become more interested in the costs of the delivery system
for the program. 8 In some states this concern has translated
into changes in the insurance arrangements used to provide
workers' compensation benefits. In most states, private in
surance carriers traditionally have paid the bulk of the
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workers' compensation benefits, and have relied on a pricing
mechanism that limited the amount of price competition
among carriers. Recently, several states have changed their
laws or regulations to permit more competition in rates. 9
Some of these changes are examined in this report because of
their effect on interstate cost comparisons.
Another manifestation of the concern over costs of the
delivery system has been the proposal to reduce the role of
private carriers in favor of greater reliance on state insurance
funds because of a belief that state funds can deliver benefits
with lower administrative costs. This belief was a factor in
the recent establishment of a new competitive state fund in
Minnesota, which means that for the first time the private
carriers in the state will have to compete with a state fund.
The argument that state funds are more efficient also
underlies the proposal to convert certain competitive state
funds into exclusive state funds. That is, rather than the state
fund competing with private carriers, as is now the case in 13
states including Minnesota, the state fund would be the sole
carrier providing insurance in the jurisdiction, as is now the
case in six states. The Ohio-Pennsylvania Study examined
the possible transmutation of a competitive state fund into
an exclusive state fund by focusing on a specific case, Penn
sylvania, where such a proposal is extant. The study chose
Ohio as a reference point for Pennsylvania because the states
are contiguous, have similar benefit levels, and Ohio has the
largest exclusive state fund.
The present study reexamines some of the conclusions
from these earlier studies. Data are presented on the
employers' costs of workers' compensation insurance as of
January 1, 1983, which permits an examination of whether
the widening of interstate cost differences between 1972 and
1978 has continued into more recent years. In addition, the
study examines whether the different rates of increase in
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workers* compensation costs in Connecticut, New Jersey,
and New York between 1972 and 1983 are related to changes
in the three states' levels of benefits.
Examination of these topics first requires the development
of accurate measures of the employers' costs of workers'
compensation. These costs will be measured at several stages
of refinement. The first comparison will involve the manual
rates in effect on January 1, 1983, which are presented in
table 3 and discussed in section IV. The second level of com
parison will rely on adjusted manual rates, which are more
accurate measures of employers' insurance costs than are
manual rates since the adjusted rates reflect factors such as
experience rating and premium discounts. The adjusted
manual rates are provided in tables 10 and 11 and are ex
amined in section IX. Finally, comparisons will be made us
ing the employers' net costs of insurance, which represent
the weekly premiums per worker paid by employers. These
net costs, presented in tables 13 and 14 and discussed in sec
tion X, are less convenient measures of employers' costs than
are the adjusted manual rates since the adjusted manual rates
can be viewed as the percentage of payroll devoted to
workers' compensation insurance, and therefore most of the
emphasis on the costs comparisons will involve the adjusted
manual rates. Because of the particular focus of this report
on Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, section XII will
extensively examine the cost differences among these
jurisdictions. The final section then considers the
significance of the changes since 1972 in the interstate dif
ferences in workers' compensation costs in all states covered
by this study.
/. Alternative Methods for Providing
Workers' Compensation Benefits to Employees
For the employer who has elected or has been required to
provide workers' compensation benefits to his employees,
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three methods are possible. In most states if the employer
has a sufficient payroll and a satisfactory record of paying
past claims, it may self-insure the risks of industrial ac
cidents. Alternatively, in most states the employer may pur
chase insurance from a private insurance company. In some
states, the employer may purchase insurance from a fund
operated by the state.
Costs of self-insurance receive little attention in this study,
as self-insurers represent a small percentage of benefit
payments; in 1980, self-insurance benefit payment
represented 17.5 percent of the total benefit payments. 10 An
even more compelling reason, however, is the lack of data.
Except for the figures cited above on aggregate benefit
payments, only limited data are available on self-insurers
and these are virtually useless for the present study. 11
Most employers purchase their insurance from private
companies or from state insurance funds. The determination
of the insurance costs begins by assigning the employer to
one or more industrial or occupational categories. In about
40 states where private insurance is available, these
categories are prescribed by the classifications published by
the National Council on Compensation Insurance. 12 Active
classifications range from 0005 Nursery Employees to 9620
Funeral Directors. Between these two are several thousand
other classifications, at least 500 of which are in common
use. Deviations from the National Council's system range
from New Jersey, with a few variations, to five states with
substantially different classification systems. Three of the
states (California, Delaware, and Pennsylvania) have private
insurance carriers, while two (Ohio and West Virginia) are
exclusive fund states.
After each of the employer's operations has been assigned
to a particular insurance classification, an appropriate initial
insurance rate, the manual rate, can be located in the state's
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current schedule. Manual rates are stated as a certain
number of dollars per $100 of weekly earnings for each
employee. Thus, if an employee earns $200 per week and the
appropriate manual rate is $3.50, the week's insurance
premium for this employee is $7.00. Unfortunately, this ex
ample ignores a number of complications that are relevant
for this study.

//. Impact of Payroll Limitations
On Interstate Comparisons
One of the factors that used to be a major obstacle to com
parisons of workers' compenation costs was that many states
had different payroll limitations. A payroll limitation is a
figure that determines the maximum amount of an
employee's weekly earnings that will be used in the calcula
tion of insurance premiums. For many years, the normal
payroll limitation was $100, which meant that the manual
rate would be multiplied by an employee's weekly earnings
or $100, whichever was less, to determine the weekly
premium. Thus, if the manual rate were $3.00, the
employee's weekly earnings $150, and the payroll limitation
$100, the employer's weekly insurance premium would be
$3.00.
Most states affiliated with the National Council on Com
pensation Insurance converted from a $100 payroll limita
tion to a $300 limitation around 1957, and to no limit (which
means the manual rates are charged against the whole
payroll) during 1974-75. However, four states (Missouri,
Texas, Florida, and Louisiana) still had weekly payroll
limitations of $200 or less as of July 1, 1975 and they were
eliminated from the Task Force Study. By July 1,1978, these
four states had payroll limitations of $300 or had eliminated
their payroll limitations, and so the MLR article included
these states. By January 1, 1983, the comparison date for the
current study, only Texas had a payroll limitation ($300),
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which means the data on Texas must be used with caution.
Because the manual rates are only applied to the first $300 of
payroll, the apparent cost of workers' compensation in
surance in Texas as shown in this report is artificially high. 13
Table 1 provides a catalog of all states, indicating those in
cluded in this study because as of January 1, 1983, they have
appropriate manual rate data available and either a $300
weekly payroll limit or no limit. The table also provides the
reasons that four states with exclusive state funds are omit
ted. Comparable data are available for 46 states and the
District of Columbia. These 47 jurisdictions are divided into
three groups in the final column of table 1: two jurisdictions
with exclusive state funds; 31 jurisdictions in which the Na
tional Council on Compensation Insurance is the designated
rating organization; and 14 states with independent local
rating organizations. As will be detailed later in this report,
the 47 jurisdictions differ in important aspects that must be
considered before valid comparisons can be made, including
differences in classification systems, experience rating, divi
dend policies, and the degree of competition among private
carriers that is permitted or encouraged.
///. Inappropriate Methods of Comparing
Workers' Compensation Costs
One admittedly crude method of comparing employers'
costs of workers' compensation is to ascertain the ratio of
earned premium to payroll for each state. Recent figures
from the National Council on Compensation Insurance
show a range from 0.99 percent in Indiana to 3.73 percent in
Arizona, with a national average of 2.46 percent. 14
For the primary purpose of the Dissertation and the Up
john Study (i.e., the significance of the interstate variations
in employers' costs of workers' compensation for plant loca
tion decisions), such information is irrelevant. Employers
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Table 1
Catalog of States Showing Reason for Elimination
of Certain States From Comparison of Manual Rates
and Status of Payroll Limitation Rule

State
Alabama
Alaska

Reason for
elimination
(Caution: high average
wage level may make
results misleading.)

Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New

Hampshire
Jersey
Mexico
York

Exclusive state fund;
insurance classification
not comparable.

Status of
payroll
limitation rule

Organization
that prepares
insurance rates

No limit
No limit

N
N

No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
(in transition)
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit

N
N
I
N
N
I
N
N
N
I
N
N
I
N
N
N
N

No
No
No
No

limit
limit
limit
limit

N
N
I
I
I
N
N
N
N

N
I
N
I
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Table 1 (continued)

State
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

Reason for
elimination
Exclusive state fund;
insurance classification
not comparable.

Oklahoma

Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington

West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Exclusive state fund;
insurance rate based on
hours of exposure; not
payroll.
Exclusive state fund;
does not use insurance
classification system.

Status of
payroll
limitation rule

Organization
that prepares
insurance rates

No limit

I

No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
$300 per week
No limit
No limit
No limit

N
N
I
N
N
N
N
I
N
N
I

No limit
No limit

E
I

E

SOURCE: NCCI, Workers' Compensation Rating Laws - A Digest of Changes (1982, with
August 15, 1983 quarterly update).

Payroll limitation rules are those in effect January 1, 1983.
Code or organization that prepares insurance rates: E is exclusive fund state; I is indepen
dent local rating organization; N is National Council on Compensation Insurance.
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who move from state to state are going to be concerned with
their own particular insurance rates, not with those of the
average employer in each state. Assume that there are only
two insurance classifications in states A and B—class 1 and
class 2—and that employer would fall into class 1 in both
states. Assume that the manual rates for each classification
are identical in both states; e.g., class 1 is $0.10 in both states
and class 2 is $1.00. Also, assume that all employers pay
their employees $300 per week and that there is no payroll
limit.
Obviously, there is no incentive for an employer to move
from state A to state B because its insurance costs will be
unaffected by the move. Yet, if in state A 90 percent of the
payroll of all employers is in class 2 and 10 percent in class 1,
while in state B 90 percent is in class 1 and 10 percent in class
2, the average earned premium as a percentage of payroll will
vary considerably between the states. Specifically, the
average earned premium will be 0.91 percent of payroll in
state A and 0.19 percent in state B, despite the critical fact
that there is no incentive for an interstate movement of the
particular employer in question or of any employer, as long
as its classification does not change as a result of an in
terstate move.
To a large extent, the National Council data on standard
earned premium are subject to the same limitations found in
the hypothetical example. Some industries, such as steel or
auto production, are important in some states and nonexis
tent in others. Even for industries found in all states, the pro
portion of covered payroll accounted for by the classifica
tion varies widely. Because of the influence of such varying
payroll distribution on the data, this approach to interstate
cost comparisons is not considered further here. The Na
tional Council cautions that conclusions drawn from com
parisons of such data "have no validity" 15 because of
payroll distribution variations and other reasons and will no
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longer publish this data in its statistical bulletins due to the
concerns about validity.
An even more questionable approach to comparing
workers' compensation costs among jurisdictions by use of
insurance industry data was utilized in a recent article in
Best's Insurance Management Reports. 16 Average premiums
per state were presented for 1981, and showed a range from
$63.77 per worker in Indiana to $594.98 in Alaska, with a
national average of $189.57. As noted in the article, no ef
fort was made to correct for different industry mixes in the
various jurisdictions. A more serious problem is that the in
surance premiums are direct premiums written by private
carriers and state insurance funds, with state information on
self-insurers omitted because such data are unavailable. The
data on premiums written "were then divided by the number
of wage earners in each state." 17 Although the article does
not identify the source of the employment data, presumably
the number of wage earners includes workers employed by
firms that self-insure. The result is that states with a high
proportion of benefits provided by self-insurers will have
their cost figures artificially lowered since premiums written
exclude the experience of self-insurers but the employment
figures do not. 18

IV. The Appropriate Method of Comparing
Workers' Compensation Costs
The previous section discussed two methods of comparing
interstate differences in workers' compensation costs, each
with a degree of invalidity. Fortunately, a more valid method
for comparing employers' workers' compensation costs in
different states is available. To return to the example involv
ing states A and B presented in the previous section, the
degree of incentive for employers to move from state A to
state B can be shown by using the same distribution of
payroll among classes for both states. For example, the
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distribution of payroll among classes in state A can be used
with the state B manual rates to generate a new average earn
ed premium as a percentage of payroll for the state A
employers on the assumption they move to state B. Obvious
ly, the state A employers would pay 0.91 percent of their
payroll as premium in either state, and the lack of incentive
to move is apparent.
This more valid method of interstate comparison using a
constant distribution of payroll for all states is the basis for
analysis in this study. However, the method has to be refin
ed, and the first step is to increase the number of classifica
tions used beyond two. There are more than 500 active
classifications in National Council states, but many of these
are generally unsubstantial, or are important only in a few
states. Seventy-one classifications were selected for the cur
rent study on the basis of their common use, their relative
importance as measured by the percentage of total payroll
for which they account, and their representative character in
three divisions of workers' compensation classifications:
Manufacturing, Contracting, and All Other. Table 2 in
cludes a brief description of each of the 71 classifications and
shows the percentage of total payroll accounted for by each
classification in the aggregate of the 36 National Council
states for which payroll information in available. 19
In categorizing data in table 2, the starting point was the
National Council's Classification Codes used in 42 of the
states included in this study. 20 States using other classifica
tion systems were "converted" by selecting the classification
which appeared most nearly analogous to each of the 71 Na
tional Council classes. 21 However, since the non-Council
states often use classifications which are broader than those
in National Council states, no attempt was made to incor
porate the payroll distribution among classes of these states
into the aggregates of table 2.
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Table 2
Insurance Classifications and Distribution of Payroll*
Code
number

Classification description

Percentage of
covered payroll in
36 selected states

Division A - classes substantial in all states, 1950-83
Manufacturing classes
2003
2070
4299
4304

Bakeries
Creameries
Printing
Newspaper publishing

.335
.189
.668
.121

Total 4 manufacturing classes

1.313

Contracting classes
5022
5183
5190
5213
5215

Masonry N.O.C.
Plumbing N.O.C.
Electrical wiring-within building
Concrete construction N.O.C.
Concrete work
Total 5 contracting classes

.349
.879
.742
.457
.049
2.476

All other classes
7219
7380
7539
8017
8018
8033
8232
8293
8350
8387
8391
8742
8810
9052
9079

Truckmen N.O.C.
Chauffeurs, drivers, helpers N.O.C.
Electric light or power companies-N.O.C.all operations
Retail stores N.O.C.
Wholesale or combined wholesale-retail N.O.C.
Meat, grocery, and provision stores-retail
Lumber yards
Furniture storage warehouses
Gasoline or oil dealers
Gasoline stations; accessories stations
Automobile garages
Salesmen, collectors, or messengers-outside
Clerical office employees N.O.C.
Hotels
Restaurant N.O.C.

1.278
.910
.158
1.402
.631
1.236
.444
.073
.217
.677
1.194
6.418
25.425
.468
2.566

Total 15 all other classes

43.097

Total 24 classes

46.886
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Table 2 (continued)
Code
number

Classification description

Percentage of
covered payroll in
36 selected states

Division B-classes with payroll in all states, 1950-83
Manufacturing classes

2039
2157
2585
2586
2802
3081
3085
4034

5221
5538

8006
8008
8044
8292
8748
8833
8868
9015
9040
9101

Four classes from division A
Ice cream
Bottling N.O.C.
Laundries N.O.C.
Cleaning or dyeing
Carpentry-shop only
Foundries-iron N.O.C.
Foundries-nonferrous metals N.O.C.
Concrete products
Total 12 manufacturing classes

1.313
.026
.186
.122
.072
.195
.116
.055
.117
2.202

Contracting classes
Five classes from division A
Concrete work: floors, sidewalks, etc.
Sheet metal work erection N.O.C.
Total 7 contracting classes

2.476
.289
.429
3.194

All other classes
Fifteen classes from division A
Retail grocery stores-no fresh meats
Retail clothing or dry goods stores
Wholesale or retail furniture stores
General merchandise warehouses N.O.C.
Automobile sales or service agencies
Hospitals: professional employees
Colleges or schools: professional employees
Buildings operation N.O.C.
Hospitals: all other employees
Colleges or schools: all other employees
Total 25 all other classes
Total 44 classes

43.097
.240
.790
.329
.104
.534
2.765
6.361
.544
.565
.901
56.230
61.626
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Table 2 (continued)
Code
number

2501
2883
3066
3076
3082
3113
3179
3400
3507
3612
3643
3681

Classification description

Percentage of
covered payroll in
36 selected states

Division C-all classes with manual rates available, 1958-83
Manufacturing classes
Twelve classes from divisions A and B
Clothing
Wood furniture N.O.C.
Sheet metal work-shop
Fireproof equipment
Foundries-steel castings
Tool N.O.C.
Electrical apparatus N.O.C.
Metal goods N.O.C.
Agricultural machinery
Pump and engine N.O.C.
Electrical power equipment
Telephone apparatus
Total 24 manufacturing classes
Contracting classes
Seven classes from divisions A and B
Total 7 contracting classes
All other classes
Twenty-five classes from divisions A and B
Total 25 all other classes
Total 56 classes

2220
2361
2660
3632
4484

Division D-all classes with manual rates available, 1972-83
Manufacturing classes
Twenty-four classes from divisions A, B, and C
Yarn or thread-cotton
Hosiery manufacturing
Boot or shoe manufacturing N.O.C.
Machine shops N.O.C.
Plastics-molded products manufacturing N.O.C.
Total 29 manufacturing classes

2.202
1.097
.280
.196
.319
.037
.282
.460
.228
.394
.159
.401
.549
6.604
3.194
3.194

56.230
66.028

6.604
.395
.115
.159
.981
.358
8.612
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Table 2 (continued)
Percentage of

Code
number

Classification description

covered payroll in
36 selected states

Contracting classes
3724
5403
5506
5606
5645
6217

Seven classes from divisions A and B
Millwright work N.O.C.
Carpentry N.O.C.
Street or road construction
Contractors-executive supervisors
Carpentry-detached private residences
Excavation N.O.C.
Total 13 contracting classes

3.194
.427
.500
.389
.433
.547
.330
5.820

All other classes
7720
8010
8039
8829

Twenty-five classes from divisions A, B, and C
Policemen
Hardware stores-wholesale or retail
Retail department stores
Convalescent or nursing homes

56.230
.615
.515
.710
.849

Total 29 all other classes

58.919

Total 71 classes

73.351

NOTE: N.O.C. means "not otherwise classified."
"Code number and classification description taken from Classification Code of National
Council on Compensation Insurance. The payroll distribution is based on 1978-79,
1979-80, or 1980-81 policy year data for 36 states.
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Even though the 71 classifications were chosen deliberate
ly to maximize covered payroll, these classes are not of equal
importance. The classes are grouped into divisions A, B, C,
and D using criteria that are detailed in the OhioPennsylvania Study. 22 Briefly, division A includes 24 classes
that had sufficient payroll to warrant the use of special ac
tuarial practices during the rate-making procedures. A sec
ond measure of importance is whether the manual rates for
the class have been published in the rate pages of a state. The
normal criterion for publication is that there must have been
some payroll exposure for the class in the state within the
previous five years. As division B of table 4 indicates, there
were 44 classes that met this requirement or the more strin
gent requirements of division A for all states included in the
Upjohn Study. 23
Division C of table 3 includes 56 classifications for which
manual rates could be obtained in any manner for the 29
states for 1958-65 and for which data were available for all
42 jurisdictions included in the Supplemental Study. 24 Final
ly, division D includes 71 classes in use in most jurisdictions
in 1983, and was added in the Supplemental Study to provide
an even broader sample of insurance classification.
However, some states for which division C data are available
cannot be shown for division D. 25
The results for the 44 classes in division B are given the
strongest emphasis in section XI because division B contains
the largest number of classes for which an historically com
parable series is available (in the Dissertation, Upjohn
Study, Supplemental Study, Task Force Report, and MLR
article) and because some of the classes included in divisions
C and D have little or no payroll experience in some states,
which means that the averages for these divisions are less
reliable than the division B averages.

Table 3
Interstate Variations in Average Costs of Manual Rates for Classes
in Each Division, Weighted by National Payroll Distributions

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

to

oo

24 classes
in
division A

44 classes
in
divisions
AandB

24 manufacturing
classes in
divisions
A, B, and C

56 classes
in
divisions
A, B, and C

71 classes
in
divisions
A,B,C, and D

1.059
2.644
1.565
1.345
2.297
1.493
2.005
1.315

1.057
2.525
1.704
1.422
2.519
1.560
2.086
1.416

2.429
4.606
3.890
3.425
5.844
3.587
4.558
4.847

1.136
2.636
1.816
1.541
2.708
1.667
2.199
1.633

1.330
2.947
2.094
1.809
3.216
1.886
2.654
...

2.575
1.637
1.039
4.112
1.500
1.431
0.379
1.120
0.941
1.315
1.515
1.866
2.277

2.592
1.728
1.071
4.429
1.508
1.426
0.394
1.119
0.975
1.371
1.572
1.954
2.274

6.147
3.628
2.850
9.098
3.309
3.416
0.847
1.995
2.238
3.570
3.769
4.262
4.467

2.798
1.803
1.177
4.668
1.619
1.541
0.420
1.163
1.052
1.510
1.706
2.065
2.365

3.209
2.067
1.351
5.357
1.881
1.800
0.483
1.339
1.253
1.827
2.027
...
2.729

Emp]
Vain
riations

o
v;
O
O

</J

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

1.686
2.203
1.603
0.975
0.671
1.819
0.906
1.536
1.564
2.263
1.372
0.837
1.393
1.573
2.058
1.728
1.564
1.092
0.839
0.883
1.844
0.885
0.839
1.201
1.104
0.868

1.782
2.327
1.685
0.973
0.703
1.856
0.933
1.598
1.683
2.297
1.391
0.856
1.439
1.627
2.161
1.786
1.708
1.105
0.859
0.926
1.929
0.929
0.856
1.225
1.063
0.928

4.249
7.038
4.855
2.018
1.622
4.167
1.994
3.338
3.976
4.511
3.504
1.618
2.750
3.959
5.181
3.811
5.155
1.993
1.582
2.210
5.076
2.416
1.819
2.235
2.044
2.215

1.915
2.602
1.886
1.032
0.760
1.998
0.978
1.681
1.807
2.424
1.510
0.893
1.488
1.773
2.342
1.877
1.909
1.145
0.900
1.001
2.130
1.020
0.904
1.268
1.130
0.999

2.294
3.045
2.191
1.214
0.904
_
1.142
2.073
2.067
2.713
1.716
1.059
1.680
2.101
...
...
2.181
1.372
1.073
1.219
2.495
1.185
1.040
1.500
1.253
1.186
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Table 4
Premium Discount Schedule for Annual Premium
in States Affiliated with the
National Council on Compensation Insurance
Standard
earned premium

First $5,000
Next $95,000
Next $400,000
Over $500,000

Stock carriers
(percentage)

Non-stock carriers
(percentage)

0.0

0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0

9.5
11.9
12.4

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance.

Using the national payroll distribution by classifications
from table 2 and the manual rates from each state, we pre
sent average manual rates for various combinations of
classifications in table 3. Column 1 uses the national payroll
distribution for the classes in division A of table 2 and shows
the average manual rates for 24 classes. Column 2 presents
averages using the 44 classes in divisions A and B of table 2.
Averages for the 24 manufacturing classes in divisions A, B,
and C are shown in column 3; for all 56 classes in divisions
A, B, and C in column 4; and for all 71 classes in divisions A
to D in column 5, where averages for some states are
unavailable.
The average manual rates shown in table 3 have been ad
justed for Minnesota and Oregon for reasons related to the
factors that complicate interstate comparisons when dif
ferent states use different payroll limitations. 26 In five
states—Delaware, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Utah, and West
Virginia—premiums are assessed against the full overtime
premium, while in the other 42 jurisdictions examined by this
study, hours of overtime work are considered at the regular
hourly wage. 27 Since the overtime premium does not appear
to represent a significant portion of payroll, 28 manual rates

Variations in Employers 'Costs

131

in the five states were not adjusted to reflect interstate dif
ferences in payroll bases.
In three states—Kentucky, Michigan, and Oregon—the
published rates do not include expense loadings and
therefore the rates used to prepare the average in table 3 were
calculated for this study. The procedure used to make the
calculations are explained in section VII in conjunction with
the discussion of open competition.

V. Modifications of Manual Rates in
National Council States: Phase 1
The averages of various combinations of manual rates
provide only a beginning toward accurate comparisons of
workers' compensation costs. Even assuming that the
various states are using the same payroll limitations, other
problems arise because the published manual rates are only a
starting point for the computation of the employer's in
surance premiums. The employer does not simply pay as a
premium the product of the manual rate and his covered
payroll; its insurance costs are influenced by premium dis
counts for quantity purchases, dividends received from
mutual companies and participating stock companies, and
the modification of the manual rate caused by the
employer's own compensable accident experience. The ef
fects of these factors are calculated for the 31 jurisdictions
that use the National Council on Compensation Insurance as
the rating organization in this section. In the next section,
the influence of these factors (premium discounts, dividends,
and experience rating) in the 14 jurisdictions with indepen
dent rating organizations is examined. Insurance costs are
also affected by open competition, deviations, and schedule
rating, and the impact of these factors in all 45 states with
private carriers included in this study is discussed in section
VII. Section VIII then reviews the impact of factors such as
experience rating in the states with exclusive state funds.
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A. A Catalog of the Modifying Factors on
Manual Rates in National Council States
The terminology in workers' compensation is not "stan
dard, descriptive, and orderly." 29 Therefore, the terms as
defined in the following discussion must be used with cau
tion since they sometimes are defined differently in other
publications or exhibits.
If the employer's total payroll falling within the payroll
limit is multiplied by the appropriate manual rate published
in the state's rate pages, the result is the manual premium. In
practice, few employers pay such an amount.
The first modification is caused by experience rating for
larger companies. In simple terms, experience rating uses the
employer's own past record of benefit payments to modify
the published manual rates. If the employer's record is worse
than the experience of the average employer in its classifica
tion, then its actual premium for the current policy period is
larger than its manual premium. Basically, the same ex
perience rating formula is used in all the National Council
states and therefore comparisons among these states are not
complicated by use of this modification. Thus, if an
employer whose accident experience is 20 percent better than
its classification in state A has its premium reduced accord
ingly, it will find the premium similarly modified in state B if
its own relative accident rate remains the same. 30
Although experience rating does not complicate com
parisons among National Council states, it is necessary to
determine the general effects of experience rating in these
states in order to compare them with other states that have
their own experience rating plans. The product of the ex
perience rating factor and the manual premium is termed the
standard earned premium excluding constants. 31
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The standard earned premium excluding constants also is
modified for most employers, although there are divergent
paths depending on the size of the premium. In order to
cover minimum costs of issuing and servicing a policy, in
almost all states employers are assessed a flat charge termed
an expense constant.* 2 In addition, employers in most states
previously were assessed a flat charge, a loss constant,
designed to compensate for the generally inferior safety
record of small businesses. The loss constant program is in
the process of being eliminated on a state-by-state basis. If
the expense and loss constants are added to the standard
earned premium excluding constants, the result is termed the
standard earned premium including constants.
Employers with annual premiums in excess of $5,000 are
entitled to reductions in their standard earned premiums
because of economies of scale. Premium discounts based on
the schedule in table 4 are compulsory in the National Coun
cil states, unless both the insurance carriers and the employer
agree to substitute retrospective rating for the premium dis
counts. Despite varieties of retrospective rating plans in Na
tional Council states, basically all are similar in that they
allow the employer to increase the effect of its own ex
perience on the published manual rates. The main difference
between experience rating and retrospective rating is that the
former uses the employer's experience from previous periods
to modify the current policy period rate, whereas the
retrospective plan uses experience from the current policy
period to determine the current premium, on an ex post facto
basis. The same expense reductions provided by the premium
discounts are built into the retrospective rating plans.
The use of premium discounts or retrospective rating
should not complicate comparisons among the National
Council states. The same discount schedule and the same
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retrospective plans are available in virtually all these states;
the few deviations are unsubstantial.
The result of starting with the standard earned premium
including constants and subtracting any amounts saved by
employers because of premium discounts or retrospective
rating is to arrive at net earned premium. 33
There is a further "wedge" in National Council states be
tween the published manual rates and the rates actually paid
by employers. A substantial proportion of the workers' com
pensation insurance is written by mutual companies or stock
companies with participating policies. While these com
panies normally use a quantity discount schedule less steeply
graded than the nonparticipating stock companies, they pay
dividends which usually cut the net cost to policyholders to
less than that charged by nonparticipating stock companies,
especially for large employers.
Participation is not a crucial detriment to comparisons
among National Council states. Most workers' compensa
tion insurance is sold by companies operating in more than
one state; in fact typically the employer with operations in
more than one state buys its insurance from the same or a
similar participating company in state A and B is not likely
to have the relative interstate differences in insurance costs
altered because of the dividends received; a 10 percent divi
dend on premiums paid in either state will not influence in
terstate relativity.
This final modification of subtracting dividends paid by
mutuals and participating stocks from the net earned
premium results in the net cost to policyholders. This exer
cise thus began with manual premium and then, because of a
series of additions and subtractions, moved to standard
earned premium excluding constants, then to standard earn
ed premiums including constants, then to net earned
premium, and finally arrived at net cost to policyholders.
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The manual premium divided by the appropriate payroll
equals the manual rate. In this study the net cost to
policyholders divided by the payroll is defined as the high ad
justed manual rate. An attempt to quantify these concepts is
presented below.
B. Estimates of Influence of Modifying Factors
on Manual Rates in National Council States
There are no data that can be used to calculate directly the
total differential between manual premium and the net cost
to policyholders. Instead, it is necessary to determine initial
ly the difference between manual premium and standard
earned premium excluding constants, then to measure the
amount of the constants, and finally to measure the dif
ference between standard earned premium including con
stants and the net cost to policyholders. The combining of
the smaller differentials into the total differential is com
plicated because data on differences between the manual
premium and standard earned premium excluding constants
are available only on a policy year basis, 34 whereas data on
the differences between standard earned premium and net
cost to policyholders are available only on a calendar year
basis.
Table 5 includes information on the differential between
manual premium and standard earned premium excluding
constants. The data as provided by the National Council on
Compensation Insurance actually included the expense and
loss constant amounts in the premiums and therefore were
adjusted for this study. 35 This study will assume that 1.000 is
the relevant ratio of standard earned premium excluding
constants-to-manual premium for the National Council
states. Historically, standard earned premium has been
lower than manual premium, but the recent data show the
two are essentially identical. 36

Table 5
Ratio of Standard Earned Premium to Manual Premium
in 38 States with Private Insurance Carriers
(all amounts in thousands)

Policy period
1979-80
1978-79
1977-78
Total

Standard earned
premium including
expense and loss
constants
(1)

Standard earned
premium excluding
expense and loss
constants
(2)

Manual premium
including expense
and loss constants
(3)

Manual premium
excluding expense
and loss constants
(4)

Ratio of standard
earned premium (2)
to manual
premium (4) (both
exclude constants)
(5)

$ 9,264,520
8,147,740
6,620,118

$ 9,232,094
8,123,297
6,600,257

$ 9,325,231
8,061,167
6,640,834

$ 9,292,593
8,036,983
6,620,912

.993
1.011
: .997

$24,032,377

$23,955,648

$24,027,232

$23,950,488

1.000

SOURCES: Data in columns 1 and 3 from National Council on Compensation Insurance, based on Unit Statistical Plan dates for 38 states
(the 31 National Council states enumerated in table 1 plus Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
The figures in columns 2 and 4 are estimates prepared by John F. Burton, Jr. based on information provided by the National Council on Com
pensation Insurance.
NOTE: Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
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The most recent data on standard earned premium in table
5 are from policy period 1979-80. Loss constants were of
miniscule importance as of then, and are even less significant
now since they are being eliminated on a state-by-state basis.
For this study the loss constants are therefore assumed to be
nil. 37 In contrast, expense constants have become more
significant in recent years as a program has been introduced
in most states to increase the annual amounts per policy to
$35, then $60, and currently $75. The National Council on
Compensation Insurance estimates that the impact of these
various levels of expense constants is to increase standard
earned premium by approximately 1.2 percent, 2.0 percent,
and 2.6 percent respectively. The National Council also pro
vided information on the amount of the expense constant in
effect in each state as of January 1,1983 (which is the date of
rate comparisons for this study). For each state, the dif
ference between standard earned premium excluding con
stants and standard earned premium including constants was
calculated using this information. 38
Table 6, also provided by the National Council, presents
data on the differential between standard earned premium
including constants and the net cost to policy holders. 39 The
figure of .835 as the ratio of net cost to policyholders-tostandard earned premium including constants will be used in
subsequent calculations in this study.
If the ratio of 1.000 between standard earned premium ex
cluding constants and manual premium is multiplied by the
state's appropriate ratio between standard earned premium
including constants and standard earned premium excluding
constants (which will be 1.012, 1.020, or 1.026 depending on
the state), and the product in turn is multiplied by 0.835,
which is the ratio between the net cost to policyholders and
standard earned premium including constants, then the
overall ratio between the net cost to policyholders and

Table 6
Ratio of Net Cost to Policyholders to Standard Earned Premium, Including Constants, All Carriers
(all amounts in thousands)

Five year total

1977

1.

Standard earned premium
including constants

$9,527,172

1978

1979

1980

1981

Dollar
amount

Percentage of
standard earned
premium

J2
5'
w

3
1EL
o*
$11,153,598 $13,585,611 $15,476,268 $15,752,452 $65,495,101

100.0

>-i

Cfl

2. Return to policyholders through
premium discounts and retrospective
rating plans

724,284

938,047

1,303,078

1,893,233

1,761,765

6,620,407

10.1

3. Dividends to policyholders

456,607

597,519

816,761

1,091,992

1,205,039

4,167,918

6.4

8,346,281

9,618,032

11,465,772

12,491,043

12,785,648

54,706,776

83.5

4. Net cost to policyholders

5'
5'
S3

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, Compilations of Insurance Expense Exhibits, 1977-1981. These figures exclude state
fund experience and are based on data from the 45 jurisdictions with private insurance carriers.
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manual premium is 0.845, 0.852, or 0.857, depending on the
state. These figures purport to say that the average employer
in the states that use the National Council on Compensation
Insurance as the rating organization does not pay insurance
premiums equal to the published manual rates times his
payroll, but pays an amount from 14.3 to 15.5 percent less
than this because of such factors as premium discounts. In
order words, including the expense constant adjustment,
there is a 14.3 to 15.5 percent differential between manual
rates and high adjusted manual rates as defined above. Ob
viously, these percentages are only an approximation and
clearly would vary from employer to employer and from
state to state for reasons other than different expense con
stants. Nonetheless, as the best available estimates of the dif
ference between manual premiums and net costs, they are us
ed in this study. The average manual rates in table 3 were
reduced by the appropriate percentage for each of the 31 Na
tional Council states to produce the high adjusted manual
rates in table 10.

VI. Modification of Manual Rates in States
with Independent Rating Organizations: Phase 1
The previous section examined the influence of factors
such as premium discounts, dividends, and experience rating
on the employers' costs of workers' compensation insurance
in the 31 jurisdictions that use the National Council on Com
pensation Insurance as the rating organization. In this sec
tion we examine the influence of these factors in the 14
jurisdictions listed in table 1 that rely on local independent
rating organizations to help determine workers' compensa
tion insurance rates.
There are significant differences among these 14 jurisdic
tions. In six (Hawaii, Indiana, North Carolina, Texas,
Virginia and Wisconsin) the National Council rate-making,
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rating plans, and classification systems are used, and
therefore any differences between these states and the 31 Na
tional Council jurisdictions can be safely ignored. 40
Michigan and Minnesota also utilize National Council ser
vices and have a classification system that is closely pattern
ed after the NCCI classification codes, and for purposes of
this study will be treated as close enough to the National
Council states to justify using the figures developed in the
previous section as applicable to the two states. High ad
justed manual rates are 14.3 to 15.5 percent less than manual
rates in these eight states, depending on the size of the ex
pense constant in effect on January 1, 1983. 41
The remaining six local rating organizations are complete
ly independent of the National Council on Compensation In
surance. They are found in California, Delaware,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Three of these jurisdictions (California, Delaware, and
Pennsylvania) use classification systems that are significantly
different from the NCCI classification system; the other
three states use systems patterned on the NCCI codes.
California does not allow any form of premium discount,
while New Jersey allows the same discount schedule as in the
31 NCCI states but limited solely to premiums written in
New Jersey. The other five states provide for premium dis
counts based on the interstate premium amount. As to ex
perience rating, California, Delaware, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania operate intrastate plans in which the ex
perience from other states is not considered in modifying the
manual rates in the state, nor is the state's experience includ
ed in the interstate experience rating calculations. In
Massachusetts and New York, the experience in the state is
combined with experience from other states to determine the
experience rating modifications.

Variations in Employers' Costs

141

This review indicates that two of the states with completely
independent rating bureaus, Massachusetts and New York,
are very similar to the 31 states that use the National Council
on Compensation Insurance as the rating organization. In
both states, the classification system closely parallels the
NCCI codes, the NCCI premium discount schedule is used in
conjunction with the entire interstate premium, and the ex
perience rating formula also considers interstate experience.
For these two states, the figures developed in the previous
section that relate net cost to policyholders to manual
premiums can be used without major qualms.
In contrast, California differs substantially from the Na
tional Council states in the methods used to modify manual
premiums in order to arrive at the net cost paid by the
employer, as it has no premium discount schedule, nor has it
used the flat loss and expense constant charges in recent
years. California does use experience rating, retrospective
rating, and dividend payments; these to some extent prob
ably reflect the absence of the premium discounts.
The relation between New Jersey and the NCCI jurisdic
tions is also attenuated compared to the relationship between
the NCCI jurisdictions and Massachusetts and New York.
New Jersey only applies the premium discount to intrastate
business, and the experience rating modification only con
siders New Jersey experience. 42 It is likely that the retrospec
tive rating and dividend payment plans in New Jersey to
some extent compensate for the limited scope of the
premium discounts and experience rating plans.
These features of California and New Jersey suggest that
the figures developed in the previous section for the dif
ference between manual rates and net costs to policyholders
in NCCI states are only rough approximations of the dif
ferences in these two states. Unfortunately, these are the on
ly estimates reasonably available for this study, and thus will
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be used. With this caveat, we proceed as if California,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York were directly
comparable with the 31 National Council jurisdictions.
Specifically, we assume that high adjusted manual rates for
these four jurisdictions are 83.5 percent of manual rates
(with the percentage modified to reflect each state's expense
constant as of January 1, 1983), the same relationship
developed for the NCCI jurisdictions in the last section. 43
The two remaining jurisdictions with independent local
rating bureaus are Delaware and Pennsylvania, for which
data were developed in the Ohio-Pennsylvania Study to
allow manual rates to be adjusted to determine net cost to
policyholders.
While the ratio of standard earned premium without con
stants to manual premium is 1.000 in the NCCI jurisdictions
(see table 5), it is .966 in Delaware, indicating a larger impact
of experience rating in the state. 44 The expense constant in
effect in Delaware on January 1, 1983 was $75, which means
that standard earned premium with constants was estimated
as 1.026 of standard earned premium without constants. In
Delaware, the ratio of net cost to policyholders to standard
earned premium with constants is .848, which is comparable
to the .835 ratio in table 6 for the NCCI jurisdictions. 45 The
larger ratio in Delaware indicates a somewhat smaller impact
of premium discounts and dividends there than in the NCCI
jurisdictions. In order to develop the overall differences be
tween manual rates and net cost to policyholders in
Delaware, the three ratios (.966, 1.026, and .848) were
multiplied together. The result is a figure of .840, which
means that the high adjusted manual rates in Delaware are
84.0 percent of manual rates.
The ratio of standard earned premium without constants
to manual premium is .947 in Pennsylvania, 46 which is
smaller than the similar ratio for the NCCI jurisdictions in-
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eluded in table 5. The smaller ratio in Pennsylvania indicates
that the experience rating plan in the state produces a larger
reduction than in the NCCI jurisdictions. The Pennsylvania
expense constant in effect on January 1, 1983 was $60, which
means that standard earned premium with constants was
estimated as 1.020 of standard earned premium without con
stants. The ratio of net cost to policyholders to standard
earned premium with constants in Pennsylvania is .835, 47
which by coincidence is the same figure for the NCCI
jurisdictions found in table 6. In order to develop the overall
difference between manual rates and net cost to
policyholders in Pennsylvania, the three ratios (.947, 1.020,
and .835) were multiplied together. The result is a figure of
.807, which means that high adjusted manual rates in Penn
sylvania are 80.7 percent of manual rates.
To recapitulate this section, state-specific data have been
used to determine the relationship between manual rates and
high adjusted manual rates for Delaware and Pennsylvania.
For the other 12 jurisdictions with independent local rating
organizations, the data from the NCCI jurisdictions have
been used to make the adjustments. For some of these
jurisdictions, the use of NCCI data is clearly appropriate
because the NCCI procedures and rating plans are used in
the states. For other jurisdictions, most notably California
and New Jersey, the NCCI data must be viewed as rough ap
proximations. For each of the 14 states with independent
rating organizations, the average manual rates in table 3
were reduced by the appropriate percentage to produce the
high adjusted manual rates in table 10.

VII. Modifications of Manual Rates in
All States with Private Carriers: Phase 2
The previous two sections reviewed a number of modifica
tions that are made to manual rates before the employer's in
surance premium is determined. There are two important
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characteristics of these modifications. First, they involve
either (1) formulas that all carriers must adhere to that
modify the manual rates at the beginning of the policy
period, such as experience rating, loss constants, and
premium discounts for quantity purchases, or (2) dividends
that are paid only after the policy year is over. In short, there
is virtually no chance for carriers to compete in terms of
price at the beginning of the policy period with any of these
types of modifications. Second, these modifications have
been in use for many years and previously were the only
modifications necessary to consider in determining the dif
ference between manual premiums and net costs to
policyholders. From the Dissertation through to the Task
Force Study and the MLR article, estimates were made of the
modifying influence of just these factors. 48 The comparable
figures produced by this procedure for this study are termed
high adjusted manual rates.
This report is forced to widen the scope of inquiry for
modifying factors because of the significant changes in the
pricing mechanism for workers' compensation insurance
that have occurred in the past few years. In many jurisdic
tions it is now possible for private carriers to compete for
business by varying the insurance rates at the beginning of
the policy period. The variations in some instances are made
for groups of employers and sometimes are even made for
individual employers.
The desirability and causes for this increased ability of car
riers to compete on an ex ante basis have been widely discuss
ed and will not be repeated here. 49 Suffice it to say that the
increased competition means the determination of the in
terstate differences in the employers' costs of workers' com
pensation has been considerably complicated. Indeed,
because the movement towards competition has been so re
cent, only limited information is available about the extent
of the competition and the impact of the various competitive
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devices on workers' compensation costs. This section relies
on the information that is available, which was provided by
the National Council on Compensation Insurance50 and the
chapter of this volume by C. Arthur Williams. 51 The data
pertain to January 1, 1983, in order to be comparable with
the manual rates used to produce table 3. Since that date, the
use of the various competitive devices has continued to
spread. 52
Table 7 provides information on three types of com
petitive devices that have been adopted in those states with
private insurance carriers. The most drastic change in the
pricing mechanism has occurred in those states with open
competition. In such states, carriers may charge whatever in
surance rates they feel are appropriate. Carriers are required
to file their rates with the state insurance department but do
not require approval before using these rates. There are dif
ferences among the open competition states, including
whether a rating bureau (renamed data service organization)
can publish advisory rates, and, if so, what those rates can
include. As shown in table 7, there were six states with open
competition laws in effect as of January 1, 1983, the date of
comparisons for this report. In Arkansas, Illinois, and
Rhode Island the advisory rates contain both pure premium
(covering expected losses) and an expense loading; these
rates are comparable to manual rates in states without open
competition and therefore were used without modification in
table 3.
In Kentucky, the advisory rates contain only pure
premium, and to place them on a comparable basis to
manual rates in other states, the expense loading of 36.2 per
cent formerly used in Kentucky was used to inflate the ad
visory rates. In Michigan, the advisory rates include loss ad
justment expenses but exclude other components of the ex
pense loading and also exclude the trend factor, so a loading
of 53.9 percent was used to simulate manual premiums com-

Table 7
Ability of Private Carriers to Modify Insurance Rates
on an Ex Ante Basis as of January 1,1983

Status

Stating of rate adherence
agreements and deviations
Number of
companies

Impact on
rate level

Type

5
X
X

N.A.
2
52

U
0.03
12.3

I
U

Open competition
Status
Alabama
Alaska (1)
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

O

Effective date

6/17/81

(O)

1/1/84

O

8/18/82

O

7/15/82

O
(O)

1/1/83
1/1/84

Schedule rating

No
NP
NP
X
X
X
NP
X
X

33

18.1

I

9
4
93
33
N.A.
2

0.5
N.A.
4.4
0.6
N.A.
N.A.

I

X
X
X

N.A.
42
22

N.A.
1.2
1.3

X
X
X
No

4
0
30

N.A.
0
2.0

X
X

5
17

0.5
0.6

3
"2.
o*

O

S

Sf

I

N.A.
I
11
NP
Montana
0.7
12
X
Nebraska
0
0
X
New Hampshire
No
New Jersey
N.A.
U
2
X
New Mexico
0.1
15
X
New York
No
North Carolina
N.A.
3
X
Oklahoma
Oregon
O
7/1/82
3.2
55
X
Pennsylvania (2)
Rhode Island
O
9/1/82
N.A.
3
X
South Carolina
N.A.
U
3
X
South Dakota
2.8
43
X
Tennessee
No
Texas
I,U
9.0
20
X
Utah
N.A.
5
X
Vermont
N.A.
38
X
Virginia
No
Wisconsin
SOURCES: Derived from Workers' Compensation Rating Laws - A Digest of Changes, NCCI, 1982, with quarterly updates thru November
1983; C. Arthur Williams, Jr., "Workers' Compensation Insurance Rates: Their Determination and Regulation, A Regional Perspective,"
manuscript presented at the First Annual Conference on Workers' Compensation, Rutgers University, May 9-10, 1983; correspondence from
Barry I. Llewellyn, Assistant Secretary, NCCI, letters, June 24, 1983 and February 7, 1984.
O denotes presence of open competition.
(O) denotes that open competition will be effective in the near future.
X denotes deviations permitted.
NP denotes rate adherence agreements not permitted.
I denotes individual schedule rating.
U denotes uniform schedule rating.
(1) Three additional companies in Alaska write deviations only for selected class codes. The total market share of these companies is 11.9 per
cent.
(2) The Pennsylvania data were provided in correspondence from Stephen S. Makgill, President, Pennsylvania Compensation Rating Bureau,
letter, September 7, 1984.

o
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m
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o*
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o
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parable to those in other jurisdictions. Finally, in Oregon,
the advisory rates only contain pure premium, and were in
creased by the expense loading of 38.7 percent previously us
ed in the jurisdiction. 53
These adjustments to the published rates in the states with
open competition in order to make them comparable to
manual rates in other jurisdictions seem reasonable, since in
all jurisdictions the manual rates are only the starting point
and have to be adjusted before meaningful comparisons can
be made. The difficult task is to make the adjustments in the
manual rates in states with open competition in order to ar
rive at adjusted manual rates comparable to those in other
jurisdictions. Unfortunately, as of the date of the OhioPennsylvania Study (from which the information in the pre
sent study is derived) there were no data showing the actual
impact of open competition on the employers' costs of
workers' compensation. This is not surprising, since the
earliest open competition law only went into effect in Arkan
sas in June of 1981, and the other five states with open com
petition laws in effect as of January 1, 1983—the date for
comparisons in this study—had laws that had been in effect
for six months or less as of that date.
If another study of insurance costs is made in four or five
years, sufficient information may be available to estimate
with reasonable precision the impact of open competition on
insurance costs. For this study, two estimates are used. First,
one view of workers' compensation is that prior to open
competition, the use of dividends, retrospective rating, etc.
had squeezed all excess profits out of workers' compensation
insurance. If this is true, then arguably the only result of
open competition will be to reduce insurance rates at the
beginning of the policy period with a corresponding reduc
tion in dividends at the end of the policy period. This view
amounts to saying that open competition has no impact on
the employers' costs of workers' compensation, and
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therefore the procedure that was developed in sections V and
VI to determine the difference between manual rates and ad
justed manual rates requires no further adjustment. In other
words, the "high adjusted manual rates" shown in table 10
for the six states with open competition correspond to the
view that open competition does not reduce the costs of
workers' compensation insurance.
The other view of workers' compensation insurance is that
prior to open competition and other competitive devices
discussed in this section, excess profits or unnecessary ad
ministrative expenses existed in the insurance industry, and
that open competition eliminates or reduces these expenses,
thereby reducing the costs of workers' compensation to
employers. This view is equivalent to saying that the dif
ference between manual rates and adjusted manual rates is
greater than the percentages developed in sections V and VI
indicate. Even if this view is correct, there are no data
available to permit a precise estimate of the impact of open
competition as of January 1, 1983. Arbitrarily, a 10 percent
adjustment factor has been used to produce the "low ad
justed manual rates" shown in table 11 for the states with
open competition. That is, for the six states with open com
petition as of January 1, 1983 (Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky,
Michigan, Oregon, and Rhode Island), the "low adjusted
manual rates" shown in table 11 are 10 percent less than the
"high adjusted manual rates" shown in table 10.
The second type of competitive device included in table 7
is deviations. (A similar device—a prohibition of rate
adherence agreements—is also shown in table 7.) In some of
the states in which rating organizations publish manual
rates, individual carriers are permitted to deviate from the
bureau rates after securing the insurance commissioner's ap
proval. The crucial differences from open competition are
that prior approval of the deviations is required, while in
open competition no such approval is required, and the
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deviations offered by a particular carrier are uniform for all
policyholders in the state, while in open competition, no
such uniformity is necessary. As an example of deviations,
the Zenith Insurance Company offers a 12 percent deviation
on all policies in Arizona. 54
The information on deviations in table 7 is incomplete
because most of the data were provided by the National
Council on Compensation Insurance, and the National
Council has only limited information of deviations in states
with independent local rating organizations. There are Na
tional Council data available for a few of these jurisdictions,
and additional information derived from the paper by C. Ar
thur Williams has been added to the table. For 16 states the
National Council has provided information on the impact of
deviations on the insurance rates, and these figures are in
cluded in table 7.
As with open competition, there are two possible views of
the impact of deviations on the employers' costs of workers'
compenstion. If there are no excess profits or unnecessary
administrative expenses in the workers' compensation in
surance industry, then reductions in premiums due to devia
tions will result in offsetting reductions in dividends and in
adjustments through the retrospective rating plans. This
view is equivalent to saying that deviations have no impact
on the employers' costs of workers' compensation, and
therefore for all states with deviations, the "high adjusted
manual rates" shown in table 10 require no further ad
justments.
The other view of workers' compensation is that excess
profits or excessive administrative expenses exist in the in
surance industry, and therefore deviations reduce the actual
costs of insurance to employers. The view means that the dif
ference between manual rates and adjusted manual rates is
greater than the percentages developed in sections V and VI.
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For the 16 states, the "high adjusted manual rates" in table
10 were reduced by the percentages shown in the "Impact on
Rate Level" column of table 7 to produce the "low adjusted
manual rates" shown in table 11. To the extent that devia
tions are only partially used to reduce dividends and
retrospective rating adjustments, the actual costs of workers'
compensation will fall between the "high adjusted manual
rates" in table 10 and the "low adjusted manual rates" in
table 11. In those states with deviations for which the Na
tional Council was unable to provide information on the im
pact of the deviations on the rate level, there is no difference
between the low and high adjusted manual rates shown in
tables 10 and 11.
The third type of competitive device catalogued in table 7
is schedule rating. Schedule fating plans have been introduc
ed in many jurisdictions in recent years. Under these plans,
insurers can change (usually decrease) the insurance rate the
employer would otherwise pay through debits or credits bas
ed on a subjective evaluation of factors such as the
employer's loss control program. There are two types of
schedule rating. In states with uniform schedule rating plans,
the regulators have decided that it is permissible for all car
riers to use the proposed schedule rating plan. If all carriers
are not given this permission, then individual carriers can ap
ply for approval of their schedule rating plans. Unfortunate
ly, only limited data are available about the overall impact of
schedule rating plans of the employers' costs of workers'
compensation, and therefore states with such plans do not
have their insurance rates further adjusted in this study.

VIII. Modifications of Published Manual Rates
by Exclusive Fund States
Included in this study are Ohio and West Virginia, which
have exclusive state funds. These states publish manual rates
and then modify them to the detriment of easy interstate

152

Variations in Employers' Costs

comparisons. Unlike the National Council states, the ex
clusive fund states do not use premium discounts for quanti
ty purchasers, nor do they use retrospective rating plans, nor
do they pay dividends as do the mutual and participating
stock companies. However, Ohio, and West Virginia use ex
perience rating plans that are similar to each other and to the
National Council experience rating plan because they cause
the rates paid by some employers to be different from the
published manual rates. We shall see how experience rating
affects their costs relative to other states.
A. Ohio
The experience rating plan in Ohio is complex and similar
in sophistication to the method used in National Council
states. The influence of experience rating can be determined
with a reasonable degree of precision. Manual rates are pro
mulgated yearly on July 1. For each calendar year, data are
available by insurance classification showing payroll and the
premium actually collected after the application of any ex
perience rating modification. 55 The main problem is that the
calendar year includes manual rates promulgated in two
years. In order to match collected premiums with manual
rates, the average manual rates in effect during a particular
calendar year were calculated. Thus for Ohio classification
2000 (equivalent to NCCI Class 2003) the manual rate effec
tive July 1, 1980 was $3.68 and the manual rate effective July
1, 1981 was $3.50; assuming an equal payroll distribution in
the first and second half of 1981, this means the average
manual rate in effect in calendar year 1981 was $3.59. The
1981 total payroll for classification 2000 was $92,967,000
and with the average manual premium of $3.59 (per $100 of
payroll), this produces a simulated manual premium of
$3,338,000. The actual premium collected during 1981,
however, was $3,487,000, indicating that experience rating
produced actual premiums 4.5 percent higher than simulated
manual premiums.
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The effect of experience rating for a sample of 58 Ohio in
surance classifications that are comparable to the 71 in
surance classifications used in the National Council states is
shown in table 8. In both 1980 and 1981, the actual collected
premiums were less than the simulated manual premiums, in
dicating that, in general, experience rating reduces the costs
of workers' compensation in Ohio. For the combined
1980-81 experience, actual collected premiums were .946 of
simulated manual premiums, indicating that the influence of
experience rating for this combination of classifications was
to reduce manual premium by 5.4 percent. For the remainder
of this report, it is assumed that the 5.4 percent influence of
experience rating for 1980-81 is relevant also for the rates in
effect on January 1, 1983. All subsequent calculations are
based on adjusted manual rates that are 5.4 percent lower
than the manual rates shown in table 3.
The Ohio workers' compensation program has separate
assessments for Administrative Costs and for the Disabled
Workers' Relief Fund. As of January 1, 1983, the
assessments for private employers were $0.15 and $0.10 per
$100 of payroll, for a total assessment of $0.25 per $100 of
payroll. The handling of these assessments in our study can
be illustrated with data for Ohio classification 2000. As of
January 1, 1983, the published manual rate for classification
2000 was $3.84 per $100 of payroll; with the assessment add
ed, the total is $4.09 per $100 of payroll. This $4.09 figure
was one of the rates used to calculate the average manual
rates for Ohio shown in table 3. The experience rating factor
does not affect the assessments. Thus, the experience rating
adjustment of 5.4 percent was used to reduce the published
manual rate (for classification 2000) from $3.84 to $3.63 per
$100 of payroll; with the assessment of $0.25 added the total
is $3.88 per $100 of payroll. This $3.88 is one of the rates us
ed to calculate the adjusted manual rates for Ohio shown in
tables 10 and 11.
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Table 8
Ratio of Collected Premiums to Manual Premiums in Ohio
(Based on Data for a Sample of 58 Insurance Classifications)

Year

Collected
premiums

Manual
premiums
(simulated)

Ratio of
collected premiums
to manual premiums

1980
1981

$339,266,000
348,596,000

$365,999,328
361,368,092

.927
.965

Total

$687,862,000

$727,367,420

.946

SOURCES: Data provided with July 8, 1983 correspondence from Paul C. Whitacre, Jr.,
Director, Actuarial Section, Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation; simulated manual
premiums calculated by John Burton and Alan Krueger, July 1983.

B. West Virginia
In recent years, West Virginia has used an experience
rating plan that is similar in sophistication to the plan used in
National Council states. It is described in detail in two
publications issued by the West Virginia Workmen's Com
pensation Fund, 56 and therefore the method will not be
discussed here, only the quantitative impact is estimated.
The influence of experience rating can be determined with
precision, using a variation of the method used for Ohio. 57
Manual rates are promulgated yearly on July 1 and are in ef
fect until the following June 30. For the same 12-month
period, data are available by insurance classification show
ing payroll and the premiums actually collected after the ap
plication of any experience rating modification. Thus, for
West Virginia classification D-7, the manual rate effective
July 1, 1980 was $4.32 per $100 of payroll. Since the payroll
between July 1980 and June 1981 for this class was
$9,112,681.90, the simulated manual premium was
$393,667.85. The gross premium actually collected for the
corresponding period was $413,693.57, indicating that ex
perience rating produced actual premiums 5.1 percent higher
than simulated manual premiums.
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The effect of experience rating for a sample of 24 West
Virginia classifications that are comparable to the 71 in
surance classifications used in the National Council states is
shown in table 9. In both July-June periods for 1979-80 and
1980-81, the actual collected premiums were greater than the
simulated manual premiums, indicating that in general ex
perience rating increases the employers' costs of workers'
compensation in West Virginia. For the combined 1979-81
experience, actual collected premiums were 9.3 percent
greater than simulated manual premiums, indicating that the
influence of experience rating for this combination of
classifications increased manual premiums by 9.3 percent.
For the remainder of this report, it is assumed that the 9.3
percent influence of experience rating for 1971-81 is also
relevant for the rates in effect on January 1, 1983 for West
Virginia. 58 All subsequent calculations are based on adjusted
manual rates that are 9.3 percent higher than the manual
rates shown in table 3.
Table 9
Ratio of Collected Premiums to Manual Premiums in West Virginia
(Based on Data for a Sample of 24 Insurance Classifications)

Year

Collected
premiums

Manual
premiums
(simulated)

Ratio of
collected premiums
to manual premiums

1980
1981

$ 63,626,663
73,861,833

$ 59,242,978
66,506,269

1.074
1.111

Total

$137,488,496

$125,749,249

1.093

SOURCES: Data from West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Fund, Annual Report
and Financial Statement, Year Ending June 30, 1980 and Year Ending June 30, 1981, table
15; simulated manual premium calculated by Alan Krueger and John Burton, July 1983.

The West Virginia workers' compensation program has
the assessments for administrative expenses and for the
catastrophe and second injury accounts included in the base
or manual rates, and therefore the rates as published were
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used to calculate the average manual rates for West Virginia
shown in table 3. Likewise, the gross premiums shown in
table 9 include the charges for these accounts and for ad
ministrative expenses. Thus the experience rating adjustment
of 9.3 percent was used with the data in table 3 to calculate
the adjusted manual rates for West Virginia shown in tables
10 and 11.

IX. Interstate Variations in Adjusted Manual Rates
The previous three sections have attempted to ascertain
systematically the influence of experience rating, premium
discounts, retrospective rating, policyholders' dividends,
open competition, and deviations on the costs of workers'
compensation. In table 3, data were presented on the
averages of published manual rates for various combinations
of insurance classifications. Table 10 was developed from
the earlier table by decreasing these averages for manual
rates by the appropriate percentages for the 31 National
Council states that were developed in section V, by the ap
propriate percentages for the 14 states with independent
rating organizations that were developed in section VI, and
by the appropriate percentages for Ohio and West Virginia
developed in section VIII. Table 10 is based on the view that
open competition, deviations, and schedule rating do not
have a net impact on workers' compensation costs (once the
offsetting changes in dividends, etc. are considered), and
produces what are termed "high adjusted manual rates."
Table 11 was developed from table 10 by decreasing the high
adjusted manual rates in those states with open competition
or with data available on the impact of deviations, using the
percentage adjustments developed in section VII. Table 11 is
based on the view that open competition and deviations do
have a net impact on workers' compensation costs, produc
ing what are termed "low adjusted manual rates."
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Columns 1 and 2 of tables 10 and 11 present the average
costs of adjusted manual rates on January 1, 1983 for 24 and
44 classifications using national payroll distributions. Col
umn 3 presents the averages for 24 manufacturing classes us
ing national payroll distribution. Column 4 presents the
average adjusted manual rates based on the 56 classifications
in divisions A, B, and C of table 3, and column 5 shows the
rates based on the 71 classes in divisions A to D.
The results in tables 10 and 11 can be interpreted as the
percentage of payroll expended on workers' compensation
insurance by employers in 47 jurisdictions (including the
District of Columbia) as of January 1, 1983. The results in
column 2 of tables 10 and 11 are the most reliable and useful
for reasons explained above. The results indicate, for exam
ple, that as of January 1, 1983, the 44 types of employers in
divisions A and B, would, on average, expend 0.905 percent
of payroll on workers' compensation premiums in Alabama.
(The "high" and "low" adjusted manual rates for Alabama
are identical.)

X. Further Adjustment to Interstate Cost
Variations Necessitated by Interstate Variations
in Employee Earnings
Even the adjustments in the preceding section to published
manual rates do not complete the modifications necessary
for comparisons of the interstate differences in the dollar
costs of workers' compensation premiums per employee.
Assume that the adjusted manual rates for an employer's
classification in states A and B were an identical $1.00 of
payroll, with no payroll limit in each state. Further assume
that A is northern, industrialized, unionized, etc., and the
average weekly earnings of employees are $500, while B lacks
these attributes and the average weekly earnings of
employees are $250. The result is that equal manual rates in
A and B lead to dissimilar insurance premiums, since the

Table 10
Interstate Variations in Average Costs of High Adjusted Manual Rates for Classes
in Each Division of Table 3, Weighted by National Payroll Distributions

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

24 classes
in
division A

44 classes
in
divisions
Aand B

24 manufacturing
classes in
divisions
A, B, and C

56 classes
in
divisions
A, B, and C

71 classes
in
divisions
A,B,C, and D

0.907
2.264
1.333
1.146
1.918
1.279
1.717
1.105

0.905
2.162
1.452
1.212
2.103
1.336
1.786
1.190

2.080
3.945
3.314
2.918
4.880
3.072
3.904
4.072

0.973
2.257
1.547
1.313
2.261
1.428
1.883
1.372

1.139
2.524
1.784
1.541
2.685
1.615
2.273

2.194
1.383
0.885
3.522
1.285
1.198
0.325
0.959
0.795
1.101
1.291
1.563
1.950

2.208
1.460
0.913
3.793
1.291
1.194
0.337
0.958
0.824
1.148
1.339
1.636
1.947

5.237
3.066
2.428
7.792
2.834
2.861
0.725
1.709
1.891
2.990
3.211
3.569
3.826

2.384
1.524
1.003
3.998
1.387
1.291
0.360
0.996
0.889
1.265
1.454
1.729
2.025

2.734
1.747
1.151
4.588
1.611
1.508
0.414
1.147
1.059
1.530
1.727
—
2.337

Emp]
ain
riations

Sn
i-i

en

O

S
sr

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

1.444

1.862

1.526
1.967

1.343

1.411

0.831
0.575
1.558
0.776
1.298
1.322
1.938
1.169
0.717
1.331
1.340
1.754
1.394
1.322
0.930
0.719
0.752
1.571
0.758
0.715
1.023
1.206
0.740

0.829
0.602
1.589
0.799
1.351
1.422
1.967
1.185
0.733
1.375
1.386
1.841
1.441
1.444
0.942
0.736
0.789
1.644
0.796
0.729
1.044

1.162
0.791

3.639
5.947
4.066
1.719
1.389
3.569

1.640
2.199
1.580
0.879
0.651

1.708

0.838
1.421
1.527
2.076
1.287
0.765
1.421
1.511
1.995
1.515
1.613
0.976
0.771
0.853
1.815
0.874
0.770
1.080
1.235
0.851

2.821
3.360
3.863
2.986
1.386
2.614
3.373
4.414

3.075
4.357
1.698
1.355
1.883
4.325
2.069
1.550
1.904
2.234
1.887

1.965
2.574
1.835
1.034
0.774

1.711

0.978
1.752
1.747

2.323
1.462
0.907
1.602
1.790
1.843
1.169
0.919
1.039
2.126
1.015
0.886
1.278
1.369
1.011
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Table 11
Interstate Variations in Average Costs of Low Adjusted Manual Rates for Classes
in Each Division of Table 3, Weighted by National Payroll Distributions

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

24 classes
in
division A

44 classes
in
divisions
A and B

24 manufacturing
classes in
divisions
A, B, and C

56 classes
in
divisions
A, B, and C

71 classes
in
divisions
A,B,C, and D

0.907
2.264
1.169
1.031
1.918
1.047
1.717
1.099

0.905
2.162
1.273
1.090
2.103
1.094
1.786
1.184

2.080
3.943
2.907
2.626
4.880
2.516
3.904
4.052

0.973
2.257
1.357
1.182
2.261
1.169
1.883
1.365

1.139
2.523
1.565
1.387
2.685
1.323
2.273
...

2.194
1.323
0.880
3.522
1.285
1.079
0.325
0.948
0.785
0.991
1.291
1.563
1.911

2.208
1.396
0.907
3.793
1.291
1.075
0.337
0.947
0.813
1.033
1.339
1.636
1.909

5.237
2.931
2.414
7.792
2.834
2.575
0.725
1.688
1.867
2.691
3.211
3.569
3.749

2.384
1.457
0.997
3.998
1.387
1.162
0.360
0.984
0.878
1.138
1.454
1.729
1.985

2.734
1.670
1.144
4.588
1.611
1.357
0.414
1.133
1.045
1.377
1.727
—
2.290
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Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

1.444

1.676
1.343
0.827
0.571
1.558
0.770
1.298
1.322
1.938
1.168
0.717
1.331
1.340
1.578
1.350
1.190
0.930
0.719
0.731
1.571
0.690
0.715
1.023
1.206
0.740

1.526
1.770

1.411
0.825
0.598
1.589
0.793
1.351
1.422
1.967
1.184
0.733
1.375
1.386
1.657
1.395
1.299
0.942
0.736
0.767
1.644
0.724
0.729
1.044

1.162
0.791

3.639
5.352
4.066
1.711
1.381
3.569
1.696
2.821
3.360
3.863
2.983
1.386
2.614
3.373
3.973
2.977
3.921
1.698
1.355
1.830
4.325
1.883
1.550
1.904
2.234
1.887

1.640
1.979
1.580
0.875
0.647
1.711
0.832
1.421
1.527
2.076
1.285
0.765
1.421
1.511
1.796
1.466
1.452
0.976
0.771

0.829
1.815
0.795
0.770
1.080
1.235
0.851

1.965
2.317
1.835
1.029
0.770
0.971
1.752
1.747
2.323
1.461
0.907
1.602
1.790
—
1.659
1.169
0.919
1.010
2.126
0.924
0.886
1.278
1.369
1.011
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workers' compensation bill is a product of the manual rate
and the weekly earnings. In this example the employers' in
surance cost is $5.00 per employee per week in A and $2.50
in B.
In reality, interstate variations in employee earnings can
influence the relative costs of workers' compensation. Un
fortunately, there is a paucity of weekly earnings differential
information relevant for this study. 59 Information is needed
that shows the interstate variations in the weekly earnings of
workers employed in the same industries, not information
that reflects interstate differences in the industry mix, which
is characteristic of most published data. A method developed
in the Dissertation to derive the appropriate information60
used earnings data broken down by the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) system. The results are presented in
table 12.
The meaning of the earnings index as used in this study is
the following: since the index for Michigan is 1.1315, it is
assumed that, for every industry, workers in Michigan earn
13.15 percent more per week than the average worker in the
United States. Because of the varying quantity of informa
tion available from the states, the index numbers should be
viewed as approximations. Unfortunately we have no more
precise measure of interstate earnings variations readily
available.
The ultimate goal of this study is to quantify the interstate
variations in the net cost to employers of workers' compen
sation. This necessitates not only the use of the adjusted
manual rates from the previous section but also the use of an
appropriate earnings figure adjusted for the interstate earn
ings variations. The weekly earnings figure which is used is
the national average of earnings of workers covered by the
unemployment insurance program, which for 1980 (the latest
data available) was $297.09.
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Table 12
1980 Weekly Earnings Indexes
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota

.9537
1.5665
.9867
.8172
1.0923
1.0360
.9723
.9538
1.1761
.8693
.8756
.9809
.9089
1.0667
1.0591
1.0543
.9532
1.0339
.9961
.9246
.9735
.9418
1.1315
.9901

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

.8147
.9916
1.0574
.9772
.8759
1.0310
.9032
1.0460
.8370
1.0661
.9509
1.0463
1.0003
.8506
.8296
1.0040
.9265
.9721
.9838
.9115
.8790
1.0160
1.0558

SOURCE: Data for most states are from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Supplement to
Employment and Earnings, States and Areas, Data for 1977-81, Bulletin 1370-16
(September 1982).
NOTES: Indexes are based on data for individual 2-digit industries except in Alaska,
Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Utah. In these states,
because of a paucity of such data, wage data for combined 2-digit SIC industries were used.
Colorado wage index pertains to 1970 because 1980 data are unavailable.

Finally, we can compute the interstate variations in the net
cost to policyholders. Table 13 presents the "high" weekly
net costs per workers, which are the products of the "high"
adjusted manual rates found in table 10, the interstate earn
ings index numbers from table 12, and the national average

Table 13
Interstate Variations in Average Costs of High Adjusted Net Costs for Classes
in Each Division of Table 3, Weighted by National Payroll Distributions

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

24 classes
in
division A

44 classes
in
divisions
AandB

24 manufacturing
classes in
divisions
A, B, and C

56 classes
in
divisions
A, B, and C

71 classes
in
divisions
A,B,C, and D

2.570
10.538
3.909
2.782
6.224
3.935
4.960
3.131

2.565
10.064
4.256
2.942
6.826
4.112
5.160
3.371

5.894
18.358
9.716
7.085
15.835
9.455
11.276
11.539

2.757
10.506
4.536
3.188
7.338
4.394
5.440
3.888

3.227
11.746
5.230
3.742
8.714
4.971
6.566
...

7.666
3.573
2.303
10.358
3.707
3.798
1.021
3.004
2.252
3.383
3.820
4.293
5.640

7.717
3.772
2.374
11.156
3.727
3.785
1.062
3.002
2.333
3.527
3.964
4.495
5.632

18.300
7.919
6.317
22.917
8.178
9.066
2.282
5.352
5.356
9.184
9.503
9.805
11.064

8.330
3.935
2.609
11.758
4.001
4.090
1.132
3.120
2.518
3.884
4.302
4.751
5.858

9.553
4.512
2.994
13.494
4.649
4.777
1.302
3.592
2.999
4.700
5.112
...
6.759
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Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

4.040
6.620
3.949
2.011
1.693
4.894
2.253
3.378

4.049
5.200
3.633
1.782
4.216
3.786
5.451
4.144

3.340
2.293
2.143
2.071
4.538
2.215
1.936
2.672
3.640
2.320

4.270
6.611
4.151
2.007
1.774

4.993
2.320
3.514
4.357
5.279
3.683
1.823
4.355
3.916
5.723
4.283
3.648
2.320
2.194
2.172
4.747
2.325
1.975
2.726
3.507
2.480

10.182
19.991
11.960
4.162
4.092
11.211
4.958
7.341
10.293
10.366
9.278
3.446
8.281
9.529
13.722
9.138
11.010
4.185
4.041
5.183
12.491
6.047
4.197
4.973
6.743
5.920

4.589
7.391
4.646
2.128
1.917
5.375
2.432
3.697
4.678
5.570
3.998
1.902
4.500
4.268
6.203
4.501
4.077
2.404
2.299
2.348
5.241
2.553
2.086
2.821
3.728
2.670

5.497
8.653
5.398
2.504
2.281
2.839
4.559
5.351
6.235
4.544
2.255
5.074
5.057
4.658
2.881
2.741
2.859
6.139
2.966
2.400
3.338
4.132
3.170
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Table 14
Interstate Variations in Average Costs of Low Net Costs for Classes
JIM m^M^Ml M^M V *kJ*W

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

»
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24 classes
in
division A

44 classes
in
divisions
A and B

24 manufacturing
classes in
divisions
A, B, and C

56 classes
in
divisions
A, B, and C

71 classes
in
divisions
A,B,C, and D

2.570
10.535
3.428
2.504
6.224
3.223
4.960
3.115

2.565
10.061
3.733
2.647
6.826
3.368
5.160
3.354

5.894
18.352
8.521
6.376
15.835
7.744
11.276
11.482

2.757
10.503
3.978
2.869
7.338
3.599
5.440
3.868

3.227
11.742
4.587
3.368
8.714
4.072
6.566
...

7.666
3.416
2.289
10.358
3.707
3.418
1.021
2.968
2.223
3.045
3.820
4.293

7.717
3.606
2.360
11.156
3.727
3.406
1.062
2.966
2.303
3.174
3.964
4.495

18.300
7.570
6.279
22.917
8.178
8.160
2.282
5.287
5.287
8.265
9.503
9.805

8.330
3.762
2.593
11.758
4.001
3.681
1.132
3.082
2.485
3.496
4.302
4.751

9.553
4.313
2.976
13.494
4.649
4.300
1.302
3.549
2.960
4.230
5.111
—
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Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

5.527
4.040
5.634
3.949
2.001
1.683
4.894
2.237
3.378

4.049
5.200
3.629
1.782
4.216
3.786
4.906
4.011
3.006
2.293
2.143
2.013
4.538
2.016
1.936
2.672
3.640
2.320

5.520
4.270
5.950
4.151
1.997
1.763
4.993
2.303
3.514
4.357
5.279
3.679
1.823
4.355
3.916
5.151
4.146
3.283
2.320
2.194
2.111
4.747
2.116
1.975
2.726
3.507
2.480

10.843
10.182
17.992
11.960
4.141
4.067
11.211
4.923
7.341

10.293
10.366
9.269
3.446
8.281
9.529
12.350
8.846
9.909
4.185
4.041

5.038
12.491
5.503
4.197
4.973
6.743
5.920

5.741
4.589
6.652
4.646
2.117
1.906
5.375
2.415
3.697
4.678
5.570
3.994
1.902
4.500
4.268
5.583
4.357
3.670
2.404
2.299
2.282
5.241
2.323
2.086
2.821
3.728
2.670

6.624
5.497
7.789
5.398
2.491
2.267
2.819
4.559
5.351
6.235
4.539
2.255
5.074
5.057
4.192
2.881
2.741
2.779
6.139
2.699
2.400
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weekly earnings figure of $297.09; the product must be
divided by 100 since the manual rates are per $100 of payroll.
Table 14 presents the "low" weekly costs per worker which
are the products of the "low" adjusted manual rates found
in table 11, the interstate earnings index numbers from table
12, and the national average weekly earnings figure of
$297.09, again divided by 100. The results indicate, for ex
ample, that the 44 types of employers in divisions A and B of
table 4 would, on average, spent $2.565 per week per worker
on workers' compensation premiums in Alabama as of
January 1, 1983. (The "high" and "low" net costs for
Alabama are identical.)

XL Historical Data
Information on the employers' costs of workers' compen
sation is available for the 44 types of employers included in
divisions A and B of table 2 for selected years since 1950.
(Prior to 1983, these divisions contained 45 classes, as was
explained in section IV.) Data for 20 states are available for
nine years between 1950 and 1983; data for eight more states
are available for seven years between 1958 and 1983; 42
jurisdictions have data for 1972, 1975, 1978, and 1983; and
for 1978 and 1983, there are 47 jurisdictions that may be
compared.
The average adjusted manual rates for the 44-employer
group are shown in table 15. For example, Illinois employers
expended, on average, the equivalent of 0.437 percent of
payroll on workers' compensation premiums in 1950, com
pared with 1.194 percent (high adjusted rates) or 1.075 per
cent (low adjusted rates) in 1983. Table 16 presents the ap
proximate net cost to the same group of policyholders for
several years between 1950 and 1983. These results show, for
example, that the employers in Illinois expended a weekly
average of $0.261 per worker on premiums in 1950, and
$3.785 (high net costs) or $3.406 (low net costs) in 1983.
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The data in tables 15 and 16 are valuable for tracing
changes in workers' compensation costs over time in a par
ticular state, but the volume of information makes it dif
ficult to comprehend general developments. Tables 17 and
18 provide a compact summary of these data, permitting
evaluations of interstate trends.
Table 17, for example, illustrates the changes over time in
the average adjusted manual rates for the various combina
tions of states. Columns 1 and 2 pertain to 20 states for
which data are available from 1950 to 1983; columns 3 and 4
relate to 28 states for which data are available from 1958 to
1983; columns 5 and 6 present data for 42 states that are
available from 1972 to 1983; and columns 7 and 8 present
data on the 47 states for 1978 and 1983. Panel A relies on
unweighted observations, while panel B weights each states'
observation by the size of the state's nonagricultural labor
force. 61 The text will refer to the weighted data from panel B
because they are more representative of national experience.
The mean adjusted manual rate in the 20 states was the
equivalent of 0.470 percent of payroll in 1950, 0.678 percent
in 1972, and 1.227 percent in 1978. In 1983, the mean for
high adjusted manual rates was 1.393 and the mean for low
adjusted manual rates was 1.343. Of particular interest is the
rapid rise in costs between 1972 and 1978, which was more
than double the 1950-72 increase. Between 1978 and 1983 the
employers' costs of workers' compensation insurance con
tinued to increase for this combination of 20 states, but at a
less torrid pace than during the earlier portion of the 1970s.
The data in table 17 also indicate that the average adjusted
manual rates increased between 1978 and 1983 for the 28
jurisdictions for which data are available since 1958.
However, for the averages of adjusted manual rates for the
42 and 47 jurisdictions, the data indicate that the employers'
costs of workers' compensation (measured as premiums as a
percentage of payroll) actually declined between 1978 and

Table 15
Interstate Variations in Average Costs of Adjusted Manual Rates
for 44 Classes in Divisions A and B of Table 3
Weighted by National Payroll Distribution Insurance Rates in Effect 1950-83
>**

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

1965

1950

1954

1958

1962

.282

.310

.348

.364

.437

.707

.858

1.183

.660

.838

.812

.762

.689

1972

1975

1978

High
1983

Low
1983
.905
2.162
1.273
1.090
2.103
1.094
1.786
1.184
2.208
1.396
.907
3.793
1.291
1.075
.337
.947
.813
1.033
1.339
1.636
1.909

.479
.832
1.385
.915
1.102
.649
.697
.578

.599
1.721
2.178
1.038
1.406
.654
.827
.736

.855
1.762
2.505
1.292
2.135
1.210
1.353
1.428

.905
2.162
1.452
1.212
2.103
1.336
1.786
1.190

.737

1.404
.760
1.335
1.283
1.002
.417
.662
.766
1.065
.981
1.009

3.502
2.641
1.077
2.057
1.287
1.382
.480
1.084
.879
1.382
1.512
1.380
1.262

2.208
1.460
.913
3,793
1.291
1.194
.337
.958
.824
1.148
1.339
1.636
1.947

.519
.437
.358

.664
.497
.363

.581
.514
.410

.582
.609
.398

.667
.624
.430

.390

.369

.394

.448

.558

.501
.960
.865
.657
.385
.451
.575
.668

.415
.501

.398
.600

.340
.661

.370
.747

.337
.854

.520
.816
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Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

.476

.416

.638

.727

.590
.572
.528

.644
.474
.586

.463

.858

.392

.512

.859
.450
.653
.758

1.034
.694
.692
.988

1.141
.715
.738
.980

1.106
.914
.854
.751

1.171
1.238
1.240
.902

.792
.437
.531
.911
.838

.721
.527
.495
1.054
.863

.845
.447
.560
1.039
.945

.473
.627

.492
.813

.474
.820

.948
.529
.534
1.224
.787
.864
.420
.885

1.007
.396
.834
.690
.392

.386
.842
.696
.389

1.491
.387
.767
.609
.511
.664

1.565
.789
.746
1.233
1.069
.973
.433
1.109
1.052
2.074
.776
.899
.590
.635
.710

.503
.514
.391
.428
.505

.766
.588
.539
.671
.581

.829
.658
.537

.930
.607
.400

.630
.355
.831
.567
.315

.524
.398

.545
.457

.502
.524

.422
.505

.531
.595

.268
.523

.345
.556

.404
.603

1.373
1.890
1.821
.902
.740
1.404
.710
1.166
1.687
1.441
1.770
.532
1.550
1.446
2.918
1.173
1.303
.836
.842
.903
1.753
.892
.875
.880
.660
.752

1.526
1.967
1.411
.829
.602
1.589
.799
1.351
1.422
1.967
1.185
.733
1.375
1.386
1.841
1.441
1.444
.942
.736
.789
1.644
.796
.729
1.044
1.162
.791

1.526
1.770
1.411
.825
.598
1.589
.793
1.351
1.422
1.967
1.184
.733
1.375
1.386
1.657
1.395
1.299
.942
.736
.767
1.644
.724
.729
1.044
1.162
.791

£J5*
5'
^

3

5'

Cfl

w
|3
T

Ioon*•»

n
o

C/J

Table 16
Interstate Variations in Net Costs of Insurance for 44 Classes in Divisions A and B of Table 3
weigiuea uy iiauunai rayruu isisiriDuuun insurance nates in raieci
1950 - 83

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

Emp]
Vain
riations

1950

1954

1958

1962

1965

1972

1975

1978

High
1983

Low
1983

.136

.183

.242

.281

.369

.611
1.627
2.066
1.040
1.755
.968
1.008
.835

.938
4.127
3.985
1.447
2.746
1.196
1.467
1.304

1.544
4.879
5.293
2.078
4.816
2.554
2.768
2.922

2.565
10.064
4.256
2.942
6.826
4.112
5.160
3.371

2.565
10.061
3.733
2.647
6.826
3.368
5.160
3.354

1.219

2.847
1.169
2.229
1.933
1.925
.766
1.159
1.253
1.856
1.588
1.750

8.199
4.793
1.912
3.964
2.238
3.063
1.016
2.190
1.659
2.781
2.909
2.581
2.526

7.717
3.772
2.374
11.156
3.727
3.785
1.062
3.002
2.333
3.527
3.964
4.495
5.632

7.717
3.606
2.360
11.156
3.727
3.406
1.062
2.966
2.303
3.174
3.964
4.495
5.520

.353

.548

.631

.858

1.296

.627

.669

.663

.253
.261
.197

.396
.363
.245

.409
.443
.326

.447
.588
.357

.561
.660
.422

.205

.237

.299

.380

.518

.629
1.306
1.063
1.029
.576
.644
.767
.949

.195
.266

.229
.390

.230
.507

.286
.639

.286
.800

.687
1.154

o

n
&n-

O
O
«-*•
01

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

.271

.290

.273

.382

.310
.303
.250

.414
.308
.339

.249

.565

.167

.267

.404
.284
.274
.283
.192

.555
.321
.250
.361
.270

.660
.370
.519
.469

.888
.655
.620
.671

1.073
.740
.724
.729

1.569
1.493
1.237
.856

2.037
2.480
2.203
1.261

.600
.335
.363
.759
.650

.584
.468
.385
.993
.722

.750
.435
.477
1.072
.866

.291
.509

.335
.755

.354
.834

1.330
.782
.689
1.872
.957
1.326
.501
1.352

.541
.280
.586
.353
.233

.949
.346
.656
.500
.330

2.269
.554
.993
.700
.706
.866

2.695
1.430
1.179
2.312
1.594
1.830
.634
2.077
1.673
3.872
1.365
1.427
.832
1.077
1.134

.678
.684
.478
.563
.751

1.267
.963
.808
1.069
1.060

.369
.726
.553
.358

.392
.365

.365
.396

.504
.511

.200
.412

.279
.494

.358
.587

2.757
4.372
3.733
1.457
1.196
2.795
1.484
2.128
3.651
2.479
3.844
.899
3.352
2.654
6.288
2.382
2.387
1.360
1.649
1.666
3.293
1.701
1.646
1.525
1.229
1.582

4.270
6.611
4.151
2.007
1.774
4.993
2.320
3.514
4.357
5.279
3.683
1.823
4.355
3.916
5.723
4.283
3.648
2.320
2.194
2.172
4.747
2.325
1.975
2.726
3.507
2.480

4.270
5.950
4.151
1.097
1.763
4.993
2.303
3.514
4.357
5.279
3.679
1.823
4.355
3.916
5.151
4.146
3.283
2.320
2.194
2.111
4.747
2.116
1.975
2.726
3.507
2.480
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1983. Data for the largest combination of jurisdictions (46
states plus the District of Columbia) indicate that employers
on average spent 1.503 percent of payroll on workers' com
pensation insurance in 1978, and 1.423 percent (high ad
justed manual rates) or 1.393 percent (low) in 1983.
The average (mean) adjusted manual rate for a particular
year obviously reflects data from some states that are more
expensive than the mean and some that are less expensive.
For example, the average adjusted rate for the 20 states was
0.470 percent of payroll in 1950 (table 17, panel B, column
1), but the average employer in Alabama paid only 0.282
percent while the average employer in Rhode Island paid
0.829 percent of payroll for workers' compensation in
surance (table 15, column 1). A statistic that provides a con
venient summary of the extent of variations among the states
around the average (mean) cost is the standard deviation. 62
The larger the standard deviation, the greater is the variation
among the states in the percentage of payroll expended on
workers' compensation insurance. The data indicate that
from 1950 through 1978, there was an increase in the amount
of variation among the states in the percentages of payroll
expended on insurance. However, between 1978 and 1983,
the variations increased for the combinations of 20 and 28
states, but decreased for the combinations of 42 and 47
states.
Table 18 presents information on the changes through
time in the net costs to policyholders for various combina
tions of states. The layout is similar to table 17, and again
the text will use the weighted observations data from panel
B. The net costs are measured as the weekly premiums per
worker, and in all instances show an increase through time.
For example, the weighted mean for the 20 jurisdictions
(table 18, panel B, column 1) indicates that employers paid
$2.426 weekly in 1978, while in 1983 the cost was $4.040
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(high net costs) or $3.879 (low net costs). Data for the largest
combination of jurisdictions (47) indicate that in 1978,
employers on average paid $3.061 weekly on workers' com
pensation premiums, while in 1983 they paid $4.240 (high net
costs) or $4.148 (low net costs).
Table 18 also provides information on the extent of varia
tion among the states around the average (mean) net costs to
policyholders. In 1950, when the average cost was $.248 per
worker per week in the 20 states, the standard deviation
among the states was $.050. The data indicate that through
time there have been continuing increases in the amount of
variation among the states in the cost in dollars of workers'
compensation insurance (table 18, panel B, columns 2, 4, 6,
and 8).

XII. Comparisons of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York
This section provides a closer examination of Connecticut,
New Jersey, and New York, the three states of particular in
terest to the conference for which this paper was prepared.
We examine the changes in the employers' costs of workers'
compensation since 1972, the earliest date when data are
available for all three states. We also attempt to explain these
cost developments in terms of changes in benefit levels and
other relevant factors.
Table 19 presents data on the percent of payroll devoted to
workers' compensation insurance by a sample of employers.
These data correspond to the adjusted manual rates shown in
tables 15 and 17. For 1983, only high adjusted manual rates
are shown since as of January 1983, Connecticut and New
Jersey did not permit private carriers to modify insurance
rates on an ex ante basis, and New York had only a very
limited use of deviations (table 7). The result is that for Con
necticut and New Jersey, low and high adjusted manual rates
are identical, while for New York the impact of deviations is
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so slight that the two variants of adjusted manual rates are
virtually the same.
The data in table 19 present an interesting history of
workers* compensation costs (measured as a percentage of
payroll) both nationally and in the three states. From 1972 to
1978, the 42-jurisdiction average of employers' costs almost
doubled (from 0.779 percent to 1.454 percent), and then
from 1978 to 1983 there was a slight decline. In Connecticut,
the employers' costs of workers' compensation relative to
the national average (column 3 of table 19) were roughly
80-90 percent of the national figure from 1972 to 1978. Then
Connecticut costs increased rapidly so that by 1983 Connec
ticut employers were paying insurance premiums some 25
percent above the national average. In New Jersey, the
employers' costs relative to the national average (as shown in
column 5) began about 60 percent higher in 1972, dropped to
about 20 percent above that average in 1975 and 1978, and
almost exactly matched the national average in 1983. The
New York record is more erratic, since costs began some 10
percent above the national average in 1972 (column 7), drop
ped slightly below the national average in 1975, increased to
about 20 percent above the national average in 1978, and
then fell to about 20 percent below the national figure in
1983.
The patterns just described involving workers' compensa
tion cost measured as a percent of payroll are paralleled by
the behavior of costs measured by the weekly insurance
premium per worker. Table 20 indicates that in 1972 Con
necticut employers' costs were about 10 percent below the
national average, while in 1983 the costs were some 20 per
cent above the national average. In contrast, New Jersey
employers began with costs almost 65 percent above the na
tional average, but found their costs almost exactly equal to
the 42-jurisdiction average in 1983. In New York, costs were

Table 19
Percent of Payroll Devoted to Workers' Compensation Insurance
By a Sample of Employers

Year
1972
1975
1978
1983 (high)

Average cost in
42 jurisdictions
(1)
0.779
1.008
1.454
1.428

Connecticut
Cost relative to
42 jurisdictions
average
Cost
(3)
(2)
0.697
0.827
1.353
1.786

SOURCE: Data in tables 15 and 17 (panel B).

87.2
82.0
93.1
125.1

New Jersey
Cost relative to
42 jurisdictions
average
Cost
(5)
(4)
1.224
1.233
1.687
1.422

157.1
122.3
116.0
99.6

New York
Cost relative to
42 jurisdictions
average
Cost
(7)
(6)
0.864
0.973
1.770
1.185

110.9
96.5
121.7
83.0
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Table 20
Weekly Insurance Premiums for Workers' Compensation Insurance (Net Costs of Insurance)
Expended by a Sample of Employers

Year
1972
1975
1978
1983 (high)

Average cost in
42 jurisdictions
(1)
$1.136
$1.805
$3.022
$4.294

Connecticut
Cost relative to
42 jurisdictions
average
Cost
(3)
(2)
$1.008

$1.467
$2.768
$5.160

SOURCE: Data in tables 16 and 18 (panel B).

88.7
81.3
91.6
120.2

New Jersey
Cost relative to
42 jurisdictions
average
Cost
(5)
(4)
$1.872
$2.312
$3.651
$4.357

164.8
128.1

120.8
101.5

New York
Cost relative to
42 jurisdictions
average
Cost
(7)
(6)
$1.326
$1.830
$3.844
$3.683

116.7
101.4
127.2
85.8
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about 20 percent above the national average from 1972 until
1978, and then fell to 15 percent below in 1983.
Both measures of workers' compensation costs thus show
a considerable movement in the relative costs among Con
necticut, New Jersey, and New York over the last decade.
Connecticut began as the low cost state and ended as the
most expensive. New Jersey began as much more expensive
than the others and ended up in the middle, while New York
moved from the middle to the least expensive. These rank
ings are based on comparisons among the employers' costs
of workers' compensation for a representative sample of 44
types of employers (or 45 types before 1983). However, the
rankings are not particularly sensitive to the types of
employers that are compared. There are, for example, five
different combinations of employers for whom the adjusted
manual rates as of January 1, 1983, are presented in table 10.
For all combinations, New York insurance rates are lowest,
New Jersey are the next most expensive (ranging from 13 to
20 percent more expensive than New York rates), and Con
necticut rates are the most expensive (ranging from 31 to 56
percent more expensive than New York rates).
A statistical or quantitative explanation of the cost dif
ferences among the three jurisdictions is not possible, given
the limited number of observations. 63 What we will therefore
present is a largely qualitative explanation of the factors that
appear to explain the cost developments shown in tables 19
and 20.
An obvious candidate for a variable that explains the costs
of workers' compensation insurance in a jurisdiction is the
generosity of benefits provided by the state's workers' com
pensation program. Table 21 presents information on several
important aspects of the workers' compensation statutes in
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York as of January 1,
1983, the date for the costs of the program as measured in
this study.
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Table 21
Selected Comparisons of Temporary Disability,
Permanent Disability, and Fatal Benefits
in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York
as of January 1,1983

Temporary total disability
Nominal rate of compensation
Minimum weekly benefit
Maximum weekly benefit
Waiting period
Retroactive after
Dependency allowance per child
Cost-of-living adjustment for
outstanding cases
Permanent total disability
Nominal rate of compensation
1st 450 weeks
after 450 weeks
all cases
Minimum weekly benefit
1st 450 weeks
after 450 weeks
all cases
Maximum weekly benefit
Maximum duration
Benefit subject to Social Security offset
Dependency allowance per child
Cost-of-living adjustment
for outstanding cases
Permanent partial disability benefits
Scheduled benefits
Nominal rate of compensation
Minimum weekly benefit
Maximum weekly benefit
1st 96 weeks
97-420 varies from
421-600 weeks
All cases
Duration varies by impairment, examples:
Total loss of arm
Total loss of leg
Total loss of hand

CT

NY

NJ

66 2/3%
$65.20
$326.00
3 days
7 days
$10.00

70%
$62.81
$236.00
7 days
7 days
-

66 2/3%
$30.00
$215.00
7 days
14 days
--

Yes

No

No

CT

NY

NJ

~
-

70%
70% minus
wages earned
66 2/3%

--66 2/3%

$65.20
$326.00
life
no
$10.00

$62.81
$5.00
$236.00
life
yes
~

-$20.00
$215.00
life
no
--

yes

no

no

CT
66 2/3%
$20.00

NJ
70%
$35.00

$49.00
- $51.00-219.84
$236.00
$326.00
312 weeks
238 weeks
252 weeks

330 weeks
315 weeks
245 weeks

NY
66 2/3%
$20.00
«
~
$105.00
312 weeks
288 weeks
244 weeks
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Table 21 (continued)
CT

Total loss of foot
Amputation cases

Nonscheduled benefits
Nominal rate of compensation
Percent of preinjury wage
Percent of (preinjury wage-postinjury
earning capacity)
Percent of wage loss
Minimum weekly benefit
Maximum weekly benefit
1st 96 weeks
97-420 varies from
421-600 weeks
All cases
Maximum duration

Fatal benefits
Nominal rate of compensation-widow only
Minimum weekly benefit-widow
Maximum weekly benefit-widow
Maximum duration-widow
Widow's benefit reduced by wages
earned after 450 weeks
Widow's benefit subject to
Social Security offset
Cost-of-living adjustment for
outstanding cases

188 weeks

NY

NJ
230 weeks
award
increased
by 30%

205 weeks

70%
66 2/3%
none

~
$35.00

_
$49.00
-- $51 .00-219.84
$236.00
$326.00
780 weeks 600 weeks
x % of
disability

66 2/3%
none
_
$105.00
length of
disability

CT

NJ

NY

66 2/3%
$20.00
$326.00
life or
remarriage

50%
$62.81
$236.00
life or
remarriage

66 2/3%
$45.00
$322.50
life or
remarriage

yes

no
yes

yes

no

no

SOURCES: National Council on Compensation Insurance, Legislative Update Service
(1983 with supplements); data on duration of scheduled benefits from U.S. Department of
Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Office of State Liaison and Legislative
Analysis, Division of State Workers' Compensation Programs, State Workers' Compensa
tion Laws (January 1983), table 8.
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Temporary total disability benefits are the most common
type of cash benefits in the workers' compensation program.
The data in table 21 indicate that for most aspects of this
type of benefit, Connecticut had the most generous provi
sions. Connecticut had the highest minimum and maximum
benefits, the shortest waiting period before benefits began,
and was the only state that provided cost-of-living ad
justments for outstanding cases. New Jersey had a slightly
higher nominal rate of compensation that Connecticut, but
to some extent this advantage was overcome by
Connecticut's payment of a dependency allowance for
children.
The benefits for permanent total disability were also
generally more adequate in Connecticut than in the other
two jurisdictions. Connecticut had higher minimum and
maximum benefits, had a dependency allowance, and was
the only jurisdiction that provided a cost-of-living adjust
ment for outstanding cases.
Scheduled permanent partial disability benefits are dif
ficult to compare among jurisdictions because of the com
plexity of the statutory provisions for such benefits. Those
aspects summarized in table 21 suggest that Connecticut is
perhaps somewhat less generous in terms of the number of
weeks of benefits paid for particular types of injuries (such
as the loss of a leg), but considerable more generous in terms
of the weekly benefit. In New Jersey, the maximum weekly
benefit started at $49 and did not reach $236 until there were
421 weeks of benefits; in New York, the weekly maximum
was $105 for all durations; in Connecticut, the maximum for
all durations as $326.
Statutory provisions for nonscheduled permanent partial
disability benefits are also difficult to compare because of
the different approaches used to provide the benefits. New
Jersey determines the duration by evaluating the extent of
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the worker's impairment and multiplying the rating percent
age times 600 weeks; the maximum weekly benefit ranges
from $49 to $236. New York has a maximum weekly benefit
of $105, which is relatively low, but the payments can con
tinue for the length of disability, which can be for life. Con
necticut pays benefits that are related to the percent of wage
loss, with a maximum duration of 780 weeks and a max
imum weekly benefit of $326. It is not evident which jurisdic
tion's provisions for nonscheduled benefits are more
generous, but Connecticut does not appear to be deficient.
The final type of benefit included in table 21 is fatal
benefits, where Connecticut generally has the most liberal
provisions. The nominal percentage of 63 2/3 percent found
in Connecticut is matched in New York, but in the latter case
the benefits are subject to an offset provision that reduces
workers' compensation benefits when social security benefits
are received by the widow or widower. The minimum weekly
benefit is lower in Connecticut, but the levels are so low in all
three jurisdictions that few cases are likely to be affected.
More significant is the maximum weekly benefit, highest in
Connecticut, and the cost of living adjustment for outstand
ing cases, a provision found only in Connecticut.
This qualitative assessment of the workers' compensation
statutes in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York as of
January 1, 1983 suggests that Connecticut has the most
generous provisions for most types of benefits. As between
New Jersey and New York, the differences are not as pro
nounced, although for all types of benefits except fatal the
New Jersey maximum weekly benefits are higher. Thus, at
least in a rough sense, the ranking of workers' compensation
costs as of January 1983 as shown in tables 19 and 20 cor
responds to the ranking of statutory benefit generosity
shown in table 21.

188

Variations in Employers' Costs

The view that employers' costs of workers' compensation
are affected by statutory provisions is reinforced by informa
tion on the changes through time in these factors. Tables 19
and 20 demonstrated the changes between 1972 and 1983 in
the costs in the three states, with Connecticut moving from
least to most expensive, while New York costs were declining
to least expensive. Table 22 presents information on the
changes between 1972 and 1983 in the extent of compliance
with the 19 essential recommendations of The National
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. 64
These essential recommendations primarily pertain to
benefit amounts and durations, the types of provisions for
which increasing compliance is likely to lead to higher costs.
It is instructive that the state with the most dramatic change
in compliance scores between 1972 and 1983 is Connecticut.
Further, most of the improvements in Connecticut took
place between 1978 and 1983, which matches the interval
when the employers' costs of workers' compensation in
creased sharply in the state.
Table 22
State Compliance With the 19 Essential Recommendations
of the National Commission
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
Year
(as of
Average of
January 1) 52 jurisdictions Connecticut New Jersey
1972
1975
1978
1980
1983

6.9
9.4
11.7
12.1
12.2

10.5
10.5
10.75
13.75
14.0

10.5
10.5
10.5
10.5
10.75

New York
9.0
9.0
10.0
10.0
10.0

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, Division of State Workers' Compensation Standards,
State Compliance with the 19 Essential Recommendations of the National Commission on
State Workmen's Compensation Laws, 1972-1980 (January 1981), as supplemented by
January 1, 1983 release from the Division (now the Division of State Workers' Compensa
tion Programs).
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An even more compelling demonstration of the relation
ship between changes in statutory provisions and changes in
workers' compensation costs is provided by comparing the
cost data in tables 19 and 20 with the data in table 23 show
ing the levels of the maximum weekly benefits for temporary
total disability. Both in terms of the dollar amounts of the
maximums and in terms of the maximum benefit as a per
centage of the state's average weekly wage, Connecticut had
the greatest increase between 1972 and 1983, followed by
New Jersey, and then by New York. Again of interest is that
most of the improvement in Connecticut's maximum for
temporary total disability took place after 1978, correspond
ing to the time when the cost of the program in the state also
sharply increased.
While this analysis suggests that changes in benefit levels
are an important determinant of changes in the employers'
costs of workers' compensation, we do not want to suggest
that benefits are the only factor that affects costs. In a
separate study, we are examining the influence on costs of
variables such as coverage and the type of insurance ar
rangements (as measured by the importance of state in
surance funds and of self-insurance). 65 Another factor that
affects costs is the administration of the law, and in par
ticular the application of the statutory provisions for perma
nent total disability and permanent disability benefits.
Tables 24 to 26 present information on the number and costs
of these types of benefits in Connecticut, New Jersey, and
New York.
The data are based on claims that occurred in the policy
years closest to 1958, 1968, 1973, and 1978. Because of the
delays between the ends of the policy years and the dates
when information on the claims from those years are
available, 1978 is the most recent year for which data are
available on both the number and costs of permanent

Table 23
Maximum Weekly Benefit for Temporary Total Disability
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, 1972-1983

Year
(as of
January 1)
1972
1975
1978
1980
1983

Connecticut
As percentage
Dollars
of SAWW

New Jersey
As percentage
Dollars
of SAWW

New York
As percentage
Dollars
of SAWW

$ 95.00
119.00
147.00
261.00
326.00

$ 95.00
119.00
146.00
185.00
236.00

$ 95.00
125.00
125.00
215.00
215.00

63.3
75.2
73.3
114.7
118.5

SOURCE: See table 22.
NOTE: SAWW is the state's average weekly wage.
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disability claims and the employers' costs of workers' com
pensation insurance.
The shares of all cases with cash benefits accounted for by
permanent disability cases in the three jurisdictions are ex
amined in table 24. The most significant finding is the con
siderably greater importance of permanent disability cases in
New Jersey than in Connecticut or New York. In particular,
minor permanent partial disability benefits dominated the
New Jersey caseload, accounting for almost half of all cases
in 1978.
The average costs of permanent disability cases are
presented in table 25. Overall, New Jersey has the lowest
average, reflecting in large part the predominance of the
minor permanent partial disability cases. As of 1978, Con
necticut had the highest average cost per case for each of the
three types of permanent disability cases as well as for the
overall average.
The shares of all cash benefits accounted for by permanent
disability cases are presented in table 26. While Connecticut
devoted the highest percentage of all cash benefits to major
permanent partial disability benefits in 1978, New Jersey ex
pended the largest percentages on permanent total, minor
permanent partial, and all permanent disability cases. In
deed, for each of the four years shown between 1958 and
1978, New Jersey expended the highest percentage of all cash
benefits on the total of the three types of permanent disabili
ty benefits.
These data confirm what has been widely discussed
elsewhere, namely, the unusual emphasis in New Jersey on
the compensation of relatively minor permanent im
pairments. 66 This probably is one reason why the employers'
costs of workers' compensation were relatively high in the
state, given the level of benefits. For example, in 1978, when

Table 24
Share of All Cases with Cash Benefits Accounted for by Permanent Disability Cases
in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, 1958-1978, in percentages

1958
1968
1973
1978

Major permanent
partial

Permanent total
CT
NJ
NY
(1)
(2)
(3)

CT
(4)

NJ

(5)

NY
(6)

0.05
0.04
0.03
0.04

1.79
2.24
1.52
3.24

1.83
2.77
3.20
4.24

2.34
2.17
2.82
4.36

0.08
0.05
0.09
0.14

0.09
0.03
0.05
0.08

Minor permanent
partial
CT
NJ
NY
(7)
(8)
(9)

All permanent
disability cases
CT
NJ
NY
(10)
(11)
(12)

30.49
24.00
68.99
32.93
31.73
19.28
61.30
33.93
27.02
14.32
53.18
29.89
24.14
15.10
54.22
28.58
SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Certain Competitive
State Funds—1st Report Basis," Exhibits dated (no date), March 15, 1972, July 1976, and April 1982.
22.16
17.00
12.77
11.82
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67.08
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Table 25
Average Cost of Permanent Disability Cases
in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, 1958-1978, in dollars
Permanent total

1958
1968
1973
1978

CT
(1)

NJ
(2)

NY

34,167
92,840
120,356
105,208

32,500
66,464
63,396
87,944

19,714
33,280
42,358
62,925

(3)

Major permanent
partial
NY
NJ
CT
(6)
(5)
(4)
7,462
10,831
17,332
25,450

8,451
10,308
11,713
15,344

8,897
12,368
14,337
18,534

Minor permanent
partial
NY
NJ
CT
(9)
(8)
(7)
1,358
2,230
3,174
4,446

904
1,566
1,918
2,482

1,044
1,722
1,819
2,351

All permanent

disability cases
CT
(10)

NJ
(11)

NY
(12)

1,875
3,407
4,926
9,204

1,141
2,015
2,617
3,711

2,430
3,072
4,997

1,616

SOURCE: See table 24.
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the maximum weekly benefits for temporary total disability
in Connecticut and New Jersey were virtually identical (table
23), the costs of workers' compensation insurance were
much higher in the latter state.
What the data in tables 24 to 26 cannot reveal because the
terminal date in 1978 is the impact of the major reform in
1979 of the permanent partial disability benefits in New
Jersey. 67 The law was amended to require objective evidence
of permanent impairments, presumably to preclude payment
of permanent partial disability benefits for minor injuries.
Apparently the reform had the intended effect of reducing
the costs of workers' compensation insurance in New Jersey:
even though the maximum weekly benefit for temporary
total disability increased more rapidly than the state's
average weekly wage between 1978 and 1983 (table 23), in
surance costs as a percentage of payroll dropped markedly
during the same interval (table 19).
The data on permanent disability benefits in tables 24 to
26 have other interesting aspects. In New York, the share of
cash benefits accounted for by all types of permanent
disability cases fluctuated in a very narrow band over the
1958 to 1978 period (from 55 to 57 percent). However, this
represented a significant decline in importance of minor per
manent partial cases and an offsetting increase in importance
of major permanent partial cases. Additional data on perma
nent partial disability benefits in New York are presented in
table 27. These data are from records kept by the Workers'
Compensation Board and pertain to cases closed in a given
year, regardless of the year of injury, while the data in tables
24-26, from insurance industry records, pertain to injuries
that occurred in a given policy year regardless of when the
cases were closed. Another difference is that the insurance
industry data divide permanent partial disability cases be
tween major and minor categories depending on the
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seriousness of the injury (or the amount of benefits paid),
while the table 27 data distinguish between scheduled and
nonscheduled permanent partial cases. The latter distinction
is particularly interesting because New York uses different
approaches for the two types of benefits: scheduled benefits
are paid on the basis of the extent of physical impairment
without regard to the amount of actual wage loss, while the
nonscheduled benefits are largely based on the amount of ac
tual earnings losses.
Table 27
New York
Number of Cases and Cost of Compensation
for Scheduled and Nonscheduled Permanent Partial Disability
as a Percentage of All Cases, Selected Years, 1960-1982

Year
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1982

Scheduled awards as
percentage of
Amount of
Number of
compensation
cases
34.1
38.9
37.9
37.3
35.6
36.4

35.0
34.8
35.7
30.0
24.0
24.2

Nonscheduled awards as
percentage of
Amount of
Number of
compensation
cases
3.0
2.6
2.6
3.1
3.8
4.2

32.2
34.8
34.5
44.7
52.2
52.4

SOURCE: Compensated Cases Closed, Workers' Compensation Board, State of New
York, for years shown.

The data in table 27 indicate a rapid increase during the
1970s in the share of cases and cash payments accounted for
by nonscheduled awards, with a significant decline in the
amount of compensation going to scheduled awards. Burton
has examined these patterns in a recent study, 68 and found
that a major reason why nonscheduled permanent partial
cases have become more expensive during the last decade is
the relatively high unemployment rates during the period. In-
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deed, given the magnitude of the increases shown in table 27
for nonscheduled cases and the high levels of unemployment
so far in the 1980s, it is surprising that workers' compensa
tion costs have declined so rapidly in New York since 1978
(table 19).
This analysis of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York
thus provides some interesting findings on the behavior of
workers' compensation costs between 1972 and 1983, and
some partial explanations of the changes in costs. There were
significant changes in the relative costs among the three
jurisdictions, with Connecticut having experienced the most
rapid increase and New Jersey the largest decline. The ex
planation of Connecticut's increase appears to be largely due
to the jurisdiction's significant improvement in benefits
compared to the other states. In New Jersey, the rapid
decline in costs compared to the other two jurisdictions be
tween 1972 and 1983 appears to reflect both a deterioration
in benefit levels compared to Connecticut and the reduction
in the prevalence of minor permanent partial disability
benefits. The New York experience of declining costs be
tween 1978 and 1983 reflects in part the slippage of benefits
compared to those in Connecticut during this interval; it is
not clear why the increasing costs of nonscheduled benefits
have not limited the costs declines shown in table 19.
Perhaps the best one sentence summary is that over the 1972
to 1983 interval, the changing relative costs in workers' com
pensation insurance in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New
York can be largely but not entirely explained by changing
levels of benefits.

XIII. Significance of the Cost Developments Since 1972
The historical data on the employers' costs of workers'
compensation insurance were presented in tables 17 and 18
and described in section XI. The essence is that between 1950
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and 1978 there were significant increases both in the percent
age of payroll devoted to workers' compensation premiums
and in the weekly insurance premium per worker. Also, the
variations among the states in these two measures of
workers' compensation costs significantly increased through
time. The developments between 1978 and 1983 are more
complex. For the combinations of states for which the
historical record is the longest (20 and 28 states), the ad
justed manual rates showed continuing increases in the
means and the standard deviations (table 17, columns 1-4).
However, for the larger combinations of states (42 and 47
states), there were decreases in the means and standard
deviations of adjusted manual rates between 1978 and 1983
(table 17, columns 5-8). The behavior of weekly premiums
per worker continued the patterns of earlier years in the 1978
to 1983 interval: for all combinations of states, the means
and standard deviations increased between these years (table
18).
Although the patterns of cost changes in the most recent
five-year interval are somewhat mixed, a clear picture
emerges if we consider developments over the entire period
since 1972. That starting point seems appropriate since it is
the first year for which data are available for all three states
of primary concern to this study (Connecticut, New Jersey,
and New York) and because 1972 was the year that the Na
tional Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
Laws issued its report and called attention to the issue of in
terstate cost differences. 69 Between 1972 and 1983, every
combination of states shown in tables 17 and 18 for which
data are available has shown increases both in the average
costs and the differences in costs among states.
The determinants of these cost developments are largely
beyond the scope of this study. Several findings are relevant,
however. In an earlier study, Burton found that the level of
workers' compensation benefits were the most significant
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variable in explaining interstate differences in costs among
25 states. 70 In a current research project, we have confirmed
the statistical significance of the level of benefits in explain
ing workers' compensation cost differences among 31
jurisdictions. 71 Because of data limitations, neither of these
studies included New Jersey and New York. However, the
qualitative analysis in section XII of this study suggests that
changes in benefit levels between 1972 and 1983 were an im
portant factor in explaining changes in workers' compensa
tion costs in these two states relative to the cost changes in
Connecticut.
We believe this evidence supports the proposition that in
terstate differences in the levels of workers' compensation
benefits are a major (though not the only) determinant of in
terstate differences in the employers' costs of workers' com
pensation. If this proposition is true, then the developments
since 1972 in costs are particularly disturbing because they
suggest the interstate inequities in benefits that were of ma
jor concern to the National Commission have become worse
in the last decade. The changes in maximum weekly benefits
for temporary total disability between 1972 and 1983 in Con
necticut, New Jersey and New York provide a partial valida
tion of the disturbing developments. In January 1972, the
dollar amounts were identical in the three states. In January
1983, injured workers qualifying for the maximum weekly
benefit received $100 more per week in Connecticut than in
New Jersey, while New York workers at the maximum were
another $21 below the New Jersey figure. 72 To be sure, New
Jersey and New York employers had lower workers' com
pensation costs than did Connecticut employers, but since
the two inexpensive jurisdictions failed to comply with the
National Commission's recommendations for maximum
weekly benefits for temporary total, permanent total, and
death cases, their achievement seems more due to parsimony
than prudence.

200

Variations in Employers' Costs

NOTES
"The present study is based in large part on a study prepared by Burton
with the assistance of Krueger entitled "Interstate Variations in the
Employers' Costs of Workers' Compensation, With Particular
Reference to Ohio and Pennsylvania." The January 1984 study was
prepared through the auspices of Workers' Disability Income Systems,
Inc. (202 Blackstone Avenue, Ithaca, NY 14850) with financial support
from the Workers' Compensation Coalition. The Coalition consists of
CIGNA, Crum & Forster, Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company,
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Pennsylvania Manufacturers
Association Insurance Company. We appreciate the opportunity to use
the material from the study sponsored by the Workers' Compensation
Coalition. The views in the present study are not necessarily those of the
Coalition.
In preparing the present study, refined estimates were prepared for the
costs of workers' compensation in five jurisdictions. The estimated costs
were increased significantly for Michigan and decreased slightly for
Delaware, New York, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
We appreciate the assistance of Dane Partridge, who prepared several
of the tables involving comparisons among Connecticut, New Jersey,
and New York, and Nancy Voorheis, for typing this article. We assume
responsibility for all views and data, no matter how persuasive and ac
curate.
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tive in July 1983. This limitation will not affect the comparisons in this
study, which involve rates in effect on January 1, 1983.
27. The rules concerning overtime are presented in the OhioPennsylvania Study, footnote 31.
28. Unfortunately, data on overtime pay and hours are limited and are
only available for production workers in manufacturing, which are likely
to overstate the importance of the weekly overtime premium. Table 5 of
the Ohio-Pennsylvania Study shows that the weekly overtime premium
for production workers involved in manufacturing ranged from 2.9 per
cent of payroll in 1982 to 4.3 percent of payroll in 1978.
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constant.
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presented in Williams, supra note 9.
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tion Rating Laws - A Digest of Changes (New York: 1982 with sup
plements), and exhibits included with June 24, 1983 letter from Barry
Llewellyn, Assistant Secretary, National Council on Compensation In
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51. Williams, supra note 9.
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published rates on January 1, 1983. By September 7, 1983 another 47
companies had filed deviations. Ratings Laws Digest, quarterly update
November 1983.
53. The adjustment figures for all states but Michigan were provided in a
September 16,1983 letter from Barry Llewellyn, Assistant Secretary, Na
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figure was provided by R. Kevin Clinton, Chief Actuary, State of
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54. Rating Laws Digest.
55. Data for 1980 and 1981 were provided in an exhibit included with a
July 8, 1983 letter from Paul C. Whitacre, Jr., Director, Actuarial Sec
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57. The West Virginia calculations are facilitated since manual rates and
premiums actually collected are available for the same 12-month period.
58. This assumption that the influence of experience rating for 1979-81 is
also relevant for the rates in effect on January 1, 1983 must be used with
caution. Frederick Kilbourse, the consulting actuary for West Virginia,
indicated in a phone conversation with John Burton on November 21,
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the impact of the revised formula, and so the 9.3 percent figure discussed
in the text will be used by default.
59. The generally available information on earnings by state is inap
propriate. The most common statistics used in connection with earnings
on a state level are the average weekly earnings of manufacturing
workers for each state compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. (See,
e.g., U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings
Statistics for States and Areas, 1939-70, bulletin 1370-8 [1971].) Similar
statistics collected by the National Council on Compensation Insurance
for affiliated states are the average weekly earnings of injured workmen
by state. Both sets of statistics suffer from the same limitation as far as
the current interest in variations in employers' costs of workers' compen-
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sation is concerned: they are influenced both by interstate variations in
the earnings received by workers in the same industry and interstate
variations in the composition of industries. For a demonstration of the
inappropriateness of such data for the present study, see Dissertation,
note 32, pp. 88-89.
60. Dissertation, note 33, pp. 89-90.
61. The size of the state's labor force in 1980 was used for the 1950 to
1983 data. The procedure used in the Task Force Report and the MLR
article relied on the state's labor force size in 1970. This explains why the
entries for 1950 to 1978 in tables 17 and 18 differ from the figures shown
in the earlier publications.
62. The standard deviation is the square root of the variance, which is
found by calculating the deviation of each item from the mean, squaring
these deviations, and then calculating the mean square deviation. When
there is a "normal" distribution of items, about two-thirds of all items
are within the range from one standard deviation below the mean to one
standard deviation above the mean. For an elementary discussion of
these concepts, see Daniel B. Suits, Statistics: An Introduction to Quan
titative Economic Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 38-51.
63. We are currently preparing a statistical study of the determinants of
interstate differences in workers' compensation insurance among 31
jurisdictions, including Connecticut but not New Jersey or New York.
See note 65 below.
64. National Commission Report, p. 127.
65. Alan B. Krueger and John F. Burton, Jr., "Interstate Differences in
the Employers' Costs of Workers' Compensation: Magnitudes, Causes,
and Cures," (mimeo: February 1984).
66. Monroe Berkowitz, Workmen's Compensation (New Brunswick,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1960), and Monroe Berkowitz and John F.
Burton, Jr., Permanent Disability Benefits in the Workers' Compensa
tion Program: A Multistate Study of Criteria and Procedures
(Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute, forthcoming).
67. These developments are described in Permanent Disability Benefits,
chapter 7.
68. John F. Burton, Jr., "Compensation for Permanent Partial
Disabilities," in John D. Worrall, ed., Safety and the Work Force
(Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1983), esp. pp. 52-58.
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69. National Commission Report, pp. 124-125.
70. Dissertation, chapter VII.

71. Krueger and Burton, Interstate Differences.
72. Even with the subsequent amendments to the New York law, the
maximum weekly benefit for temporary total disability will not reach
$300 until 1985. Because the Connecticut law has an automatic increase
in the maximum tied to changes in the state's wages, Connecticut will
maintain a higher maximum for the foreseeable future: by late 1983, the
figure had already reached $345.
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Workers' Compensation
Insurance Rates
Their Determination and Regulation
A Regional Perspective
C. Arthur Williams, Jr.
School of Management
University of Minnesota

One of the most discussed issues of the day is the high cost
of workers' compensation insurance. As of September 1,
1982, in the 45 states (including the District of Columbia)
with private insurers, workers' compensation standard earn
ed premiums (a term to be defined later) averaged about
$2.41 per $100 of payroll. The variation among states was
great, however, ranging from $.74 in Indiana to $4.83 in
Hawaii. 1 Comparable data are not available for the six states
with exclusive state funds (Ohio, Nevada, North Dakota,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). Because this
session is directed mainly toward regional experience in Con
necticut, New Jersey, and New York, the relative cost in
those three states is of special interest. Connecticut ranked
16th highest with a $2.75 rate, New Jersey 22nd with a $2.48
rate, and New York 39th with a $1.55 rate.
Many factors account for the variation in these rates, in
cluding differences in the following: (1) the mix of payrolls
according to industry and firm size; (2) injury and disease
209
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frequency and severity rates; (3) statutory benefits including
eligibility requirements; (4) administrative and court inter
pretations of these benefits; (5) medical expenses for the
same treatment; (6) the effectiveness of loss control and
claims handling services provided by employers, insurers,
and state agencies; (7) insurer expense and profit loadings;
and (8) the presence or absence of a competitive state fund.
This paper will concentrate on how the ways in which
workers' compensation insurance rates are determined and
regulated vary among the states, with special attention to
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York.

Workers9 Compensation
Insurance Rate Determination
Insured employers can be classified according to whether
they are (1) class-rated, (2) experience rated, (3) schedulerated, or (4) retrospectively-rated. This section will discuss
first how insurers determine the insured's premium, given a
set of rates and rating plans. Second, it will describe in
general terms how insurers determine the class rates printed
in their rating manuals. In addition to these rating methods
many insurers return a dividend that reduces the net cost.
The dividend may vary among firms depending upon their
size and individual loss experience. Because these methods
tend to be the same in all jurisdictions, no special attention
will be paid to regional practices in this section.

Class Premiums
Employers who are class-rated pay a rate per $100 of
payroll that is based primarily on the industry or industries
in which they are engaged. Separate rates have been
developed for over 600 industries. However, the payroll
assigned to certain employees such as clerical office
employees, drivers (usually but not always), and outside
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salespersons is assigned the same rate regardless of the
employer's industry. For example, suppose a small abrasive
paper manufacturer has a total payroll of $250,000-$200,000
for plant workers and $50,000 for clerical office employees.
Further assume that the class rates per $100 of payroll are
$2.50 for the plant workers and $.25 for the clerical
employees. The class premium would be
2,000($2.50)-f 500($.25) or $5,125. 2 Traditionally all
workers' compensation insurers in the state charged the same
class rates, but in an increasing number of states some price
competition exists with respect to class rates.
For employers whose average class premium is under
$2,500 (still $750 in some states), the class premium is the
amount charged. Over half the insured employers are classrated, but because they employ few workers, these classrated firms pay less than 10 percent of the premiums received
by insurers. All other employers are experience rated. An in
creasing number are both experience rated and schedulerated. Employers whose premiums exceed $5,000 may be
permitted to be retrospectively-rated in addition to being ex
perience rated. Insurers, however, usually limit retrospective
rating to firms paying premiums of at least $100,000.
Employers whose experience premiums exceed $5,000 (still
$1,000 in some states) receive a premium discount because
the insurer's expenses (not loss payments) do not increase
proportionately with the premium size. Retrospectivelyrated employers receive this discount through the retrospec
tive rating formula. Other eligibile employers are rated under
a separate premium discount plan.

Experience Rating
Under experience rating an employer's class premium is
modified to reflect two factors. 3 The first factor is how the
employer's loss experience during a recent three-year period
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compares with the amount the insurer would have expected
to pay (given current rates except for changes in the workers'
compensation law since the experience period) if the
employer had been an average employer in the same industry
with the same payroll. For example, if the employer's losses
were half the insurer's expectation, this factor alone would
suggest cutting the rate in half. If the losses were twice the in
surer's expectation, this comparison would suggest a dou
bling of the rate. However, the adjustment also depends on
how much credibility or confidence the insurer should assign
to this employer's loss experience. The reasoning behind this
factor is that chance alone may cause the experience of in
dividual employers to fluctuate greatly from year to year.
The smaller the payroll exposure for a given hazard class, the
more important this chance factor becomes. For example, a
very small employer may have no losses for 10 years follow
ed by a substantial loss the next year. As the employer's
payroll increases, his or her experience becomes more pre
dictable because the future tends to resemble the past more
and more closely. Of course, no matter how large the
employer may be, the future may differ from the past
because of such factors as law amendments, inflation, or
changes in the work environment. In practice, insurers assign
no credibility to the experience of employers with average
class premiums of less than $2,500. Above that point the
credibility increases gradually from 1 percent to 100 percent.
Few employers have enough exposure for their experience to
be considered 100 percent credible. If an employer had a
credibility factor of 20 percent and experience period losses
equal to half the insurer's expectations, instead of cutting the
class premium in half the insurer would reduce the class
premium (20 percent) (50 percent) or 10 percent. If the ex
perience period losses had been twice the insurer's loss expec
tation, instead of doubling the premium the insurer would
increase the class premium (20 percent) (100 percent) or 20
percent.
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The net effect of experience rating is that the employer
pays a rate that is in effect a weighted average of two rates.
The first of these two rates is one based on his or her own
loss experience during the experience period adjusted to
reflect what these payments would have been under the cur
rent workers' compensation law. The second is the ap
propriate class rate. The first rate is weighted by the
employer's credibility factor, the second by one minus that
same factor. For example, if the credibility factor is 20 per
cent, the rate based on the employer's experience is .50, and
the class rate is 1.00, the experience rate will be (20 percent)
(.50)+ (80 percent) (1.00) = .90. The higher the credibility
factor the less the experience rate will depend upon the class
rate.

Schedule Rating
In many states many insurers have in recent years in
troduced schedule rating plans. Under these plans insurers
usually decrease the rate the employer would otherwise pay
through credits based on a subjective evaluation of such fac
tors as the employer's loss control program.

Retrospective Rating
Retrospective rating bases the employer's premium on the
employer's loss experience during the policy period, subject
to the condition that the premium cannot be less than a
stated minimum nor higher than a stated maximum. Between
the minimum and maximum limits the retrospective
premium is equal to the losses the employer incurs during the
policy period plus the expenses that are related to the losses
incurred and a basic premium. The basic premium covers the
expenses that do not vary with the losses incurred and a net
insurance charge. The insurer imposes a net insurance charge
because in the aggregate the insurer loses more dollars
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(because of the maximum premium limitation) than it gains
from those who pay the minimum premium. Retrospective
rating permits quasi-self-insurance. In most cases the
premium depends upon the employer's own loss experience,
but the insurer administers the program and the premium is
bounded by the minimum and maximum premiums. Because
the basic premium is a function of the experience premium,
it is affected by any change in the class premium in the same
manner as the experience premium. For the most part,
however, an employer's retrospective premium does not de
pend upon its class rates.
A version of retrospective rating that has become popular
in many states in recent years is paid-loss retro. Instead of
paying a deposit premium in advance, subject to later ad
justments as more information on payrolls and losses
becomes available, the insured pays the retrospective
premium in annual installments. Each year's installment is
the benefits and expenses paid that year because of accidents
that occurred during the policy period. The insured may
prefer this approach because (1) the insured retains the use
of the premium dollars longer and (2) the premium paid
never depends upon the insurer's estimate of future
payments. However, the insurer may increase its charges
because it loses some of the investment income it would
otherwise make. A related practice that affects more insureds than paid-loss retro plans waives the requirement that
employers with a premium of at least $2,500 pay in advance
a full deposit premium.

Dividends
Many workers' compensation insurers return dividends to
their policyholders. These dividends may vary among firms
depending upon their size and their individual loss ex
perience.
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How Insurers Determine Their Class Rates
In order to understand how insurers determine the class
rates in the rating manual, one must know the elements of a
class rate. A class rate includes allowances for (1) expected
losses, (2) the expenses the insurer expects to incur in servic
ing the insured, and (3) a profit for the insurer or a margin
for policyholder dividends.
The expected loss allowance is the amount the insurer ex
pects to pay in benefits per $100 of payroll to all insured
employees in the same industry during the period the rate is
in effect. The principal reasons the insurer may change this
allowance are that it expects changes in (1) the frequency and
severity of job-related injuries or diseases, (2) the propensity
of employees to claim benefits for their injuries or diseases,
(3) the workers' compensation law, or (4) the cost of settling
claims because of such economic factors as rising or falling
wage levels or medical costs. The expected loss allowance,
therefore, is based on expectations for the future that are
subject to considerable error. In establishing these expecta
tions, the insurer analyzes its experience in the recent past,
modified to reflect changes that it expects to occur during the
future because of law changes and trends in claim frequency
and severity. Even if the law will remain the same and there
are no changes in claim frequency or severity, the past ex
perience may suggest that the current rates be increased or
decreased. The current rates may be inadequate or excessive
because the insurers or the regulators either underestimated
or overestimated the insurer's needs when they established
those rates, or because the rates have been in effect for some
time and conditions have changed.
The expense allowance is expressed as a percent of the
rate. Some of these expenses, such as commissions, are
budgeted and paid as a percent of the rate. Others, such as
general administrative expenses, are not budgeted, but on
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the basis of past experience and future trends the insurer can
determine what proportion of the rate it will use for this pur
pose.
The profit or profit and contingency allowance is also ex
pressed as a percent of the rate. As will be explained later,
the profit allowance in most states is 2.5 percent. Conse
quently if the insurer's expected loss and expense allowances
exactly matched actual losses and expenses, the insurers
would have earned an underwriting profit equal to 2.5 per
cent of the class premiums written. Because these expecta
tions are almost never realized exactly, the actual under
writing profit rate may be more or less than 2.5 percent. In
surers argue that this 2.5 percent profit rate plus the invest
ment income generated by writing workers' compensation
insurance would produce a reasonable profit on net worth.
If the expense allowance were set at 32.5 percent of the
rate and the profit allowance at 2.5 percent, the remainder of
the rate, 65 percent, would be available to pay losses. If the
dollar amount required to pay losses was determined to be
$1.30 per $100 of payroll, the rate would be $1.307.65 or
$2.00.
Workers' Compensation
Insurance Rate Regulation
Workers' compensation rates are regulated in a variety of
ways. Except for Texas, where a state board makes the rates,
states are commonly grouped into two general categories:
(1) rating bureau—prior approval states and (2) opencompetition states. In rating bureau—prior approval states,
the largest category at the present time, rating bureaus are
permitted to develop and file rates in behalf of their
members and subscribers. Membership in the rating bureau
may be compulsory or optional. Agreements to adhere to
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these rates may or may not be permitted; where such
agreements are permitted, members and subscribers may or
may not be permitted to deviate from these rates. All of these
states require the insurance commissioner to approve
workers' compensation rates before they can be used.
Open-competition states may or may not permit rating
bureaus, renamed data service organizations, to publish ad
visory rates. All, however, make membership in the
organization optional, and prohibit agreements to adhere to
these rates. All require insurers to file their rates with the
state insurance department, but none have a prior approval
requirement. Insurers, however, may be unable to use filed
rates until after they have been on file for a designated
period of time. The six open-competition states at present
are Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, and
Rhode Island. Georgia and Minnesota have also enacted
open-competition laws that soon will become effective.
As this discussion indicates, a two-way classification of
states (other than Texas) oversimplifies the situation. Within
each of these two categories some significant differences ex
ist. Table 1 shows for each of the 45 states in which private
insurers operate (1) the role that rating bureaus are permit
ted to play in rate determinations and (2) whether the state
insurance commissioner must approve proposed bureau or
individual insurer rates before they go into effect.

Role of Rating Bureaus
As of early 1983, every state except Kentucky, Michigan,
Oregon, and Texas permits rating bureaus either to develop
advisory rates or make rate filings in behalf of their
members. Kentucky, Michigan and Oregon permit rating
bureaus to develop only advisory "pure" premiums
(premiums without expense or profit loadings). In Texas the
State Board of Insurance makes the rates. Only 10 of these

Table 1
Types of Workers' Compensation Insurance Rate Regulation, by State, Early 1983
Rating bureaus

Jurisdiction

Bureau rate filings
or advisory rates
permitted

Membership
required

Rate adherence
agreements
permitted

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas (OC)
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia*5
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois (OC)
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky (OC)
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan (OC)
Minnesota0

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Nod
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Nod
Yes

No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

3

Deviations
permissible

Prior approval of
rates required

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Prior filing only
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
NA
Noa
NA
NA
Yes
Yes
Yes
NA
Yes
Yes
NA
Yes
Yes
Yes
NA
Yes
Yes
NA
No
NA
NA

O
"1

a
O

o
3

s

03
P
r*

o"
S3

90

P
ff
VI

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Oregon (OC)
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island (OC)
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Nod
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
State Board of Insurance makes rates, no deviations
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
Noa
NA
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
NA
No
NA
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Prior filing only
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
NA
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

SOURCE: Derived from information supplied by the American Insurance Association and the National Council on Compensation Insurance.
a. Unless above rates approved by the commissioner.
b. Effective January 1, 1984 Georgia will substitute an open competition rating law for its present approach. Bureaus will be permitted to
publish advisory rates.
c. Effective July 1, 1983 Minnesota will enter a transition period that will lead to full open competition by January 1, 1986. After that date the
bureau will not even be permitted to publish advisory pure premiums. It will be able to publish aggregated loss data, trend factors, and loss
development factors. Prior approval will continue with respect to upward deviations from these pure premiums until July 1, 1986 when it will
cease completely. (In late May 1983 Minnesota advanced the beginning of complete open competition to January 1, 1984.)
d. Advisory pure premiums only.
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43 jurisdictions (Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana,Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Penn
sylvania, and Wisconsin) require all workers' compensation
insurers to belong to a rating organization, but the practice
in most other states is for most, if not all, insurers to become
bureau members. Although bureau membership is not re
quired in most states, all but 14 of the 43 states that permit
bureau rate filings (Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode
Island, and Virginia) permit bureaus to require adherence to
the bureau rates. In these states that prohibit such adherence
agreements, however, most insurers have until recently
elected to use the bureau rates. Among the 29 states that per
mit agreements to adhere to bureau rates all but seven states
(California, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) permit insurers
either (1) to deviate from the bureau rates after securing the
insurance commissioner's approval or (2) a much less com
mon option, to charge lower rates without securing any prior
approval. Such deviations seldom occurred in the past except
for specialized classes for which some insurers may have
developed some special expertise or associations. They have
become more common in recent years through the filing of
deviations from class rates or of scheduled rating plans. Only
five states require all insurers to belong to a rating bureau,
permit agreements to adhere to the bureau rates, and pro
hibit deviations from these rates.
In most states the National Council on Compensation In
surance is the rating organization. The exceptions are as
follows:
Workers' Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau
of California
Delaware Compensation Rating Bureau
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Hawaii Insurance Rating Bureau
Indiana Compensation Rating Bureau (administered
by the National Council on Compensation Insurance)
Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau
of Massachusetts
Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection
Association of Michigan
Workers' Compensation Insurers' Rating Association
of Minnesota
New Jersey Compensation Rating and Inspection
Bureau
New York Compensation Insurance Rating Board
North Carolina Rate Bureau
Pennsylvania Compensation Rating Bureau
Virginia Compensation Rating Bureau
Wisconsin Compensation Rating Bureau
The National Council provides many of these independent
rating bureaus with statistical services.
All states with independent rating bureaus except Indiana,
Minnesota, and Virginia permit these bureaus to require
adherence to their rates. Of the seven states that prohibit
deviations from agreements to adhere to bureau rates, all but
Missouri are states with independent rating bureaus.
Georgia and Minnesota will soon become opencompetition states. In Georgia insurers will be permitted to
develop advisory rates. In Minnesota rating bureaus will at
first be permitted to develop advisory pure premiums, but
starting in 1986 (changed to 1984 in late May 1983) they can
publish only actual loss costs plus loss development and
trend information.
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York are all rating
bureau-prior approval states. However, Connecticut does
not require insurers to belong to the bureau and forbids
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agreements to adhere to the bureau rates. New Jersey re
quires insurers to belong to its independent bureau, permits
agreements to adhere to the bureau rates, and prohibits
deviations from those rates. New York does not require in
surers to belong to its independent bureau, but it permits
agreements to adhere to bureau rates. However, deviations
from the bureau rates are permitted. Connecticut and New
Jersey, but not New York, permit insurers to waive the ad
vance payment of a full deposit premium.

Prior Approval Requirements
As table 1 shows, all states, except the six opencompetition states, require insurers to file their proposed
rates and wait until the state insurance commissioner ap
proves them. Usually the commissioner must act within a
stated period after the rates are filed. If he or she fails to act
within that period, the insurer can use the rates.
In two open-competition states (Arkansas and Oregon) an
insurer cannot use rates until they have been on file for a
designated period. In the other states, insurers are permitted
either to use the rates and then file them or to file their rates
and use them immediately.
Georgia and Minnesota will soon become opencompetition states. Georgia will not require prior approval;
Minnesota will require approval only of upward deviations
from the bureau advisory pure premiums until 1986 (chang
ed to 1984 in late May 1983) after which time insurers will be
able to use their rates immediately and file them later. Con
necticut, New Jersey, and New York are all prior approval
states.
Important Regulatory Issues
Three regulatory issues that have been the subject of in
tense debate in recent years are (1) open competition versus
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the rating bureau-prior approval approach, (2) the effect of
insurers' investment income on the profit loading in their
rates, and (3) the excess profits approach as a supplement to
either open competition or prior approval.

Open Competition Versus Rating
Bureau-Prior Approval Approach
Traditionally workers' compensation insurance rates have
been more restrictively regulated than other property and
liability insurance rates. Although a few states have erased or
reduced these differences, workers' compensation rates con
tinue in most states to be more rigidly controlled. For exam
ple, 21 states are generally considered to be opencompetition states with respect to property and liability in
surance. Only six states (soon to be eight states) have opencompetition workers' compensation laws. However, several
other states have considered such legislation in recent years.
The arguments advanced in the legislative debates on this
issue are summarized in the next two sections.

Arguments Favoring Open-Competition Laws
Those who favor open-competition laws argue that the
rating bureau-prior approval approach stifles or discourages
price and service competition. In the early days of workers'
compensation, this approach made sense because only a few
states had insolvency funds that would protect employers
and injured workers against insurers who became insolvent
because of competitive pricing pressures or undercapitaliza
tion. Furthermore, few insurers had developed enough ex
perience or expertise to establish their own prices. Today
such guarantee funds exist in every state; insurers are now
more highly capitalized and better managed, and many in
surers, with the aid of data advisory organizations, can
establish their own rates with confidence.
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A prior approval requirement, in their opinion, is a
misguided, inefficient use of regulatory resources. Insurers
are subjected to costly delays, decisions that are influenced
too often by political pressures instead of objective evalua
tions, and in some states expensive hearings. Regulators are
required to make decisions that would frustrate Solomon
and are better left to the marketplace. Consumers lose
because insurance availability problems arise when insurers
believe the approved rate structure is inadequate, and
because for some insureds the approved price exceeds the
competitive price.
Rating bureaus by definition set an average price that is
too high for some insurers, too low for others. The expense
allowances included in the rates are typically based on the
average expense experience of nondividend paying stock in
surers, which tend to have higher expenses than the other
groups of insurers. Without rating bureaus or prior approval
requirements, they argue, insurers will compete more
vigorously for business. Both price competition and service
competition will intensify, producing better services and
lower prices. Much of the service competition will consist of
improved loss control advice and assistance and more effec
tive claims management, both of which will reduce claims
costs. Price competition will cause the premiums to be lower
on average and more responsive to the loss experience of
groups of insureds with similar exposures and of individual
insureds. Groups of similar insureds and individual insureds
will in turn have more incentive to better their own perfor
mances in controlling losses and managing claims. Admit
tedly, some intense price and service competition does exist
under the rating bureau-prior approval approach, but ac
cording to open-competition supporters, this competition
benefits almost exclusively larger employers who might
otherwise self-insure.
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Open-competition laws will also force insurers to make
more independent decisions regarding workers' compensa
tion insurance instead of delegating so much of this decisionmaking to the rating organization. Currently, insurers tend
to assign their most able employees to other lines involving
more decisions. Open-competition laws will cause more of
these employees to become concerned about workers' com
pensation problems; the result will be some innovative ap
proaches.
Finally, open-competition advocates argue, in those states
where open competition has been tried price competion has
been intense, no serious insolvency problems have
developed, insurer services have not suffered, and insurance
has become more readily available through standard chan
nels.

Arguments Against Open-Competition Laws
The opponents of open-competition laws argue with equal
intensity that it would be a serious mistake for most states
with rating bureau-prior approval laws to move to open
competition. Workers' compensation insurance, they argue,
is different. Workers' compensation insurance is social in
surance. With a few exceptions, workers' compensation is
the exclusive recourse of the employee against the employer.
The benefits, prescribed by statute, are to be paid on a nofault basis. Unless employers secure permission to self-insure
their financial obligations under this statute, they must pur
chase workers' compensation insurance. Consequently, the
public is much more concerned about the solvency of
workers' compensation insurers and how they establish their
prices than in the solvency and pricing practices of other in
surers. Consequently the public is best served by (1) a pricing
mechanism that permits a rating bureau to apply its expertise
to the pooled experience of many insurers and promotes rate
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stability and (2) prior approval which involves the regulator
more actively in the pricing process.
These opponents deny that permitting rating bureaus to
exist and requiring prior approval stifles price and service
competition as much as the open-competition advocates
claim. In the typical prior approval state, competition takes
many forms. Insurers need not belong to the rating bureau;
they may develop their own rates. The bureau is permitted to
require members to adhere to its rates, but the members may
secure insurance department approval to deviate from these
rates. Schedule rating plans that permit such deviations on
the basis of subjective evaluations have become much more
commonplace. Dividends provide another avenue for price
competition. Prior approval, they agree, could be a problem
if rigidly and unfairly administered, but they believe this is
not the case in most states. The trend is toward more flex
ibility and reliance on market forces. Furthermore, price
competition is not the only kind of competition that is possi
ble. Under prior approval, insurers have even more incentive
to compete on the basis of services rendered.
The second line of thought pursued by the opponents of
open competition is that this approach will itself produce
some adverse effects. For many insureds, especially small
employers, prices will rise in the short run and probably the
long run. Price competition may become so intense that the
solvency of many insurers and the viability of guarantee
funds may be threatened. Small insurers especially will be
adversely affected by the inability of the rating bureau to
develop rates to which they can simply agree to adhere.
Because smaller insurers may be less able to compete effec
tively under open competition, the market may soon be con
trolled by a few large insurers; this growing concentration
would weaken the degree of effective competition. The pro
ponents of open competition, they assert, have greatly
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underestimated the quality of the insurer and rating
organization personnel who are currently involved in
workers' compensation insurance. The rating practices, loss
control services, and claims management services match in
quality those associated with any other line of insurance.
Probably the most serious concern of open-competition
opponents is that the data base used to calculate workers'
compensation rates will be less reliable. Unless all insurers
use the same rate classes, or subclasses that can be combined
into a uniform set of rate classes, their experience cannot be
pooled to establish a credible yardstick for measuring the
fairness of the class rates. Open-competition laws are likely
to generate heterogeneous classifications that will substan
tially reduce the volume of experience that can be mean
ingfully pooled.
In any event, these opponents say, it is too early to
evaluate experience under the open-competition laws in
force. None of these laws has been in effect for more than a
few years. Even if one leans toward the concept of open
competition it is better to liberalize the administration of a
prior approval state and to "wait and see."
Some opponents of open-competition laws simply deny
that price competition in workers' compensation insurance is
effective enough to justify such heavy reliance on the
marketplace. These opponents are much more opposed to
removal of the prior approval requirement than to pro
hibiting rating bureaus.
A Brief History: 1980-83
The trend toward open-competition workers' compensa
tion laws was stimulated by the adoption in December 1980
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners of
a model open-competition rating law. This model bill, which
was considered to be a regulatory alternative for those states
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favoring the open-competition approach to rate regulation,
dealt with most types of property and liability insurance, but
one of its most controversial parts was the section on
workers' compensation insurance rates. For two years rating
organizations could publish advisory rates, but insurers
would not be required to join the organization and would be
prohibited from agreeing to adhere to the advisory rates. In
surers would have to file new rates before they used them,
but these rates would not be subject to prior approval. After
two years workers' compensation insurance rates would be
treated like most other property and liability insurance rates.
Rating organizations could develop only advisory pure
premiums. Insurers could use new rates before filing them.
In December 1982, in response to some objections to the
December 1980 model bill treatment of workers' compensa
tion insurance rates, the NAIC adopted a separate and dif
ferent model open-competition workers' compensation act.
Under this bill, data service organizations can develop only
advisory pure premium rates. A major provision requires in
surers to report their loss experience under a uniform
statistical plan approved by the state insurance commis
sioner.
During 1982 at least eight states debated vigorously but
did not act on open-competition workers' compensation
statutes. Fewer states have thus far seriously considered this
possibility. This slowing down has been attributed primarily
to the development of, and more liberal regulatory response
to, scheduled rating plans and other deviations from bureau
rates, but some observers believe the real cause is a "wait
and see" attitude. 4

Investment Income and Insurance Rates
Employers and others have expressed intense interest in re
cent years in whether workers' compensation insurers have
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adequately recognized in their pricing the investment income
they generate from writing workers' compensation in
surance. This section will describe (1) why insurers generate
investment income from writing workers' compensation in
surance and (2) how this investment income is recognized in
the profit loading in class rates.

How Insurers Generate Investment Income
From Insurance Writings
Insurers generate some investment income from their
writings in all lines of insurance because some time elapses
between the dates when the insurer collects its premiums and
the dates when it pays some of its expenses and most of its
claims. For some lines of insurance, such as fire insurance
and automobile physical damage insurance, the time lag is
short and the investment income generated during this
period on the monies held by the insurer is relatively small.
For other lines of insurance such as automobile liability in
surance and workers' compensation insurance, the time that
elapses is long and the investment income generated by the
insurer relatively large. For example, according to the most
recent rate filing by the Workers' Compensation Insurers
Rating Association of Minnesota, on the average only 22.5
percent of the total dollar claims is paid by the time the insured's policy expires, 58.5 percent five years after the policy
period starts, 77.8 percent ten years later, and 92.9 percent
20 years later. 5

The Profit Loading in Manual Rates
Insurers have for many years recognized investment in
come in their pricing of workers' compensation insurance.
Whether they have adequately recognized such income and
whether they should do so explicitly is the real issue. In most
states insurers include a 2.5 percent profit loading in their
class rates which, if their predictions are correct, will pro
duce an underwriting profit equal to 2.5 percent of the
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premiums earned. If an insurer's workers' compensation
premiums are three times the net worth the insurer allocates
toward writing workers' compensation insurance, the 2.5
percent profit loading will produce a 7.5 percent under
writing profit on net worth. 6 Therefore, the insurer's total
return on net worth because of its workers' compensation
writings would be 7.5 percent plus its investment income ex
pressed as a percent of net worth.
The underwriting profit loading has not always been 2.5
percent. In 1915 the national underwriting profit loading was
0 percent. The loading was raised to 1.5 percent in 1917 but
dropped again to 0 percent in 1920. Despite underwriting
losses insurers did not try to increase this 0 percent profit
loading again until 1934. According to C. A. Kulp, insurers
did not seek a higher profit loading during this period
because (1) workers' compensation insurance was a favorite
wedge or business-getter for more profitable lines and
(2) workers' compensation time lags provided substantial
funds for investments. 7 Other considerations were the threat
of state funds and the social insurance characteristics of
workers' compensation. In the early thirties, however, in
vestment income disappeared or turned into losses and
underwriting experience worsened. In 1934 the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners approved a profit
loading of 0 percent to 5 percent, depending upon how the
insurers' cumulative losses in the state since 1933 compared
with the portion of the premiums collected since 1933 that
was supposed to cover these losses. If the cumulative loss
payments equaled the cumulative loss allowances in the
rates, the approved profit loading was to be 2.5 percent. If
the cumulative payments exceeded the cumulative loss
allowances, the profit loading could be more than 2.5 per
cent but not more than 5 percent. If the payments were less
than the allowance, the loading could be less than 2.5 percent
but not less than 0 percent. Because underwriting experience
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improved markedly during the next few years, during the
forties the loading under this rule soon became 0 percent for
all but a few states.
In 1949 the National Council on Compensation Insurance
included a 2.5 percent profit loading in its rates, which by
1957 had been approved in most states. One argument in
favor of including a 2.5 percent profit loading in workers'
compensation insurance rates was that in all other property
and liability insurance lines the profit loading was at least 2.5
percent. In 1951, however, a subcommittee of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners had recommended
that the loading be only 1.5 percent. The subcommittee
argued that a 1.5 percent profit loading plus investment pro
fits should provide a reasonable rate of return on net worth.
The NAIC, however, approved a 2.5 percent profit loading.
In recent years a few states have required insurers to in
clude a smaller profit loading than 2.5 percent because of the
presence of investment income. For example, on April 21,
1981 then Minnesota Commissioner of Insurance Michael
Markman issued an order disapproving the request of the
Workers' Compensation Insurers Rating Association of
Minnesota for an average 28.6 percent increase in workers'
compensation rates. Instead he granted an average increase
of 11.8 percent effective June 1, 1981. 8 The principal reason
why the Commissioner recommended a much lower increase
than requested was because he disagreed with WCIRAM's
2.5 percent profit loading in the proposed rates. He argued
that if rates were increased 28.6 percent, the combined
underwriting and investment profits of insurers would ex
ceed 30 percent, which would be excessive. He based this
finding on several assumptions, including a 14-year payment
period for losses incurred during the policy year, net worth
during those 14 years equal to one-third of the loss reserve
established at the end of each year, and a 7 percent after-tax
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investment return on assets corresponding in amount to the
loss reserves and associated net worth. Commissioner
Markman argued that the reasonable rate of return was 18
percent and that, under the assumptions noted above, in
surers could attain this objective with a -10 percent profit
loading in their rates. Depending on the assumptions used
this approach may produce a profit loading above, below, or
equal to 2.5 percent.
Only three other states have reduced the 2.5 percent profit
loading to reflect investment income—Georgia to 2 percent,
Massachusetts9 to -12 percent, and Oklahoma to 0 percent.
The effect of investment income on total insurer profits has
been cited in two or three other states as one of the reasons
for reducing recently requested rate increases, but the profit
loading was not explicitly reduced. In Connecticut, New
Jersey, and New York the profit loading is 2.5 percent.

Excess Profits Statutes
Another approach to rate regulation that may supplement
either a prior approval or an open-competition law is an ex
cess profits statute. Six states (Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Minnesota, New York, and South Carolina) have excess pro
fits statutes applicable to automobile insurance. 10 Only one
state, Florida, has such a statute applicable to workers' com
pensation insurance.
Excess profits statutes require insurers to return to their
policyholders profits in excess of a specified threshold. In
theory the threshold is the long-run reasonable rate of return
from all sources plus an allowance for short-run fluctuations
around that reasonable rate of return.
The Florida statute requires workers' compensation in
surers to return to their policyholders any underwriting pro
fit that exceeds the profit loading in the rate by 5 percent.
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Currently, therefore, the threshold is 2.5 percent plus 5 per
cent or 7.5 percent. Instead of applying the test to each
year's operations, however, the statute orders the state in
surance department to test the average underwriting profit
over the past three years. Investment income does not affect
the allowance for short-run fluctuations, but the department
is supposed to consider investment income in approving the
basic profit loading.
Excess profits statutes first appeared on the scene during
the early seventies when several states passed automobile nofault statutes and a gasoline shortage existed. Both of these
events were expected to reduce insurance costs, but opinions
differed widely on the extent of those reductions. Excess pro
fits statutes were passed to protect consumers against large
insurer windfall profits. Florida's workers' compensation
statute had a similar stimulus—the conversion of permanent
partial disability benefits to a wage loss benefit. Insurance
costs were expected to decrease because of this change with
the possibility of large windfall profits for insurers.
Excess profits may make open-competition statutes more
acceptable because insureds have some protection against ex
cess insurer profits. For the same reasons regulators might be
able to also administer prior approval statutes more flexibly.
On the other hand, excess profits will occasionally require in
surers to return profits to their policyholders even if their
long-run rate of return is equal to or even less than the
reasonable rate of return. Furthermore, determining the ex
cess profit threshold is a difficult process involving several
highly subjective assumptions. 11
None of the three regional states has an excess profits
statute applicable to workers' compensation insurance. New
York, however, is one of only two states, the other being
Florida, that has implemented such a statute applicable to
automobile insurance.
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Concluding Remarks
Workers' compensation insurance rate determination and
regulation vary widely among the states. A trend exists
toward more reliance on competition through the passage of
open-competition laws or, more commonly, through more
flexible administration of rules permitting class rate devia
tions and schedule rating. A few prior approval states have
reduced the 2.5 percent profit loading in the rates to reflect
insurers' investment income. Open-competition states expect
competition to reduce insurers' total profits. One state has
an excess profits statute.
The three states represented here illustrate this diversity.
All are rating bureau-prior approval states. All authorize a
2.5 percent underwriting profit loading. In Connecticut
membership in the rating bureau is optional and rate
adherence agreements are prohibited. New Jersey, on the
other hand, forbids deviations from the rates developed by
its rating bureau to which all insurers must belong. New
York is much closer to Connecticut than to New Jersey in its
rate regulation, but is somewhat less flexible. Both Connec
ticut and New York have seriously considered opencompetition laws. New Jersey has not. New York is one of
two states in the nation to implement an excess profits law
applicable to automobile insurance.
Strong arguments exist pro and con for each of these ap
proaches. The opportunity to experiment is supposed to be
one of the advantages of state regulation as opposed to
federal regulation. The laboratories testing ways of deter
mining and regulating workers' compensation insurance
rates have probably never been more active.
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NOTES
1. The National Council on Compensation Insurance periodically
publishes a listing of state standard premium rates.
2. Employers whose class premium would otherwise be under some small
amount, such as $500, have to pay an extra charge called an expense con
stant because the expense allowance in the rate does not produce enough
dollars to cover the expenses incurred in servicing these very small insureds.
3. The rating formula used in practice is more complicated than the one
described here. The results, however, are close to those described above.
4. "Drive for Open Competition Rating Starting to Slow Officials,"
Business Insurance, February 21, 1983, pp. 2, 74. "Trend to Open Com
petition Rating Slows," Journal of Commerce (March 11, 1983), p. 7A.
5. Exhibit A - Derivation of Overall Average Premium Level Change
(Minneapolis: Workers' Compensation Insurance Rating Association of
Minnesota, 1982), Exhibit B-I, p. 39.
6. No generally accepted method exists for determining what portion of
an insurer's net worth is devoted to writing a single line of insurance. In
deed, some persons argue that an insurer's net worth cannot be appor
tioned among lines of insurance; each $1 of net worth is available if need
ed for all lines of insurance written.
7. C. A. Kulp, Casualty Insurance, 3rd ed. (New York: The Ronald
Press, 1956), p. 151.
8. For more details, see the original order and C. A. Williams, Jr.,
"Minnesota Employers' Workers' Compensation Costs: The Short-Run
and the Long-Run," Risk Management and Insurance Issues, No. 1,
School of Management, University of Minnesota, January 1982.
9. The Massachusetts -12 percent profit loading, which became effective
January 1, 1983, is currently being contested before a court. Investment
income was the major reason for a negative profit loading but no single
formula was used to derive -12 percent.
10. For an analysis of these statutes see C. A. Williams, Jr., "Regulating
Property and Liability Insurance Rates Through Excess Profits
Statutes," The Journal of Risk and Insurance 50, 3 (September 1983).
11. For additional arguments for and against such statutes see Ibid.

The Administration
of Workers' Compensation
Monroe Berkowitz
Economics Department
Rutgers University

Introduction
Too often comprehensive studies of workers' compensa
tion programs conclude (as will this paper) with the recom
mendation that workers' compensation programs should be
better administered. Certainly no one will quarrel with that,
but just as certainly it is a relatively weak recommendation. I
am as guilty as anyone, and in a study comparing programs
in 10 states I came up with the remarkable conclusion that
some states are better administered than others. 1 Yet there is
hardly any way to account for the superior performance of
the Wisconsin program other than to say that its program
has been administered in an active or aggressive manner.
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compen
sation Laws has had a modicum of success in persuading
states to increase benefits and broaden coverage. However,
in areas where it is difficult to devise quantitative standards,
its success has been less well documented. This is not surpris
ing. In so many aspects of workers' compensation, I have the
feeling that the problem is not the law, but the way the law is
administered. Unfortunately, we do not have much of a clue
as to what an appropriate and proper system of administra237
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tion of the law ought to be, or any objective way in which to
judge whether one law is better administered than another.
At the outset, I might point out that the problem is
relatively simple in some states when there does not seem to
be any administrative mechanism whatsoever. I am not
thinking only of a state such as Louisiana which until recent
ly had no administrative agency of any sort, or states such as
Alabama or New Mexico where courts play a major role in
the administration of the workers* compensation act. I am
thinking of other states which have administrative agencies
whose sole concern seems to be the adjudication of disputes.
In most jurisdictions, administration of the act is en
trusted to a workers' compensation board or commission.
The idea of the disinterested public-spirited commission to
administer these laws was a popular idea in the progressive
era when workers' compensation acts first were passed.
Some 21 jurisdictions have a single administrator, sometimes
in conjunction with an appeal board, sometimes housed
within a Department of Labor and Industry or some other
department within the state government.
I do not believe that the organizational structure of the
workers' compensation program is the crucial item to be
looked at when analyzing problems of administration. It is
the functions which are discharged and the manner in which
they are carried out.

The National Commission's Recommendations
Everyone who has looked at this problem agrees that ad
ministration is a crucial variable in judging the program. The
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
Laws stated that the basic objectives of the system, i.e.,
broad coverage, substantial protection against interruption
of income, provision for sufficient medical care and
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rehabilitation services, and the encouragement of safety, are
dependent on an equally important fifth objective: "An ef
fective system for the delivery of the benefits and services." 2
The National Commission recognized that in the beginning
the system was thought to be self-administering. It was ex
pected that with the elimination of the fault concept and the
prescription of benefits by statute, employees would be able
to protect their interests without external assistance. We now
know that hope for self-administration was overly op
timistic. Few would argue with the National Commission's
view that litigation might have been less frequent had state
agencies provided enough positive assistance to workers who
are unable by themselves to deal with the complexities of the
law and that the void has been filled by an active plaintiffs'
bar.
The Commission viewed the state agencies as having six
primary administrative obligations:
1. The agency must take the initiative in administering the
law.
2. It must continually review the performance of the pro
gram and request state legislatures amend the law to
meet the changing needs of the program.
3. An agency must advise workers of their rights and
obligations under the law and assure that they receive
the benefits to which they are entitled.
4. Agencies should apprise employers and carriers of
their obligations and rights under the law. Other par
ties in the delivery system, including physicians and at
torneys, should also be informed of their obligations
and privileges.
5. The agencies should assist in a voluntary and informal
resolution of issues.

240

Administration

6. The agency must adjudicate claims which cannot be
resolved voluntarily.
In the eyes of the Commission, the key to an effective
delivery system is the agency's active pursuit of these ad
ministrative obligations. "The thrust of the system should be
to create an ambience of protection and mediation rather
than adjudication." 3 The Commission delved into the pro
cessing of workers' compensation claims, making recom
mendations on reports, organizational structure, attorneys'
fees, methods of closing cases, supervision of medical care,
and security arrangements, among other aspects. I do not
wish to dwell on administrative organization or structure or
even the processing of cases. I believe that the crucial
variable is the business of creating the ambience and per
suading the agency to pursue an active role.

The Historical Neglect of Administration
It is confusing to discuss administration because of the
lack of information, and frustrating because nothing seems
to change in spite of continual detailed inquiries about the
nature and quality of administration.
As an example, let me excerpt from a fine inquiry into the
problem of administration. It was noted that of three recent
investigations, all agreed that the system ought to have ad
ministrative hearings with informal procedures, and judicial
review upon issues of law only. Two investigations urged
control of attorneys' fees and that compensation boards be
equipped with a competent medical staff to aid in the ad
judication of compensation claims. One recommended im
partial testimony with respect to the extent of disability. All
made recommendations for a more adequate standardization
of the disability schedules. The study concluded that there is
substantial agreement as to many of the fundamental prob
lems of workers' compensation. What is frustrating is that
this excellent study by Walter Dodd was made in 1936. 4
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These same kinds of recommendations have been cited in
conferences, investigating reports, and academic discussions
since then. But if things do not change in a half century, it
may be that the present system meets the needs of the wider
community that supports the system. We must be very hum
ble about making any recommendations for changes in
workers' compensation administration.
Yet when we look at the essence of the administrative
problem and try to state it in the simplest possible way, it is
that workers' compensation is fundamentally a social in
surance program with compulsory coverage. Neither
workers nor employers have choices in these matters.
Although it may not be self-administering in the sense that
the earliest proponents of the law believed, nonetheless, the
principal rationale for the program is that it would minimize
conflict. The concept of liability without fault was to
substitute a swift, certain and assured remedy for litigation
endemic to tort liability. To assure that objective requires
some administrative functions.

The Workers' Compensation Agency
Does Not Pay Claims
What are the essential functions that a workers' compen
sation administration ought to perform? Before we can
answer that question it is well to recognize that the ad
ministrative agency usually is not responsible for the pay
ment of claims. Common to all systems of cash disability
transfers, be they tort cases, workers' compensation cases,
or social security disability insurance cases, is the payment of
claims. What is different in workers' compensation is that
the administration of the claims management function is the
responsibility of the insurer, whether it is a private insurance
company, an exclusive state fund, a competitive state fund,
or the firm itself if it is self-insured. Unlike the Social Securi
ty Administration, the workers' compensation agency does
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not issue any benefit checks, does not pay any benefits, nor
does it pay treating physicians or any other provider of ser
vices. Yet there comes a time, at different stages of the
claims process, depending on the jurisdiction, when the
workers' compensation agency is charged with responsibility
for administering the claims procedure. At these times the
agency's responsibilities are substantial.

The Public Interest in Administration
It is probably important to pin down why this is so. The
patient suing his physician in a malpractice suit can settle for
any amount that is agreeable to him, his doctor, and the in
surance carrier. If dissatisfied with a proffered settlement, he
can pursue his remedies through the court system. No state
agency will interfere with a voluntary settlement on the
grounds that it is not sufficient. At the opposite end of the
administrative spectrum, a person seeking social security
disability insurance benefits will receive a benefit amount
determined in accordance with his wages as specified in the
statute. Valid workers' compensation claims are paid by the
insurance carrier in accordance with the statutes, but the ex
act amounts to be paid, especially in the case of permanent
disabilities, is not certain. There is wide discretion in the
system which impedes the objective of certainty, and unlike
the tort settlement, the amount should not be left to the par
ties alone. The whole theory of workers' compensation
argues that there is a direct public interest in the amount of
compensation and the manner and method in which it is paid
to those injured at work. It is the administrative obligation
of the agency to provide guidance as to the type and amount
of such payments, the conditions under which they are to be
made, and the medical and rehabilitation services to be pro
vided. It is the very nature of a compulsory social insurance
program that such matters are not left to the parties.
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The Basic Administrative Functions
Once we allocate the claims management function to the
insurer, the functions performed by the agency in processing
the workers' compensation cases can be grouped under four
separate headings. These are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Recordkeeping
Monitoring
Evaluation
Adjudication

The recordkeeping function is present in all agencies. Each
workers' compensation case begins with a report of an injury
or disease to the employer, a copy of which is sent to the car
rier and eventually to the agency. Each state requires some
subsequent reporting about the individual case and its even
tual disposition. States will vary greatly as to the kinds of
case records the agencies maintain and the diligence with
which administrators will follow up requests for reports that
do not come to them in the normal course of events.
However logical it may be to proclaim a public interest in ad
ministrative matters, the total extent of some agencies' in
volvement may be in recording and filing what the parties
themselves have done voluntarily.
Some, and possibly most, states go further and are con
cerned with the monitoring function. The state agency is
concerned with the equity and adequacy of the payments
made voluntarily by the insurance carrier. The agency may
also be concerned with the worker's rehabilitation in cases
where his return to work is delayed. The agency may police
the carrier's activities designed to maximize the probability
of the worker's return to his job. The monitoring function
may involve procedures for checking on the carrier's
promptness of payment, or adequacy of general perfor
mance, advising or penalizing carriers if their performance
falls short.
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A third group of procedures has to do with what may be
termed evaluation of the workers' permanent disability.
Some agencies have prescribed procedures to evaluate, or to
aid the parties in evaluating, the extent of the claimant's
disability. In some states, the agency itself will take on the
responsibility of determining the extent of disability. In
other states, the agencies will do almost nothing in this area;
the parties reach some agreement, and if they fail to do so,
they resort to the contested procedures.
The fourth function is the adjudication function which is
universally undertaken by the state agencies. Each agency
has procedures to adjudicate disputes between the parties.

Diversity Among the Three States
What has remained a hallmark in workers' compensation
has been the diversity among the various jurisdictions in how
they go about any one of their tasks. Nowhere is this better
illustrated than in the case of the administration of workers'
compensation in the neighboring states of New Jersey, New
York, and Connecticut.
As far as structure is concerned, in New Jersey we have no
workers' compensation board or commission. A supervising
judge has chief administrative responsibility for the ad
ministration of the law. The agency employs few, if any,
professionals, other than the judges of compensation and
persons who participate in one capacity or another in the ad
judication process. There is no board of appeals within the
state. Appeals from compensation judges' decisions are to
the state courts. In contrast, the administration in New York
is in the hands of a workers' compensation board whose
chairman bears responsibility for administrative functions.
In Connecticut, regionalism seems to be the key.
As noted in the Connecticut annual report, the workers'
compensation law is administered by a nine-member com-
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mission with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes
under that law. The chairman of the commission has
statewide jurisdiction. Each of the seven district commis
sioners has responsibility over disputes in an area of the
state, and the remaining commissioner-at-large is assigned
by the chairman to act in any district where needed.
When it comes to recordkeeping functions, it is safe to say
that no one of the states does a complete job. In all states,
the case begins with a report of injury to the employer. A
copy is sent to the carrier, and eventually to the agency. Each
state does require subsequent reporting on the case. In New
Jersey, however, very little is done with these records, other
than to report annually on case activity. Almost nothing is
done now in analyzing the first reports of injury. Few ad
ministrative statistics are kept on the agency activities. New
York produces a rather complete set of information about
closed cases and some analysis of the first reports of injury.
In Connecticut, records as to the number of voluntary
agreements, informal hearings, formal hearings and appeals
processed by the Compensation Review Division are kept.
No analysis of these case statistics is done.
The monitoring function also differs in each of these
states. In New Jersey, from time to time, there has been
some review of the so-called direct settlements where the
worker and the employer reach voluntary agreement as to
the amounts of compensation to be paid. If, however, some
discrepancy was found in that type of settlement, the pro
cedure was to advise the worker of his rights and have him
file a formal complaint. In these instances, the matter
becomes a contested case. In sharp contrast, New York, at
least on a formal basis, has a hearing system in which all
cases have the opportunity to have a hearing before the mat
ter is closed out. In Connecticut, lack of administrative per
sonnel prevents any significant monitoring activity. The in
formation for recordkeeping and monitoring purposes may
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be available in the future. Public Law 81-407 established a
Statistical Division effective February 1, 1982, but only in
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1983 were start-up funds pro
vided to implement that legislation. Funds were also
available beginning July 1, 1983 to implement provisions of
the law creating a Division of Workers' Education.
Presumably that division would undertake some monitoring
functions.
As far as evaluation procedures are concerned, none of
these states has prescribed procedures to evaluate, or to aid
the parties in evaluating the extent of their obligations for
payment for permanent disabilities. This can possibly best be
seen in the area of permanent partial disability. As pointed
out above, in some states the agency takes on the respon
sibility for determining the extent of the permanent partial
disabilities. That is not the case in New Jersey. Nothing in
the uncontested procedures aids the parties in determining
the amounts that are due. Consequently, very few permanent
partial disability cases are closed out in New Jersey, except at
the formal level or at steps immediately preceding the formal
level. In New York, hearings are held in most permanent
partial cases whether scheduled or nonscheduled. Connec
ticut follows the New Jersey pattern with extensive use of in
formal and formal hearings to dispose of these matters.
All three states devote major portions of their ad
ministrative energies to the adjudication function. Each of
these states has a type of substitute court system where
workers may have their cases heard and decided with the ac
tive participation of the plaintiffs' and defense bar.
Are the systems as they exist in these three states optimal?
Are they the most efficient and equitable systems that could
be devised? Do those clients who seek out representation
from the plaintiffs' bar do better than they would otherwise?
Is the fact that the normal procedure is to resort to an at-
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torney in the event of permanent partial or permanent total
disability the wisest use of scarce resources?

Using the Tri-State Conference
to Improve Administration
This is the first of what I hope will be a series of annual
conferences in which interested persons in these three states
convene to discuss workers' compensation problems to their
mutual benefit. I am a realist. I do not expect quick results. I
know that these administrative problems have existed since
the inception of the program, and I do not expect that im
provements will be made overnight.
One possible purpose of these meetings is to initiate
dialogue and to begin discussions about matters of common
concern. Perhaps this first conference might be thought of as
a consciousness-raising session. I would raise the question of
whether it makes any sense for each of these states to begin
to think of improving their recordkeeping, monitoring, and
evaluation functions. If I were to plead for improvements in
the administrative area, I would first plead for im
provements in the data and information systems. I believe
data systems are useful. As an example, I would like to be
able to compare the litigiousness of New York, Connecticut
and New Jersey on some valid basis. Yet I find myself
defeated by the fact that the data systems are not complete in
any of the states, and they are certainly not comparable.
Take another example: states are presumed to be
laboratories of experiment. In these states we have three dif
ferent ways of administering different laws. Which is more
efficacious in the prevention of accidents and diseases at the
workplace? I submit that the data systems currently in place
do not come close to providing an answer.
But something more than data systems is involved. We
need better evaluation and monitoring to decrease the pro-
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portion of contested cases. Nothing I have said, nor anything
I wish to say, is meant to denigrate the contributions of the
plaintiffs' bar. In the same vein as saying "Some of my best
friends are members of a particular religion/' I say that were
I injured at work today, I would find myself a good lawyer
before I would move one inch in the State of New Jersey. But
as I say it, I resent the fact that it is necessary to resort to
representation. In the majority of cases where compensability is admitted, why cannot the state devise an evaluation
system such that a claimant would know in a particular case
what the obligations of the carrier were? Several states have
done this, other states are doing it, and although I cannot
point to the exemplary state lest my recommendations be
misconstrued, I can say that some states do better than New
Jersey, New York, or Connecticut.
Although it is difficult to change the administration of
state workers' compensation systems, why not start in this
part of the country, in these three states which have a high
proportion of the workers' compensation cases? Why cannot
the responsible administrative and political officials col
laborate to seek ways and means of improving their systems?
These three states have the unique opportunity of utilizing
the services of three universities, each of which has personnel
and units vitally interested in the area of workers' compensa
tion.
Administrative reforms might well begin with the matter
of data systems, since it is the least controversial and least
threatening to the parties involved. It would be equally possi
ble to begin to think about monitoring and evaluation func
tions, and about doing simple checks of what workers have
received in voluntary settlements, and of devising ways and
means by which adequate settlements might be forthcoming
without litigation.
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In similar fashion, it should be possible to think about sets
of evaluation standards which could be widely promulgated,
or at least to ask the question of whether it is possible to deal
with this issue. I raise only one caution. It is necessary for
each of the jurisdictions to accept the fact that ad
ministrative personnel are necessary if administrative tasks
are to be accomplished. I do not think that these matters can
be left solely to chairmen, supervising judges or commission
members. It should be possible for these responsible officials
to get together to think about these matters and perhaps to
go further and devise ways and means whereby desirable ob
jectives can be met.
On July 4, 1983, we celebrated the 72nd birthday of the
oldest of these three compensation statutes. But in workers'
compensation programs, there is no compulsory retirement
age. There may be life left in this program which may not yet
be ready for the geriatric scrap heap. Survival depends on
evidence of change and vitality, and nowhere can that better
be shown than in administrative reform. It is the most dif
ficult of areas to change, but even small improvements can
yield great social benefits.
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2. Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensa
tion Laws (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 35.

3. Ibid., p. 101.
4. Walter F. Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Compensation (New
York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1936).

10
Nominal Costs, Nominal Prices,
and Nominal Profits
John D. Worrall
Economics Department
Rutgers University

The Berkowitz, Burton, and Williams papers ask whether
costs, prices, or profits in the workers' compensation in
surance market differ across "regulated states." The market
is regulated in most states, including those they consider in
depth: Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. A central
question they ask is what role the state (or its regulatory arm)
plays in the process that generates costs, prices, and profits.
Professor Williams gives an excellent summary and
description of rate regulation and price determination in
both the national and regional workers' compensation in
surance markets. He describes how manual rates are deter
mined, as well as the adjustments to manual rates that affect
the price actually paid. He describes the environment in both
open-competition and prior approval states. He examines
the underwriting profit and contingency factor, investment
income and insurance profitability. Professor Williams is
not judgmental. He is simply scholarly. He reports the pro
and con arguments for open competition.
I think that given a state workers' compensation law and
its basic administration, what Professor Berkowitz
251
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categorized as recordkeeping, monitoring, evaluation, and
adjudication, the state and its regulatory arm will play little
role in the price of workers' compensation insurance or the
profitability of the business. I consider one family of excep
tions later. First, I present the rationale for my judgment
that the state plays a limited role.
For over half a century, workers' compensation insurance
was a stable line. The actuarial estimates of program costs
were generally on target and the combined ratios predictable.
But in the early 1970s at least two major events eliminated
this predictability. One was the impact of inflation. The
other was structural change in the program, including in
creased benefits, brought about in part by the National
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
chaired by Professor Burton. These events made the accurate
forecasting of losses a more difficult art. Medical costs
escalated rapidly, as did indemnity claim frequency, and
perhaps the durations of disability, as both real and nominal
benefits rose.
As Professor Williams pointed out, writing workers' com
pensation insurance is a leveraged business. Over the 1970s
the leverage, the ratio of either net premiums written or
reserves to statutory capital and surplus or to net worth, also
increased. Obviously, nominal rates of interest rose with in
flation, and the nominal investment income earned by in
surance companies increased with the rise in interest rates
and leverage. The nominal rate of return required by all in
dustries to attract and retain capital also rose. As regulators
and others saw insurers earning increasingly larger amounts
of nominal investment income, there was increasing pressure
to have open competition or to include investment income in
the calculation of manual rates in prior approval states.
The workers' compensation insurance market is
characterized by intense price and nonprice comptition. The
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market has relatively easy entry (and exit) requirements. The
capitalization requirements are low in many states and insur
mountable in none. There are many sellers in the market
and, although some are large in absolute size, the concentra
tion ratio (combined market share) of the top four or top
eight firms is low. Firms actively in the market must compete
with one another, contend with the threat of firms selfinsuring and the potential entry of insurers licensed in the
state but not active in the market. There are many buyers in
the market, and these buyers are businesses with good
prepurchase information. The basic coverage sold in the
market is mandated by law, and although insurers compete
vigorously on claims handling and safety services, the in
surance coverage offered by insurance company A is a good
substitute for that offered by insurance company B.
Insurers compete vigorously on price. They do so at the
beginning of a policy period, at the end of the period, or
both. Professor Williams has listed some of the methods in
surers use to compete. Insurers offer firms cost-plus in
surance, sliding scale dividend plans (rebate of part of the
premium based on the safety record of their insured), and
they alter the time flow of the premium that their insured
must pay. In virtually all states, the deposit premium rule has
been waived. This means that an insured and an insurer can
enter into an agreement to lengthen the time over which the
insured can pay a fixed nominal insurance premium. For ex
ample, assume the nominal price of mandated coverage is
$100. The insurer and insured can agree that this amount will
be paid in a lump sum today, or in installments over N
periods. The latter case could include some initial periods of
zero payment. In effect, there is price flexibility downward.
Prices will vary with the inflationary and real return expecta
tions of the parties to the contract. It is difficult to imagine
excessive profits being earned in markets such as the one
described above.
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Professor Williams pointed out that some critics argue
that competition in the workers' compensation insurance
markets "benefits almost exclusively the larger employers
who might otherwise self-insure." The argument posed by
these critics is extremely weak. Firms risk their capital in ex
pectation that they will receive a market return, which in
cludes a risk premium. Firms are not prohibited from writing
insurance business for small risks. Many insurers do so. If
there is not great downward pressure on prices for the
business of smaller firms, it is because insurers do not
evaluate the risk involved in writing this business to be com
mensurate with the rewards for writing the business. Infor
mation is available on the loss records of smaller risks (both
individually and collectively). If insurers thought they would
earn greater than a market rate of return writing this
business, they would. Some risks end up in assigned risk
pools. These firms do not end up in assigned risk pools
because insurers expect to make too much money writing this
business. They do not end up in assigned risk pools because
insurers are charities. They end up in assigned risk pools
because insurers do not expect to earn a reasonable profit
writing these risks. Why? Because most states have man
dated that the nominal price of insurance cannot exceed a
preset limit. Although there is downward price flexibility,
prices are not flexible upward. This is one of the exceptions
that I mentioned earlier regarding the impact of regulation
on workers' compensation prices.
The state can affect prices and profits by arbitrarily setting
the price of insurance too low at the beginning of an
operating period and not allowing upward price ad
justments. States may also delay the implementation of new
manual rates. Or regulators may shift interest rate risk to the
beginning of an operating period, in effect lowering the
manual rates and hence the ceiling price, and forcing more
risks from the competitive market. Finally, the state may
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constrain the taste for risk bearing on the part of some in
surers by requiring them to write business at lower leverage
than the insurers would desire, or the market would dictate.
Why do workers compensation insurance prices and costs
vary across states? In large part because of differences in the
state: law, labor market, industrial composition, cost of liv
ing and a host of related factors. The benefits paid may dif
fer over states as a result of variations in state workers' com
pensation laws and state wage distributions. Workers in a
state may be willing to bear more risk or to report more in
juries and file more workers' compensation claims given
higher insurance benefits. Given different benefit structures
across states, workers with the same tastes for risk bearing
may have different accident and claim filing rates. In addi
tion, with the same level of benefits across states, workers in
different states, and in particular in different industries and
occupations, may have different tastes for risk bearing. The
number of occupational injuries and diseases will be a func
tion of the industrial composition of a state. If more risky in
dustries are concentrated in a state, the total cost of workers'
compensation insurance in that state will be higher. Similar
ly, if the costs of accident prevention are higher in one state
than another, all else constant, more injuries will take place
in the high prevention cost state.
Professor Burton and Mr. Krueger examine the dif
ferences in costs to employers across states. In their research,
they control for heterogeneity in the state industrial com
position. Their paper gives us insight into how much of the
variation in the costs to employers is due to residual factors,
including regulation, market conditions, and administration.
They carefully document the link between the benefits and
costs of a social insurance system. Although they do not
stress the point in their paper, their methodology also pro
vides one way to compare the cost of public versus private
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provision of a social insurance. They close their paper with
the value judgment, "... New Jersey and New York
employers had lower workers' compensation costs than did
Connecticut employers, . . . their achievement seems more
due to parsimony than prudence." It may be that what Bur
ton and Krueger chose to call parsimony is simply political
markets working well.
Monroe Berkowitz poses the basic question, why do some
states "administer" their programs by letting litigation take
place, and others by aggressive and interventionist strategies.
I believe political markets work. New Jersey had high perma
nent partial claim frequency because it was the political con
sensus to have it. Property rights and their administration at
any point in time are reflections of the will of the people (or
their power block coalitions).
The political market is the mechanism through which
groups attempt to shift the cost burden of disability. Witness
the existence of state insurance funds. This same political
market has given us state systems for compensating perma
nent partial disability, and all of the headaches that go with
administering such a system. The market has not yet given us
a full federal system for compensating for permanent partial
disability under the social security system. Much of the
claimed "administrative efficiency" of that federal pro
gram, and inefficiency of state programs, is actually the
market at work. And much of the role that I have ascribed to
the state, including the setting of ceiling prices and leverage
ratios, is simply that magnificent market at work.

11
Federal Occupational
Disease Legislation
A Current Review
Donald Elisburg
Connerton and Bernstein
Washington, D.C.

Attending a seminar and discussing the future of occupa
tional disease legislation and compensation systems
sometimes becomes an exercise in riding merry-go-round. It
is not exactly clear to me why we have suddenly decided to
ride the horse again, but I welcome the opportunity. I par
ticularly welcome the fact that there is renewed public
scrutiny of this serious social issue.
My purpose today is two-fold: first, to review the
background of congressional consultation of this issue; sec
ond, to review and comment on some of the major policy
issues involved in this particular legislative activity.
I believe we have finally reached a point in our policy
development where we can safely say that most of the rele
vant issues have surfaced, been examined and explored, and
been given reasonable public consideration. That is not to
say that there is any agreement on where we go and how we
get there.
By way of contrast, when the question of occupational ill
ness was first broached during consideration of the Occupa257
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tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, there was perceived to
be an almost complete lack of information on this subject.
The number of organizations paying attention to the issue
was miniscule. The focus, if any, was on the question of
respiratory diseases, principally pneumoconiosis (Black
Lung).
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compen
sation Laws actually commissioned some interesting work on
occupational disease. Those studies recognized that there
were coverage and other questions which needed to be con
sidered in the reform process. Nonetheless, the focus of that
Commission's report was not on the emerging problems of
occupational illness and compensation thereof.
Following the Commission's report, the emphasis shifted
to concerns about state workers' compensation systems and
the process of legislative reform. Very little time was actually
spent on how occupational illness would fit into this com
pensation system, except along the lines of an adjunct to the
underlying need to have a uniform system for injury as well
as illness. Thus, even though occupational disease has always
been a significant element in the policy and political con
siderations surrounding such legislation, it has not been
recognized as such until recently.
Why, one might ask, did this situation exist? It may be at
tributed in part to the complacency of the state workers'
compensation system administrators and the insurance in
dustry, who saw few occupational disease claims, and
assumed that the problem in actuality was far less than ex
periences reflected. Moreover, awareness of toxic
substances, carcinogens, and their impact on individuals has
only emerged to its true dimensions in recent years. Again,
that is not to say that such things were not known, but the
focus tended to be on identifiable situations such as Black
Lung and not on the whole host of other occupational ill-
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nesses for which the existing state laws are generally quite
restrictive.
The next plateau in our consideration rests with the work
of the Department of Labor's Interdepartmental Task
Force, which spent several years and a fair amount of public
funds in exploring a number of workers' compensation
issues including problems of occupational disease, product
liability and third party issues.
Unfortunately, the problems of commissioning an inquiry
and ultimately bringing it to fruition can become quite un
manageable. In this case much of the work of that group
commissioned in 1975 and 1976 was not completed until
1978 or 1979 and was not published until 1981. I know not
how these documents become lost in the Government Prin
ting Office. However, each of these studies has provided in
valuable information about the nature of the problem.
One may cut through all of the complexities and come to
the realization that this very serious problem of disability
compensation can readily be solved if only it could fit within
the existing system.
After all, if in this day and age we have reached a state of
public acceptance that those who are made ill by toxic
substances should be duly compensated and properly cared
for, there is no great public consensus to be built on the
underlying issue.
We know that the ideal law should cover any and all oc
cupational illnesses arising out of and in the course of
employment. We know that the ideal system should deliver
prompt, reasonable benefits for permanent and partial
disability and should provide full medical treatment, oppor
tunity for rehabilitation and all of the other facets of a
"good" workers' compensation program. Unfortunately,
we have a few odds and ends of matters about which we have
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not quite reached agreement—for example, should this be
done on the state or national level, should it cover all ill
nesses and diseases, or should the legislation be diseasespecific; what is a "reasonable" level of benefits and who
should pay for them; how should benefits be financed; and,
who should administer the program?
I do not come here today with any great conceptual
framework about which we can gather to create this new ho
ly writ of a disability compensation law. Most of you are
aware that there have been several legislative proposals pend
ing in Congress that represent what might reasonably be con
sidered a fresh start to the process. 1
There are a number of basic elements that any proposed
bill should have in order to make a disability compensation
system effective. They include the federal role, coverage,
benefit levels, claim processing and funding. A review of
these elements might suggest that the major issue is over
what diseases should be covered by any compensation
scheme. However, in my judgment the major issue is really
whether an improved occupational disease compensation
program should be created as a new system or be part of the
existing state compensation systems.

Federal Role
Some 10 years ago, I was the advocate for a workers' com
pensation system that would have provided fully for a
federal program administered through the state agencies, in
cluding a full occupational disease component. At that time
Congress, the Executive Branch, and many scholars on the
subject suggested that the federal government's takeover of
the state workers' compensation systems, if not unconstitu
tional, was certainly unconscionable. If one learns nothing
else over a period of time in our nation's capitol, it is that
you cannot climb the same greased pole twice. Accordingly,
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I believe that we are now talking about a compensation
system that does not impact on the state agency's operations.
Indeed, we are looking at a proposal that was too revolu
tionary for 1973, that is, preempting the state law with
respect to occupational disease claims and administration
totally at the federal level. The strongest argument for
federal preemption is in the interests of uniformity.
Judgments about the effects of toxic substances and the
causal relation to the workplace are difficult enough for one
agency to develop. Spread to more than 50 jurisdictions, the
problem becomes quite unmanageable. Moreover, the
political interests of many state agencies do not appear to
lend themselves to comprehensive treatment of occupational
disease and appropriate benefit levels.

Coverage
What is covered under this new scheme is indeed the sec
ond most serious question. It arises because the onset and
causality of an occupational disease are simply not as simple
as in straight cases of injury. There are, as we know, long
latency periods, complications arising from the combination
of on and off the job exposure and numerous other scientific
and medical problems to solve before one can reasonably
suggest that a particular disease did arise out of and in the
course of employment. Nonetheless, much is known about
many diseases, both in the U.S. experience and elsewhere in
the western world. The fact is that to deal with the occupa
tional disease issue in a fair manner, we are going to have to
adopt something called "presumptions." Now if there was
any single issue which caused more confusion and difficulty
than the Black Lung program, it was the question of
presumptions.
Somehow we have established in some quarters a view that
presumptions are either a) unscientific, b) unfair, or c) load-
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ed against the employer. In the context of the Black Lung
program, Congress confused the issue by legislating different
kinds of presumptions without fully explaining the particular
political purpose for each one. For example, with respect to
the presumptions regarding time worked in the mines and in
dications of Black Lung, one can argue that there was some
medical evidence relating to the development of
pneumoconiosis after long exposure to coal mining. On the
other hand, creating a set of presumptions relating to
pneumoconiosis based on affidavits, nonmedical evidence
and other criteria in order to provide compensation to
widows of Black Lung victims does not rise to the level of
scientific support. There is nothing wrong with providing
such a political presumption if indeed it is not characterized
as medical criteria. My own view is that Congress, in enac
ting the Black Lung Law, created a hybrid mechanism of
some parts medical, some parts compensation and large
parts combat pay. The difficulty, aside from the ad
ministrative problems of handling that law, is that it was un
fortunately characterized as a workers' compensation pro
gram, although it had many of the elements of a pension
program or a social security compensation system and an in
sufficient number of the elements of a true disability com
pensation program. The worthiness of it should not be in
dispute, merely the nomenclature under which it was
presented through Congress to the public.
In viewing presumptions for occupational disease, the
underlying need is to eliminate the concept that in each in
dividual case an entire system of proof need be offered to
establish both the illness and its causal relationship to
employment. There is no reason to create a system that
would thrive on having expert medical testimony repeat and
repeat and repeat the same well-known and established fact
that certain exposure to certain types of chemicals and toxic
substances in the workplace can and will, over a reasonable
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period of time, lead to the development of certain occupa
tional illnesses.
The mechanism of developing such presumptions is not
easy to achieve. It will require some form of impartial han
dling, and it will involve judgment calls by some form of
neutral or independent agency to promulgate the presump
tions against which diseases will be compensated. The fact
that it may be a difficult mechanism does not make it the
wrong way. In point of fact, there are a number of models
from the European experience that could be utilized in the
way in which the scientific and medical criteria are developed
for purposes of creating such a presumption. 2 Indeed,
creating a series of properly medically based presumptions or
"good" presumptions is the only way in which a comprehen
sive occupational disease compensation system can function.

Benefit Levels
The next area that should be addressed in our model com
pensation system is one involving the appropriate benefit
levels. Once again, we are confronted with a serious dilemma
in the way in which we approach workplace disability and
occupational disease compensation. If we are talking about
an income replacement, or so-called wage loss concepts, we
approach perhaps half the problem. Indeed, it is not so dif
ferent from the disagreements which have been raging in
other areas of occupational injury for some years. Perhaps a
major difference is that the partially disabled worker with
occupational disease has a more than reasonable chance of
that disease eventually pushing that worker into total
disability and death. Unlike most injuries, occupational ill
ness is not necessarily a discrete result.
Consequently, we're looking at an entirely new compensa
tion system. One should not be narrow-minded in looking at
benefit levels and levels of compensation. In particular,
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should there be some provision that goes beyond income
replacement or wage loss, and provides some form of com
pensation for the pain and suffering as a result of the
disease? I think the answer is yes. One result of toxic ex
posure is harm to an organ which does not interfere with
work ability. So the equivalent of a "scheduled" award is
worth examining. Should benefit levels be higher for occupa
tional disease than for injury? My response would be prob
ably not. But in developing any new law, we should not ac
cept current levels of compensation as the norm, because by
and large they are far below reasonable economic protection.
Moreover, we may be procedurally faced with a situation
where there is a family trauma and not just an individual
situation, because family members may also be affected by
the results of the exposure to a toxic substance. Likewise, the
question of a maximum level of compensation in order to
provide an incentive to return to work may be a somewhat
specious criterion when one is confronted with an occupa
tional disease problem where the result is often permanent
disability or death, or progressive deterioration.

Claims Processing
One of the more difficult problems in dealing with an oc
cupational disease compensation system is the question of
claims management and claims handling. Always we are con
fronted with the question of providing appropriate due pro
cess and appropriate procedures for handling administrative
and judicial review in a fair and reasonable fashion. The
question becomes, to some degree, due process for whom?
In a preemption situation, we are clearly looking at a
uniform federal system in an area where the federal govern
ment has not always been known for its clarity of claims
handling.
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I suggest that the system, whatever it be, become simple,
that it be designed to keep adjudication to a minimum and to
focus on eliminating controversy and the adversary mentali
ty. Insofar as the medical side of the claims handling is con
cerned, this area lends itself to the creation of some form of
impartial medical evaluation. It may be advisable to create
one group of physicians who will determine causality and a
different group of physicians who will be the panel to review
degree of impairment or disability caused by such exposure.
A major concern about the due process mechanism of any
claims proceeding is the determination of who will pay. If
some form of a group requirement or group responsibility is
created, it then is very important to create a mechanism that
does not provide a "super employer" to challenge each and
every claim. The concept of super employer is currently em
bodied in the "pool" arrangement of HR 3175. In that pro
posal, the pool represents all of the employers and has the
right to challenge claims pending before the Department of
Labor. If that be the case, it might be better to keep pushing
at the states to adopt improved systems of handling occupa
tional disease claims matters, rather than subject individual
claimants to the potential of opposition by a single entity
representing all employers.

Funding
In each of these scenarios, one must determine both who
should pay and how they should pay it. There are a number
of different criteria which have been suggested for a funding
mechanism, ranging from assessments to direct taxes to in
surance pooling arrangements and a whole spectrum in be
tween. I suspect that as this process continues over the next
several years, someone will even invent a voucher system for
handling the cost of the compensation program.
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On the other hand, in administering such a super-fund
program, we may well have reached the point where it would
be useful to examine not just the public or the private sector,
but also whether we need to create some quasi-public or
private agency to handle the paperwork and financial trans
actions this sort of a fund would entail. Even though the
political process of enacting a pool arrangement based on a
tax is formidable, I believe it may be the only viable
mechanism. The concept of an insurance pool is interesting,
but the ability to administer such a process may be beyond
our current capabilities.
While I have used up a great deal of verbiage in describing
these various components of a disability system, there are at
least two more considerations that I would suggest in think
ing about the necessary mechanisms for dealing with this
problem. First, we have put the cart before the horse
somewhat in dealing with these compensation legislation
recommendations because we have not emphasized enough
the preventive and risk assessment screening programs that
are urgently required to protect the workforce against these
new and emerging occupational maladies. This is peculiarly
an area where investment in prevention, investment in risk
assessment and investment in screening will not only pay vast
dividends to workers who will be given opportunities for
treatment or cure at early stages of their disease, but can also
result in enormous cost savings to employers.
Second, having described the basic elements required of
any system, I am not at all sure that they constitute the ideal
system. 3 1 would say to you that while we need to implement
this process and have a legislative solution as soon as possi
ble, we ought also consider the longer-range implications of
workplace disability, particularly in the occupational disease
area.
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Because we are confronted with difficulties in causal rela
tionships in occupational illness, there is reason to consider
the possibility of an integrated benefit system. It may be time
to consider the notion that if one is afflicted with an occupa
tional illness or disease, the question of whether it happened
on or off the job is perhaps less relevant than in other com
pensation systems. One could legitimately view an occupa
tional disease compensation system as the beginning of an in
tegrated approach to disability compensation. 4
There is an area that I have thus far deliberately not men
tioned in this paper. That is the question of whether a pro
gram such as I have outlined here should be provided only if
it is the exclusive remedy for exposure to occupational
hazards in a workplace situation. Under its other name, it is
called exclusive liability or elimination of third party
liabilities. It may even be one of the criteria for enactment of
a product liability statute.
I am not sure that I can add to the many statements made
on both sides of this issue. 5 Suffice it to say that it seems to
me it is not the relevant consideration for looking at a com
pensation system that hurdles a problem relating to the
employer and employee. In point of fact, the so-called
manufacturer is indeed a third party. I would say that the
employment contract runs from the worker to the employer.
The tort system has traditionally provided a remedy, as be
tween the employer and the manufacturer, or as is now so
frequently, between the individual and the manufacturer
under various product liability standards. It is indeed strange
to see the U.S. Congress, in this area of liability, being forc
ed into denying workers' rights they have yet to receive. I
think it is the wrong bargain and the wrong form.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not occupa
tional disease legislation can be enacted. No one ever knows
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the direction in which the political process will move on a
given issue. It is safe to say that there is more interest now in
occupational disease than ever in history. There is more in
terest now in providing a disability compensation system
than in any time in recent years. There is also a greater
understanding of the scope of certain federal or federallyadministered compensation programs such as Black Lung
and FECA. These programs have been widely criticized as
costly and inefficient. The fact that they were poorly ad
ministered and never provided proper funding or manage
ment until recently does not mean that they are not fun
damentally sound from a public policy and worker protec
tion point of view.
Is all the above feasible? Who knows. But if I can review
from the beginning, there is nothing new or novel. There is
no lightning rod to come down upon us. The studies have
been done. We must recognize that only 3 percent of occupa
tional disease cases are filed through the existing workers'
compensation system in the face of vastly more numbers be
ing afflicted. This is the time to be considering such matters.
There is an interest now, thanks to the Environmental Pro
tection Agency. 6 There is an interest now, thanks to JohnsManville and asbestos, asbestos, asbestos.
We do not need any more study commissions or any more
large groups to evaluate public policy. We now need to
design and implement the program.
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NOTES
1. See, for example, the bills introduced by Congressman Miller and
Senator Hart in the 97th Congress (HR 5735 and S 1643). Also note HR
3175 Occupational Disease Compensation Act of 1983, introduced May
26, 1983.
2. E.g., Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, U.K. In most of these
statutes the descriptions have taken the form of a list of diseases. Once
the exposure to a listed disease through a period of employment is
established, causation is no longer an issue.
3. Appendix A is a copy of recent testimony of the AFL-CIO that lays
out in brief form the way in which these elements could be put togther
for a reasonably successful, if not ideal, system.
4. The European systems noted above are examples of integrated benefit
programs. Some are all government run and some have strong elements
of the private sector. Some, such as in the Netherlands, pay the same
benefits regardless of on or off the job illness. Most have some differen
tials, but none as disparate as those found in the U.S.
5. See generally, DOL Task Force Report, Volume 4.
6. Recent criticism that the Administrator of EPA was not properly en
forcing the environmental laws led to a congressional investigation.
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Appendix A
83-55
Testimony in Behalf of the
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations,
The AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department and
The AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Department
Before the Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the
House Education and Labor Committee on H.R. 3175, to Provide
a Program of Compensation for Occupational Disease Victims
June 13, 1983

For the AFL-CIO: Kenneth Young, Executive Assistant to the
President of the AFL-CIO
For the Industrial Union Department: William H. Bywater, President,
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
For the Building and Construction Trades Department: Robert
Georgine, President
Statement of Mr. Kenneth Young, Executive Assistant
to the President of the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
June 13, 1983
The AFL-CIO, the Industrial Union Department and the Building and
Construction Trades Department are appearing today jointly to present
views on H.R. 3175, which would establish a system for compensating
workers and survivors in cases of disability or death caused by occupa
tional exposure to asbestos and other toxic substances.
We thank the committee for this opportunity to appear and we com
mend you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention and diligent efforts in seek
ing a solution to a serious deficiency in the workers' compensation
system and to relieve the suffering of tens of thousands of victims of
these diseases.
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This legislation, introduced by the chairman and co-sponsored by
other members of this subcommittee, offers the Congress, organized
labor, the insurance carriers, the manufacturers and processors and
other interested parties an opportunity to come forward to discuss this
proposal in serious pursuit of solutions to the pressing social, economic,
legal and political problems that occupational diseases cause our society.
The moral and ethical issues are so serious that common sense tells us
that it is time to resolve this problem for the welfare of the stricken
workers and their families and for the good of our nation.
We believe that we can agree on several basic concerns:
1. The need for a federal program. State workers' compensation laws
governing occupational disease and disability do not provide prompt,
adequate and equitable compensation to workers exposed to toxic and
hazardous substances. Reform of this inadequate system is long overdue.
2. The need is evident for a system that adequately meets the economic
and medical needs of workers stricken by occupational diseases, and for
their families.
3. The need is evident for a system that provides swift and certain
remedies without delay.
4. The need is evident for a system that provides for expansion of
coverage of diseases in an ever-widening world of risk factors and in
cidences.
5. The need is evident for a system that is adequately financed and
properly administered.
6. The need is evident for a system with mechanisms for protecting
workers from exposure in the workplace.
Mr. Chairman, none of us is an expert in this field, though we are
familiar with the problems and the need for solutions from our direct ex
perience in the labor movement.
While workers' compensation laws in all states cover disability that
results from occupational disease, this coverage most often is in name
only. There is no uniformity of procedures to determine occupational
disease compensability. Many states have in their laws restrictive eligibili
ty provisions or arbitrary compensation standards. Claims procedures
are generally too costly and time-consuming. Many occupational
diseases are not adequately covered by the workers' compensation
system. Thus, millions of workers who suffer the disabling effects of ex
posure to hazardous agents in the workplace receive no benefits.
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The occupational disease effects of new and changing technology are
increasingly being borne by workers themselves rather than the system
designed to compensate them. Thousands of workers die each year from
the effects of asbestos, radiation, cotton dust, vinyl chloride, benzene
and hundreds of other hazardous agents to which they were exposed,
sometimes many years ago. Millions of workers are at risk of irreversible
diseases of the heart, nerves, muscles, bones and lungs. Many of the tox
ic agents that cause these diseases have found their way into workers'
homes and communities, claiming as victims an unknown number of
family bystanders as well. Many of these victims are uninformed about
the fact that they are at risk as well as about what must be done to reduce
the risk.
The AFL-CIO, and our Industrial Union and Building Trades Depart
ments, therefore, have called for the establishment of a federal program
to compensate workers and their families for death or disabiity resulting
from occupational diseases. Attached to our testimony is the February
28, 1983 statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council, and the compan
ion Resolution of the Industrial Union Department urging Congress to
enact legislation that will establish a comprehensive occupational disease
compensation program as well as a program to identify, notify and
diagnose workers who are at high risk as a result of occupational health
hazards.
There are provisions in H.R. 3175 that we support. However, there are
elements of the bill about which we have concerns: specifically, the level
of disability benefits, the death benefit, the wage loss provision as well as
the procedure for filing and determining claims. While we will not ad
dress in our testimony, today, all of these features, we look forward to
working with the Committee to resolve the problems of concern and to
strengthen this legislation.
At this time I wish to address one problem: the matter of exclusive
remedy.
The AFL-CIO has long endorsed the traditional concepts of exclusivi
ty with respect to workers' compensation as between the employer and
his employees. The certainty of the compensation payment weighed
against the uncertainty of traditional common law actions and defenses
has been the cornerstone of the workers' compensation system for more
than 70 years in this country.
H.R. 3175 continues this approach by including within the exclusive
remedy limitations the employer, insurance carriers, collective bargain
ing agents and fellow employees.
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There is much to argue for this approach. Experience has shown that
where workers have had to seek redress in the courts, the time consumed
has been extensive, the outcome uncertain and the awards when they
come often net the worker very little after lawyer fees and costs.
Also, uncertainty on the employer's part transfers to the worker: If a
company does not know its liability, then its workers can have no sense
of protection.
There are two points, however, which we would like to make regarding
the notion of exclusive remedy. First, in the area of occupational illnesses
related to toxic substances, we believe that the exclusive remedy protec
tion granted to employers should not extend to those actions of willful or
intentional misconduct which cause harm to employees.
We have seen too many examples of employers with knowledge of the
dangerous substances or the dangerous conditions, willfully exposing
their workers to these dangers.
Second, we do not believe that the exclusive remedies should be ex
tended to extinguish the traditional third-party rights of actions that
employees would have against manufacturers. We believe that these
workers should be entitled to their full rights against such manufacturers
for additional damages including pain, suffering, loss of consortium and
punitive damages as appropriate.
Limiting the manufacturing liability to that of an employer reduces the
incentives on that manufacturer to operate with a high standard of
testing and production as well as comprehensive warning requirements.
Statement of Mr. William H. Bywater, Vice President and Member
of the Exeuctive Council of the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO,
and President, International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. On behalf of the In
dustrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, we are very pleased to be here to
testify in support of occupational disease compensation legislation.
As stated in the companion testimony of the AFL-CIO, occupational
disease is a many-faceted workplace problem. The focus of public atten
tion has been on cancer and asbestos because of the enormous, wellpublicized impact it has had on thousands of workers exposed to that
substance. Nonetheless, rubber workers who develop leukemia from
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benzene, plastics workers who develop liver cancer because they must
breathe vinyl chloride, miners who die of lung cancer because of ionizing
radiation, electroplaters in my own industry who breathe cadmium
fumes and die of prostate cancer—all sicken and die just as easily as men
and women exposed to asbestos.
Their suffering and the suffering inflicted upon their families should
not be less because their tragedy draws less attention in the media.
Cancer is not our only occupational disease. Cotton dust disease,
nerves destroyed by lead, mercury and solvents; all are worthy of our
concern.
We hope that the Committee recognizes that the effects of other toxic
processes and substances should be covered in the compensation scheme.
We believe a mechanism for doing so is essential with respect to some of
the requisite elements contained in this Bill.
The provisions contained in Section 16 of the Bill provide a framework
for coverage of additional diseases and populations. Fleshing out of
these provisions is necessary if this section is to be successfully im
plemented, and diseased workers compensated. Experience with stan
dard setting for toxic substances and processes under other statutes and
legislative history, has shown that absent specific Congressional direc
tion in the statute promulgation of effective standards is seriously
hindered.
We are concerned that the legislative directions make clear the
Secretary of Labor's responsibility to promulgate a suitable regulation in
a specific time frame. It is important that workers not become caught in
the cross-fire of inter-agency disputes, and suffer long delays in obtain
ing relief. For those occupational diseases and populations at risk
already recognized and well documented such as byssinosis among cot
ton textile workers, the Congress should set a maximum time limit for
coverage of these diseases and workers under this legislation.
The Bill at a minimum should direct the Secretary of Labor to set stan
dards for additional discrete diseases, populations at risk, and substances
or processes which consider exposure criteria, diseases and disease sites
to be covered, and diagnostic criteria.
The Bill should also make clear that the criteria transmitted to the
Secretary of Labor should contain to the extent feasible specific
presumptions relating to causality so as to eliminate the challenges to the
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eligibility where medical evidence is sufficient to warrant the finding of a
connection between the occupation and the disease.
H.R. 3175 already contains such presumptions for asbestos-related
diseases. The Bill correctly makes irrebuttable the presumption that
asbestosis is caused by breathing asbestos because the scarring of the
lung and calcification observed by the physician is typically found among
exposed workers. The chance is very small that the same conditions can
be found in the absence of asbestos exposure.
The proposal makes a similar presumption for mesothelioma.
In this complex struggle with problems of causation and in under
standing what happens to populations and groups of workers, we must
deal with scientific information as it emerges and relate this knowledge to
the legal formulations in order to accomplish our compensation scheme.
The traditional requirement of compensating diseases "arising out of
and in the course of employment" can and must be reconciled through
appropriate redefinitions and qualifications to reflect the state of
knowledge about disease causation. The acceptance of presumptions as a
basis for clarifying causation and thereby determining compensation is
essential.
Presumptions are a method of recognizing the advancement as well as
the limits of science; they are valuable only when used fairly and con
sistently.
We believe that it will not be difficult for NIOSH to make the same
determinations for workers exposed to other toxic substances and pro
cesses that reflect the increased burden of risk. Those who have borne
this risk and developed cancer or other diseases because they are cokeoven workers, welders, textile workers, uranium miners, painters or oil
refinery workers are no less entitled than asbestos workers to compensa
tion.
Consideration should also be given to including a "general
protection" provision which would allow claimants to seek compensa
tion for work-related disease even though the specific effects have not
been explicitly listed as compensable.
All of those provisions requiring consultation with the insurance pool
insofar as it would permit a veto of additional coverage should be
eliminated from this legislation. In our judgment the question of addi
tional coverage should be limited to assessment of risk or disease and not
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confused with a criterion of whether there is an insurance mechanism for
funding a particular compensation program. We also believe that there is
no need for Congressional review of each new disease regulation.
Mr. Chairman, this is not wishful thinking about problems down the
road. As is amply shown in my colleagues' testimony this morning, the
need for additional coverage for occupational illness is urgent. There are
afflicted workers and their families who need help now. There are a
number of groups of workers in high-risk populations which should be
covered within a short period of time after passage of this statute. The
Secretary's timeframe should be far shorter than one year for promulga
tion of such additional regulations.
We support the approach taken for the medical considerations in H.R.
3175 because we believe that there is an understanding that this complexi
ty of occupational diseases is not explainable in terms of simple single
causes and simple single effects. The language of the proposed statute
implies recognition of the concepts of risk factors and thinking in terms
of populations which need to be the focus of the process of assessment
that delineates work-related illness.
Finally, we would like to make clear that our interest is not just in
compensation alone. The basic process of risk assessment useful in a
compensation scheme is also important and has application in the reduc
tion of suffering and death.
One of the most important realities repeatedly established for en
vironmentally induced chronic disease is the long period of clinical laten
cy between the onset of effective exposure and the first evidence of the
disease. This "silent period" between initial exposure and the discovery
of disease is of more than theoretical interest. It offers an opportunity, a
possibility that intervention during this time might be successful in
breaking the chain of events between exposure to an agent and the onset
of uncontrollable disease. For cancer alone, the American Cancer Soci
ety estimates that nearly a third of the expected deaths could be
prevented by existing clinical methods of early detection and treatment.
There is even some evidence of reversing the development of disease
before it is found when the exposure has been stopped. Consequently, an
integrated program of early detection is an urgent need including the
identification and notification of high-risk groups, resources for the
diagnosis and verification of disease effects, community and family
resources for continuous and lifetime surveillance, and referral and
counseling.
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We believe that these elements are essential to an effective program of
occupational disease prevention. We can not focus totally on compensa
tion without bringing to bear an understanding of this need as well.
Mr. Chairman, the Industrial Union Department joins with the AFLCIO and the Building Trades Department in underscoring the impor
tance of this legislative effort. We are pleased that you lead the Congres
sional effort to enact legislation and we intend to spare no effort to help
achieve a law that is so needed by our membership.
We are attaching to our statement additional remarks which we ask be
included in the record of this hearing.
Statement of Mr. Robert Georgine, President,
Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO
I am very pleased to join with my colleagues from the AFL-CIO and
the Industrial Union Department to speak to this committee today on
behalf of the Building and Construction Trades Department.
My belief is that now is the time for all of the groups concerned over
the problems created by hazardous materials to accept the responsibility
for the solution to the ultimate problem—how to make whole, and fully
and fairly compensate, the diseased workers, and to eliminate the
dangerous work practices causing these diseases. No facet of our society
can be complacent because they have solved their individual piece of the
problem. This legislation certainly addresses the issue of society's
restoration of, and financial restitution to, diseased workers and their
families.
This is not a matter of abstract concern to the trade union movement.
The effort to design and evaluate a comprehensive approach to the oc
cupation disease problem is urgently needed. I also recognize that as the
solutions begin to evolve, the potential for conflict will arise. This is so,
because there are so many interested parties—labor, producers and
manufacturers of asbestos itself, mining, quarrying, packaging, and the
processing of the products using asbestos, plus the builders, the con
sumers, the insurance companies who underwrite risks, the people who
are exposed, and the health and welfare services who must tend the vic
tims, plus governments and courts who must administer, interpret and
enforce laws.
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All of us in construction remember the decade between 1960-69 when
more than 40,000 tons of fireproofing material were sprayed annually in
highrise buildings. The estimate today is that more than one million tons
of asbestos material remain in place aboard ships, in buildings, and in
process industries. We know that asbestos dust fills the air when it is
damaged or has to be replaced. Fortunately, through our apprenticeship
and training programs we have promoted the use of better work prac
tices, means of isolation, and engineering controls to minimize the ex
posure during removal or repair of in-place asbestos that is easily crushed
and releases fibers readily into the job-site atmosphere. Laborers,
Asbestos Workers, Painters, are exposed in rip-out work; I could name
every International Union in the Building Trades, and I'm sure that they
could provide additional situations of exposure.
Boilermakers, similar to many other craft unions, also have lodges or
locals that represent workers in an Industrial setting; but they have work
ed on construction sites where it has been estimated that 10,000 to 20,000
tons of asbestos were applied annually to pipes, boilers, and other hightemperature equipment in factories, refineries and power plants.
We have tried to control the exposure of construction workers to inplace asbestos during rip-out work by encouraging the development of
specialty contractors to do this work, and discouraging the use of con
tractors without experience and knowledge.
Researchers at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine have estimated
that 7.5 million construction workers are at some degree of risk of
developing an asbestos-associated disease. Within the next 20 years an
nual excess deaths from asbestos-related lung cancer among construction
workers are estimated to range from 1,405 persons to 1,893. When other
cancer deaths are projected, it adds an additional 1,000 to 1,500 deaths.
There are other toxic substances which I will talk about for a few
minutes. An Ironworker told me recently,
"We used to bring bottles or cartons of milk with us to do the
job when we were welding. We would drink this milk thinking
that it would reduce the upchucking when we were welding
galvanized steel, or over the surface of steel that had been
painted with lead in it."
Of course, we all know that it didn't work very well, but I use this as an
illustration of the immediate and violent reaction of a respiratory system
that is being overloaded with welding fumes. Apply this to confined
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spaces, and add Plumbers and Pipefitters and the toxic atmosphere prob
lem is magnified. NIOSH has listed deaths due to respiratory disabilities
as the number one cause of death among the occupational diseases.
Painters are exposed to the fumes of paints and solvents in the con
struction trades. Roofers are exposed to coal and asphalt tar pitch fumes,
Tile Setters, Plasterers, Cement Masons, Carpenters, Bricklayers are also
exposed to mixtures and epoxies from which toxic fumes can be present.
Laborers handle bags, barrels, boxes, cans, drums, cylinders, and other
containers which may contain hazardous substances, and all crafts on a
construction site are exposed to many kinds of dusts and vapors. Iron
workers, Pipefitters and Plumbers handle materials, cut, shape and weld
coverings with paint and anti-corrosive materials that are too numerous
to mention. Carpenters, Operating Engineers, Electricians—pick any
craft, and you will find a potential group of construction workers for ex
posure to asbestos and other toxic substances.
It is against this background of danger that a special Building and
Construction Trades Department Committee was appointed to study and
coordinate efforts with other AFL-CIO departments concerning all oc
cupational disease compensation programs. That Committee developed
several basic questions about such a compensation system. They are:
(1)

How will our members, who are potential risks to exposure,
gain entry to any system devised to meet their health,
economic and social needs? Not only for themselves but their
families when they are deceased, or worse yet, suffering a
"living death"?

(2)

What will be the mechanisms to identify and to label, as well
as to define, the very best procedures and equipment needed
to protect those who are presently exposed at their workplace,
or may face work assignments in the future that will expose
them?

(3)

How can we insure that the delivery system will not be out
moded, and constantly require upgrading in the future to
serve the people dependent upon it?

(4)

How can we insure that such a program will be adequately
financed?

(5)

How can we insure that it will be properly administered?
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How can such a program be designed so that it will become
the catchment basin for all such future problems as may arise,
and not be done on a piecemeal basis as we have done in the
past, and then only after there has been great suffering by our
working people?

Our Committee report to me indicates that their impression of this Bill
now pending before the Subcommittee is that it does not answer all of
these questions as specifically as is necessary but it does offer an oppor
tunity for substantial improvement over the present situation, and a
great deal of opportunity for real progress towards the day that our
country will achieve a comprehensive compensation program for work
ing people who are disabled or die as a result of an unsafe or harmful
health environment. Our comments are offered in this spirit.
The testimony of the AFL-CIO has outlined in detail the reason why
this legislative effort to provide occupational disease compensation is so
critical to American workers.
I would like to comment more specifically on the funding mechanics.
This aspect of the proposed legislation is of particular importance to
both construction workers and their employers. Construction is an oc
cupation with a high degree of mobility. Most of our members work for
many different employers during their normal career. Our industry long
ago set up multi-employer health and pension funds to accommodate this
mobility.
With the long latency periods and multi-exposure problems of occupa
tional diseases, we believe that it is essential to have a financing system
that will fairly compensate our workers made ill and not place the entire
cost on the "last employer," whose involvement may be minimal.
We believe that the responsibility for compensating the workers and
their families made ill through asbestos exposure and other toxic
substances should be placed squarely on those who are responsible for
the harm. Any mechanism for paying compensation should place the
burden of payment on the employers or manufacturers of the toxic
substance; because of latency and multiple exposure factors it is ap
propriate that a compensation fund be created that will have an industryby-industry orientation.
We do not believe that the American public should pay for the
workplace disability caused by exposure to toxic substances.
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We recognize that there are many possibilities for funding
mechanisms, one of which is the insurance pool arrangement embodied
in H.R. 3175. This is a complex issue and we would be willing to work
closely with the subcommittee to develop a mechanism that will provide
certainty of payment, reasonable financing, and fairness of process to
the injured workers and their families.
We have serious reservations about the insurance pool arrangement
from at least two aspects as it is now constituted in H.R. 3175. First, the
pool arrangement gives substantial rights to the pool to challenge in
dividual claims coming before the Secretary of Labor. The claims con
sideration and adjudication process should be simple as we have stated
and principally rest with adjudications by the Secretary of Labor. We do
not believe it is appropriate to create a process whereby the pool becomes
a "super employer" able to challenge claims. Under the pool arrange
ment, as currently set forth in H.R. 3175, the various provisions of the
pool and claims-handling permitting constant challenge to the claim will
create a mechanism that will be litigation-prone and will be an injustice
to the workers' interest.
Second, we do not believe that the pool should have any say in whether
or not additional diseases will be recognized as eligible for compensation
under the statute. The pool arrangement appears to give the insurance in
dustry a veto over whether or not additional diseases will be the subject
of compensation. This is not an acceptable process for the workers' in
terest.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, this is a very serious
effort you have started. It means a great deal to our membership in the
Construction Industry. As we have stated, it is not an abstract proposi
tion for us. It is an urgent need and we hope the Congress will be respon
sive to this urgency.
Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council
on
Occupational Disease Compensation and Prevention
February 28, 1983
Bal Harbour, Fla.
About 100,000 workers die each year from the accumulated effects of
exposure to carcinogens and other chemical hazards. Another one
million workers become disabled each year from the same cause.
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When occupational disease episodes are publicized, attention is drawn
to the tragic situation of the victims of radiation, asbestos, cotton dust,
kepone, vinyl chloride, benzidine, and hundreds of other hazardous
agents. The vast majority of those who have been harmed are not afford
ed assistance; often they do not even know that they are at risk. And only
a very small percentage of the most severely disabled workers receive
benefits from state workers' compensation systems, which are designed
to deal primarily with traumatic injury, not disease.
A federal program is needed to compensate workers and their families
for death or disability from occupational disease. The AFL-CIO is en
couraged in this respect by current legislative initiatives. Both Rep.
George Miller (D-Calif.) and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) have
announced an intention to introduce legislation that would establish a
comprehensive federal program to provide adequate and equitable com
pensation.
Any such legislation: should include generous time limits for filing
claims that take account of the long latency periods for occupational
diseases; should include eligibility requirements that give workers a fair
opportunity to prove that their disabling disease is caused by exposure to
a toxic substance; and should cover known occupational health hazards
and provide for coverage through administrative action of additional
hazards as they become known.
While a comprehensive compensation program is essential, it is not
sufficient in itself. A program to identify, notify and diagnose workers
who are at high risk as a result of an occupational health hazard is also
necessary. Legislation should be developed to authorize the National In
stitute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to carry out medical
research to isolate occupational diseases and to assist populations at risk.
We strongly object to the denial to workers on grounds of alleged
bankruptcy of compensation to which they are entitled for job-related in
jury and disease. Legislation should be enacted to correct this injustice.
Working men and women need and deserve a nationwide effort by the
federal government to prevent occupational disease and to assist those
who are paying the price in pain, in suffering and in the lost ability to
provide for themselves and their families for years of inaction by
employers and by the states.
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About 100,000 workers die and one million become disabled every
year because of past and continuing exposure to toxic agents in their
workplaces. Millions of workers are at risk of irreversible diseases of the
heart, nerves, muscles, bones, and lungs. Many of the toxic agents that
cause these diseases have found their way into workers' homes and com
munities, claiming as victims an unknown number of family bystanders
as well.
When occupational disease episodes are publicized by the media, at
tention is drawn to the tragedy and pain suffered by victims of radiation,
asbestos, cotton dust, kepone, vinyl chloride, benzidine, and hundreds
of other hazardous agents. But when the television cameras are turned
off, the vast majority of victims remain completely unassisted. They are
uninformed about the fact that they are at risk as well as about what
must be done to reduce the risk, and only a very small percentage—10
percent in 1978—of even the most severely disabled workers receive
benefits from state workers' compensation systems, which are designed
to deal with traumatic injury, not disease.
Past legislative efforts have focused solely on the compensation issue,
in recent months focused on asbestos victims. Workers and their families
need help to prevent disease, those who do develop work-related diseases
need assistance, and legislation cannot be restricted to the effects of one
or two agents. There must be a mechanism for helping all workers made
sick by conditions at work.
A comprehensive program to identify, notify, screen, diagnose, aid,
and compensate populations of both workers and their families who are
at high risk of dying or becoming disabled as a result of an
occupationally-attributable disease is critical if we are to end this
chronic, massive national epidemic based on ignorance, apathy and inac
tion.
A two-fold national program is needed. This first part would be ad
ministered by NIOSH, which would conduct medical research to identify
and assist populations at risk and administer a Risk Assessment Board.
Coverage for known populations at risk would be based on an
epidemiologic trigger. Additional workers would be included as new in
formation is collected through research.
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The second part would be administered by an independent federal
agency that would compensate disabled workers and their families
through industry trust funds gathered from employers, adjudicate
claims, and initiate a national recordkeeping system. Compensation
would be virtually automatic where occupation is a factor in causing a
worker's disease or disability, on a no-fault basis. Workers and the agen
cy would have the right to sue both corporation and individual corporate
officers in cases of criminal and gross negligence, and workers would be
protected from exclusion from coverage under existing health insurance.
The Executive Council and Conventions of the Industrial Union
Department have adopted resolutions on this issue in the past. These
have been confirmed as policy statements of the labor movement by ac
tion of the Executive Council and Conventions of the AFL-CIO.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED:
That the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, mount a campaign
to implement these policies, that the Department call on all affiliates and
Departments of the AFL-CIO to join us in a national campaign to cor
rect the injustices of the past.

12
Issues in Asbestos
Disease Compensation
Donald L. Spatz
Director of Occupational Safety and Health
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths,
Forgers and Helpers

The Asbestos Legacy
The relationship between occupational exposure to
asbestos and the development of human disease has been ex
tensively studied, both clinically and epidemiologically. Scat
tered reports of lung scarring among workers in asbestos fac
tories occurred throughout the industrial world in the first
two decades of this century. In 1918, one of the first in
dustrial hygiene reports issued by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics referred to the adverse health experience of
asbestos workers. 1 Population studies among asbestos textile
workers in the 1930s showed that these workers experienced
a high frequency of lung abnormalities. 2 3
These first clinical and epidemiological reports focused ex
clusively on the development of asbestosis. In 1935, the first
case reports of the cancer-causing potential of asbestos were
published. 4 5 In 1946, the annual report of the chief inspec
tor of factories in Great Britain noted an extremely high rate
of lung cancer among workers who had died from
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asbestosis. 6 Population-based studies confirmed the excess
risk of lung cancer among asbestos factory workers in both
Great Britain and in the United States. 7 8 In 1964, Dr. Irving
Selikoff and others published findings of an enormously in
creased rate of death from cancer and asbestosis among
users, rather than producers of asbestos products. 9
Since the mid-1960s, scientists have found similar results
among other groups of workers occupationally exposed to
asbestos in either production or use of asbestos-containing
products. Pleural and peritoneal mesothelioma, a rare and
striking disease, began to be diagnosed among groups of
workers only casually exposed to the "magic mineral." 10 It
could indeed be argued that without the finding of
mesothelioma among persons with such varied occupational
and environmental exposure, that the tragic potential of
asbestos to cause human disease might have been thought to
be limited to only those persons with direct and substantial
contact.
As mesothelioma was found among shipyard workers,
railroad workers, construction workers, those servicing
automobile and truck brakes, and among family members
who cleaned workers' dust-laden clothes, it brought new
awareness of the potentially broad impacts of toxic
substances. While black lung was restricted to those who
chose to mine coal for a living, and silicosis was confined to
a handful of occupations, the effects of asbestos spread
across occupational groups and, somewhat, across social
classes. 11
While it appears self-serving for a major insurance com
pany with extensive liabilities at stake to call asbestos disease
a "social problem," 12 it is undoubtedly true that the
widespread use of asbestos products has caused enormous
suffering and personal loss among workers whose jobs
brought them into contact with the substance.
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Recently, the most detailed estimates of the number of
workers occupationally exposed to asbestos and an assess
ment of those who, because they were significantly exposed,
are at risk of developing an asbestos-associated disease, have
been published. 13 There are presently more than 21 million
American workers who, in the past 40 years, were
significantly exposed to asbestos. 14 From this legacy, it is
estimated that 8,200 to 9,700 annual deaths from asbestosassociated cancer plus additional deaths from asbestosis will
occur for each of the next 20 years. 15
Of some importance in understanding the implications of
the asbestos problem is the fact that less than one in 17 of
these workers was involved in the primary or secondary pro
duction of asbestos products. The remainder were involved
in using, maintaining, or removing products containing
asbestos—primarily asbestos insulation materials. Addi
tionally, initial evidence reveals that workers who had no
direct contact but were exposed to fugitive asbestos dust may
be at risk. 16
With this toll of current and future victims of asbestosassociated disease as a backdrop, how well have victims and
their survivors fared under our statutory social insurance
programs—state and federal workers' compensation—and
under common law remedies against manufacturers? While
data are not available for members of most groups of
workers who have been disabled or killed from prior
asbestos exposure, this paper presents information on two
groups of asbestos factory workers and asbestos insulation
workers in the State of New Jersey.

Artificial Barriers to Workers' Compensation
The statutory barriers to occupational disease claims in
state workers' compensation laws have been welldocumented, beginning with the report of the National Com-
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mission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws in 1972, 17
continuing with the Inter-Departmental Workers' Compen
sation Task Force in 1976, 18 and most recently by the
Department of Labor in its Interim Report to Congress on
Occupational Diseases. 19 Perhaps the best summary of the
situation was provided by Larson, who wrote, "a close
review of the current statutes can only lead one to
believe . . . that their real objective is to deliberately limit
the number of cases, especially of the chronic long term (and
probably costly) variety, which are admitted into this
system. 20
Recency of employment rules, strict statutes of limita
tions, and definitions of occupational disease that require
peculiarity to a particular trade or exclude ordinary diseases
of life, are the three types of artificial barriers which restrict
the entry of legitimate claims. 21 Recency of employment or
exposure rules are patently unfair in cases of disability or
death from an asbestos-associated disease. The progressive
nature of asbestosis, in which impairment may progress to
disability in the absence of additional exposure, and the
latency period for the development of an asbestos-associated
cancer, have been documented by Selikoff and others. 22 23
The negative presumption of work-relatedness created by
these rules is not necessary because each state still requires
the claimant to carry the burden of proving that the condi
tion arose out of and in the course of employment.
Statutes of limitation have been modified by legislative ac
tion and judicial interpretation in many states since the
report of the National Commission was released. The liberal
discovery rules have mollified the effect of statutes of limita
tion, but unjustifiable exclusion of claims may still occur.
State laws that continue to require that a compensable
disease be peculiar to an occupation or trade make little
sense for asbestos-associated diseases. 24 How could a brake
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mechanic show that mesothelioma is peculiar to the trade? It
is a disease peculiar to exposure to asbestos, regardless of
trade. Exclusion of ordinary diseases may also act as a bar to
asbestos-exposed workers who develop lung cancer or
cancers of other sites. 25 When the disease is clinically in
distinguishable as to specific cause, the asbestos-exposed
worker can only point to the higher statistical incidence of
the disease in his trade in seeking compensation.

Experience in a State Without Artificial Barriers
If the worker is fortunate enough to live or work in a
state26 without artificial barriers to seeking workers' com
pensation, the claimant still faces the formidable problem of
proving causality. Even with expert legal and medical advice,
the outcome is less than certain and rarely speedy. Evidence
of the difficulties that workers and their survivors have
faced, even in a state without artificial barriers, is available
from a study of three groups of workers in New Jersey who
died of an asbestos-associated disease over a decade, from
1967 to 1976. 27
The New Jersey workers' compensation statute has a fairly
broad definition of compensable occupational diseases and,
since 1974, has applied a liberal discovery rule with no other
artificial barriers. 28 During the decade from 1967 to 1976,
205 deaths from lung cancer, mesothelioma, asbestosis or
another asbestos-associated cancer occurred among the three
groups. Other than having suffered from the same occupa
tional diseases, the three groups of workers shared few oc
cupational characteristics. One group consisted of asbestos
insulation workers who were members of one of the three
New Jersey locals of the Union. These were a subgroup of
the 17,800 asbestos insulators enrolled in a nationwide mor
tality study in 1967. 29 Of these New Jersey locals, 44 men
died of an asbestos-associated disease during the next
decade.

292

Asbestos Disease Compensation

The second group was composed of 87 persons who died
from asbestos-associated disease who had worked at a Paterson, New Jersey asbestos insulation factory that had closed
in 1954. These workers came under prospective surveillance
by the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in 1961. This is a
classic case of short term exposure producing an elevated in
cidence of asbestos-associated diseases. Detailed informa
tion on the mortality experience of this group of workers and
its relationship to asbestos exposure has been reported. 30 31
The fact that the factory closed in 1954 permitted examina
tion of the effect that a break in the employment relationship
had on the likelihood that these workers or their survivors
sought compensation.
The third group included in the comparative analysis con
sisted of workers employed in production and maintenance
classifications in the Manville, New Jersey plant, the largest
asbestos products manufacturing company in North
America. From a cohort of workers under prospective obser
vation since January 1, 1959, 74 deaths from asbestosassociated disease occurred between January 1, 1967, and
the end of 1975. 32
Long term mortality studies of each of these groups of
workers showed a significantly increased incidence of
diseases caused by previous asbestos exposure. Lung cancer
was the predominant cause of death among all groups, but
many of the workers died of mesothelioma and asbestosis.
Cancers of the gastrointestinal tract, the kidney, and other
sites accounted for the remaining asbestos-associated
diseases. 33
The occupational histories of each group of workers were
considerably different. The insulation workers primarily ap
plied and removed asbestos insulation products, working for
a variety of different contractors in the construction industry
over their careers. Exposure to asbestos was usually con-
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tinuous during their employment in the trade. The Manville
workers were likewise exposed to asbestos over their working
lives at the factory. Employment with this company was
stable and, for these workers, usually continuous until retire
ment, disability or death. The workers at the Paterson firm
were different. During the war years, labor turnover at the
factory was high, and upon its closing in 1954, the remaining
workers dispersed to a wide range of other industries and oc
cupations. With the long latency period of asbestosis,
however, short term exposure in this plant three decades
previous produced a pattern of disease similar to that seen
among the insulation and Manville workers, even though the
workers had gone on to various types of other blue-collar
and white-collar employment.

Initiation of Workers' Compensation Claims
There were considerable variations among the three
groups in the initiation of workers' compensation death
claims. Claims for benefits were filed by only nine survivors
of the 87 workers from the Paterson factory. In contrast,
among the insulation workers claims for benefits were in
itiated by survivors in 26 of the 44 deaths. A similar propor
tion of claims (40 of 74) were filed by survivors of the Man
ville factory workers. 34
Among the insulators who remained in the same trade,
albeit with different employers, and among the Manville
workers exposed continuously at one production facility, the
association between asbestos exposure and the resultant
diseases was much better recognized. In turn, the knowledge
to seek workers' compensation was displayed more con
sistently by these workers and their survivors than among the
Paterson victims. The dissemination of information con
cerning asbestos hazards and advocacy for compensation
were aided by the presence of union representation among
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the insulators and Manville workers. The Paterson workers
and their survivors, because of the closing of the plant, no
longer shared an occupational bond or association through
which information and assistance could be transmitted.
While the proportion of workers' compensation claims fil
ed by survivors of insulators and Manville workers was
rather constant over the decade, reflecting early and con
tinuous recognition of the occupational nature of these
deaths, the few claims by survivors of the Paterson workers
came only in more recent years. The increase in the number
of Paterson survivors filing workers' compensation claims
could not be directly attributed to any one factor. Greater
public knowledge of the effects of asbestos exposure,
awareness through participation in a medical surveillance
program, and the elimination of the recency of exposure
limitation from the state law in 1974, could all be considered
contributing factors. Based on interviews with survivors of
Paterson workers who did not file claims, it appeared that
lack of recognition of the association between asbestos and
disease was not as limiting a factor as was the lack of
knowledge that the survivors were potentially eligible for
benefits.
The specific cause of death, as well as the accuracy of the
diagnosis recorded on the death certificate, had an impact
upon whether compensation was sought. The influence of
these factors, however, was not consistent across all three oc
cupational groups. Among the insulators and Manville
workers, claims for death benefits were filed by survivors in
a high proportion of deaths from mesothelioma, yet only
one in 13 deaths from mesothelioma among the Paterson
workers resulted in a survivor's claim. Somewhat surprising
ly, claims for compensation benefits were less often initiated
by survivors of those who died of asbestosis. To a large
degree, this was found to be related to the worker's age at
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death and the description of the cause of death on the death
certificate. Only among the survivors of the insulators were
claims for compensation benefits filed from deaths of less
well known asbestos-associated cancers, such as
gastrointestinal cancer.
Among all three occupational groups, the age of the
worker at death was a consistent factor in whether compen
sation claims were initiated. In part, the decline in the pro
portion of claims filed as age at death increases reflected the
lesser likelihood of there being dependents to advance
claims. Yet the same decline in the initiation of claims was
seen among those deaths in which there was still a surviving
spouse. Although there were no restrictions on the availabili
ty of workers' compensation to survivors of those who died
after retirement and whose major source of income was no
longer wage earnings, the worker's retirement status at the
time of death appeared to be a considerable factor in
whether compensation was sought by a survivor. Three
reasons might be considered to explain this: workers and sur
vivors have less access to information after the connection to
the employment network is severed by retirement; eligibility
for retirement benefits reduces the financial need to file a
claim; and lack of pursuit of potential claimants by legal ad
vocates when a worker's death occurs at an older age.

Outcomes of Workers' Compensation Claims
Detailed information on the processing and outcomes of
the workers' compensation claims was available from the
New Jersey Division of Workers' Compensation for the 26
claims filed by survivors of insulators and the nine filed by
survivors of Paterson workers. Less detailed data were
available on 40 claims and seven direct settlements among
the survivors of the Manville workers. Despite the lack of ar
tificial barriers, only 11 of the 26 survivors of the insulators
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were awarded full dependency benefits. Eleven claims were
resolved through the payment of partial benefits, three
through compromise agreement by the parties, and eight
others by formal decision of the judge in which dependency
was dismissed and posthumous disability awards were
entered. 35
Particularly disturbing was the manner in which claims by
six survivors of insulators who died of mesothelioma were
resolved. In only one case was the widow awarded full
dependency benefits. In other words, in only one of six
claims could the survivor meet the required burden of proof
that the disease and death arose out of and in the course of
employment. In neither the one award, nor the approving
settlements signed by the judges, was mesothelioma
specifically indicated as the cause of death. Despite the fact
that asbestos exposure encountered while on the job was the
only plausible cause of these workers' deaths from
mesothelioma, this medical reality was not reflected by the
decisions and practices under the New Jersey workers' com
pensation system. The handling of claims resulting from
deaths due to lung cancer shows a similar lack of consistency
with documented scientific evidence. Half of the lung cancer
claims were either dismissed or compromised.
Claims resolved through compromise agreements or in
which the judge dismissed the dependency claim and award
ed posthumous disability benefits provided considerably less
in compensation than if judgments for full dependency had
been awarded. New Jersey law provided income benefits for
surviving dependents of 50 percent of wages at the time of in
jury since 1970. Claims paid through compromise
agreements in a fixed amount were less than $30,000 in all
cases and most likely were less than what a survivor would
have received had full dependency been awarded. Yet in an
individual case facing long litigation, compromise may have
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been the only way for the survivors to receive benefits during
the immediate time of need.
Among the survivors of insulators the median period be
tween filing a claim petition and its resolution was 19
months. One in three claims took two years or more to
resolve. Over the decade under study, there was no indica
tion that the period of controversy was reduced as evidence
of asbestos-associated occupational disease became more
available and seemingly less subject to dispute.
Among the survivors of the Paterson workers, with the ex
tended period of time between the last exposure to asbestos
and manifestation of disease, the lack of recognition of the
occupational nature of their husbands' diseases and inade
quate knowledge of their possible eligibility for workers'
compensation were primary impediments. For that reason
only 9 of 87 potential claims were filed. The resolution of
these nine claims indicates that the New Jersey system was
even less capable of acting in concert with medical
knowledge of the etiology of asbestos-associated diseases
than it had been with the insulators. Prior to 1974, claims of
these survivors were effectively barred because of the recency
of exposure limitation in the state law.
Although the Paterson asbestos insulation firm was nam
ed as a responsible employer in eight of the nine claim peti
tions, it was ultimately found liable for payment of sur
vivors' benefits in only two (both deaths from lung cancer).
One successful claim had been appealed by the company for
seven years before final resolution. The widow was finally
awarded lifetime benefits of $34 per week, based on her hus
band's last earnings with the firm in 1954. The other claim in
which the firm paid benefits was a $14,000 settlement reach
ed four and a half years after the worker's death. The only
claim arising from a death from mesothelioma was dismissed
in 1978 for "failure to sustain the burden of proof."
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Despite the scientific evidence of the association between
these workers' employment at the Paterson factory and their
deaths from asbestosis, mesothelioma and lung cancer, the
experience of their survivors, when claims were no longer
statutorily barred, indicates that the compensation system
was unable to handle the medical fact of latency. These
workers, who suffered a pattern of disability and death
similar to that of the asbestos insulation workers, found that
workers' compensation, even in a state with a longestablished and well-regarded system, was incapable of
assigning responsibility to an employer who had ceased pro
duction more than 20 years earlier.
Less detailed data were available on the manner in which
claims from survivors of the Manville workers were resolved.
About the same proportion of survivors filed claims and
received benefits as among the insulators, reflecting the con
tinued exposure until disability, death or retirement. Sur
vivors' benefits were paid in 19 of 23 deaths of
mesothelioma, but in only half of the deaths due to lung
cancer. No claims were filed by, or direct settlements paid to,
survivors of workers who died of gastrointestinal cancer.
The period of time between last employment and death ap
peared to be a factor in whether compensation was sought or
paid. Of five widows whose husbands had been last
employed more than 10 years prior to their deaths, only one
received workers' compensation benefits. Of some note was
the near uniformity between the death certificate cause of
death and that established by review of best evidence for
those Manville workers who had died of mesothelioma and
asbestosis. 36 The employment of the worker in an asbestos
products factory rather than as an asbestos products user led
the physicians to more often correctly list these two asbestos
diseases as the cause of death.
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These three groups of workers may fairly well represent
the range of responsiveness that other workers and their sur
vivors faced in seeking compensation for occupational
asbestos disease in New Jersey. Clearly, those with con
tinuous and current exposure were more aware of their rights
and more successful in meeting the burden of proof. Even
so, there were a majority of deaths in which benefits were
not sought or in which survivors' claims were dismissed or
only partially awarded.
The claim experience of these survivors may be atypical to
the rest of the country, but the New Jersey statute (with no
artificial barriers) can be fairly considered to be more open
to potential claimants than the laws in many other states.
Among the nationwide group of asbestos insulators reported
by Earth, claims for workers' compensation death benefits
were proportionately most often filed in the states of New
Jersey, Ohio and Washington. 37 While it was found in the
nationwide survey that few claims were ultimately denied
and that most resulted in an award or settlement, few details
were available on the actual resolution of the claim, as was
the case in New Jersey. 38 One might surmise that claims of
survivors in other states were reduced to far below their full
value, as in New Jersey.
The Paterson workers may be representative of many
workers in other industries and trades in which asbestos ex
posure was intermittent, brief, noncontinuous or truncated
for whatever reason. However, many of the Paterson
workers had participated in a medical research and
surveillance program that provided some understanding of
the work-relatedness of the diseases which afflicted the
workers. Other victims of asbestos-associated diseases, caus
ed by similar exposure circumstances but without a program
of surveillance, can be expected to be even less informed and
even less likely to seek and obtain compensation. Based on
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the outcomes of the claims by survivors of the Paterson
workers, the potential for swift and equitable resolution of
claims for survivors of workers with similar occupational
histories does not appear promising under the workers' com
pensation mechanisms throughout our country.
The issue of causality and sufficient proof is crucial. The
divergence between scientific evidence and actual workers'
compensation practice—particularly evident in the handling
of claims of insulators from deaths due to mesothelioma, but
also seen in lung cancer deaths—suggests that in the absence
of specific medical presumptions, compensation is neither
certain in amount nor swift in delivery. Nor did the resolu
tion of the Paterson claims reflect the extensive body of
scientific evidence documenting the issues of latency,
etiology, sufficient exposure and increased incidence of
disease among briefly-exposed workers. 39 Clearly, workers'
compensation practice in New Jersey, over the decade
studied, did not reflect scientific evidence establishing the
parameters of the relationship between these diseases and
past occupational exposure to asbestos.
Similar findings reported by Earth from the much larger
nationwide survey of insulation workers who died of an
asbestos-associated disease, aptly described as a "best case"
scenario, 40 strongly reinforce the findings from New Jersey
on the inadequacies of workers' compensation.

Product Liability Suits
It was a mere decade ago, in 1973, that a district court in
Texas extended the concept of strict liability to include the
duty to warn both buyers and users of the product. In this
landmark case (Borel v. Fiberboard Products Corporation)
the court, in ruling in support of an asbestos insulation
worker, wrote "the user or consumer is entitled to make his
own choice as to whether the product's utility or benefits
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justify exposing himself to risks of harm." 41 Since this case,
a veritable explosion of third party liability suits have been
filed against manufacturers of asbestos products by those
who encountered asbestos in their employment. 42 Beginning
with the initial cases of asbestos insulation workers, thirdparty law suits have been filed by numerous shipyard
workers and others involved in use, rather than primary or
secondary production of asbestos products.
The experience of the world's largest asbestos producer,
Manville Corporation, demonstrates the growth in thirdparty law suits. In 1976, only 159 cases had been filed against
the company. 43 The growth in the number of law suits led the
company to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in August 1982.
In congressional hearings, Manville has testified that they
were defending against 16,500 suits, which were increasing at
a rate of 500 per month. 44 Financial studies upon which the
bankruptcy was based estimated an additional 32,000 suits
with a potential total cost of $2 billion by the year 2009. 45
Two additional asbestos manufacturers have also filed for
Chapter 11 reorganization, and others are expected to do
likewise, depending on the prognosis for the Manville action.
The growing number of third-party law suits and the
Chapter 11 reorganization filings have increased the pressure
to find a better method of compensating victims of asbestosassociated disease. Third-party suits exhibit many of the
same problems encountered by the worker or survivor who
seeks workers' compensation. State laws govern these ac
tions, and a uniform product liability law does not exist.
Restrictive statutes of limitation exist in a number of states. 46
The recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, 47 declining
to review rulings by the New York Court of Appeals which
dismissed asbestos suits based on a three-year statute of
limitations, underscores the pitfalls to workers who seek
reparations through product liability suits. Litigation is
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lengthy, and reargument of causation and state of the art are
necessary in each suit. Expert medical and legal advice is
necessary in every case.
Statistical data on the efficacy of third party suits for
asbestos-associated disease are very limited. Among the sur
vivors of the asbestos insulators the average award or settle
ment in 60 cases was $71,000, with an average lawyer's fee of
$26,900, leaving the plaintiffs an average of $44,100. 48 While
the plaintiff's legal fees took approximately 37 percent of the
award or settlement, the legal cost to the defendants may be
even more. Manville Corporation has reported that in 1982
its costs to dispose of suits was an average of $40,000,
$19,000 of which was the cost of defending against the suit. 49
In addition to these direct transactional costs, extended
litigation concerning insurance coverage, pitting members of
the asbestos and insurance industries against one another
over the question of who is obligated to defend and indem
nify the insured, add an unknown cost. 50 There can be little
argument that having courts of law decide individual suits
for compensation when there is such a large class of current
and future injured persons is inefficient. Yet a popular sense
of justice argues against restricting diseased workers or their
survivors from seeking reparations from whatever source
available, especially when workers' compensation is inade
quate.
Among asbestos insulation workers, it is known that there
was an interrelationship between the filing of workers' com
pensation claims and the initiation of a tort suit. Of those
survivors who filed workers' compensation claims, 25 per
cent also sought a remedy against the manufacturer. 51 Ten
percent of those who did not seek workers' compensation fil
ed third-party law suits. 52 This is not unexpected, as in
developing the evidence for a compensation claim, the
worker or survivor gathers much of the factual information
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necessary to pursue an action against the manufacturer.
However, it should be strongly noted that among the nation
wide group of insulators, both workers' compensation
claims and third-party law suits were brought in only 9 per
cent of the deaths. 53 Whether this same interaction between
workers' compensation and third-party suits exists among
other groups of occupationally exposed workers is unknown.
An interesting finding from the awarded or settled suits of
insulators was the substantially higher average award for vic
tims of mesothelioma, compared to victims of lung cancer.
While the average age at death was essentially identical, sur
vivors of mesothelioma victims received an average dollar
recovery before legal fees of nearly $100,000, while the com
parable figure for lung cancer was just $60,000. 54 This may
reflect the availability of cigarette smoking as a defense in
lung cancer suits or reflect a subtle difference in treatment
between a so-called ordinary disease of life and one with
clear-cut etiology. For whatever reason, the disparate
recovery begs for an equitable and uniform compensation
program for victims of all asbestos-associated diseases.
Also of some note is that two claims for workers' compen
sation for lung cancer in New Jersey (discussed above) which
had been dismissed for failure to sustain the burden of prov
ing a causal relationship, resulted in tort suit settlements for
the survivors. Though the burden of proof might be thought
to be as stringent, if not more so, in these cases the manufac
turers were willing to settle even though there was a previous
denial in workers' compensation proceedings.

Conclusion
Asbestos is foremost among the causes of a growing
number of well-defined occupational diseases for which our
current system of workers' compensation has been inade
quate. It has not met the basic quid pro quo of speedy and
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certain awards in exchange for abrogating common law ac
tions against employers. Even in the absence of artificial bar
riers, victims of asbestos-associated diseases fared poorly in
a state with a well-regarded workers' compensation pro
gram.
The existence of a limited number of manufacturers of
asbestos products and a large number of worker-users rather
than worker-producers has created a large pool of potential
third-party litigants. The now well-established legal inter
pretation of strict liability, in which the manufacturer is held
to the duty of an expert, has opened up an avenue for those
who have received less than fair treatment under workers'
compensation to seek further redress. However, the number
of suits against manufacturers, even if the current figure of
25,000 is accurate, represents only a fraction of those who
have been damaged. The experience of survivors of asbestos
insulators in seeking tort compensation shows that although
recovery can be substantial in some cases, overall it is ine
quitable and unavailable.
The detailed estimates of economic losses made by
Johnson and Heler35 for the nationwide cohort of insulation
workers clearly show that the losses were primarily borne by
the disabled, their survivors and the general public, rather
than by employers and manufacturers. For the minority of
survivors who received survivorship benefits of some type,
workers' compensation benefits accounted for only 27.9 per
cent, and tort suits and settlements 15.9 percent of total
payments. In the words of Johnson and Heler, "the fact that
the common law and workers' compensation provide such a
small proportion of the payments to the victims of occupa
tional illness from asbestos is a serious indictment of both
approaches."
Though the "tort problem" has generated new supporters
for an equitable and swift occupational disease compensa-
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tion program, the past history of asbestos manufacturers
does not make it easy to find a method to accommodate
competing equity arguments. The evidence that has surfaced
in tort suits showing that manufacturers covered up their
knowledge of the true hazards of asbestos since at least the
1930s56 57 makes it difficult for worker advocates who wish
to see an adequate workers' compensation system to support
barring suits against manufacturers as a fair quid pro quo
for a nationally administered occupational disease compen
sation program. Perhaps such a compensation program
could be supported as the exclusive remedy for pecuniary
losses and medical care on a no-fault basis if workers retain
ed the right to sue outside the workers' compensation system
for additional damages when individuals or corporations
knowingly and willfully created an unreasonable risk.
Such approaches are not unknown in other parts of the
world. In some Western European countries the employer
has immunity from civil suits for normal cases covered by
their social insurance scheme. But civil action remains possi
ble where there has been penal sanction (Italy), gross
negligence (Norway), or serious fault (Switzerland). 58 In still
other countries, civil action remains possible to cover
elements of compensation, such as damages for pain and
suffering, which are not covered by the statutory scheme.
Under the compensation program established for coal
workers in the United Kingdom there are lump-sum benefits
for pain, suffering, and loss of amenity, together with com
pensation for lost earnings, acceptance of which is in lieu of
the right to seek tort compensation. 59
The findings in the "best case" examination of the ex
periences of the insulation workers in New Jersey show the
need for an independent agency to investigate and adjudicate
claims and the need to develop adequate and workable
medical presumptions. The burden of proof must be chang-
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ed to a burden of disproof on the part of the employer when
statistical evidence shows a higher incidence of disease
among groups of workers exposed to specific substances,
and individual workers meet a minimum threshold of clinical
signs and symptoms.
No asbestos compensation scheme will be truly effective
unless it creates an outreach program to provide
surveillance, notification and assistance to those at risk. This
must be directed particularly to older workers who are less
likely to seek compensation, even though they are at greater
risk as asbestos residency time increases. All artificial bars to
entry and recovery must be eliminated, and income and
medical benefits must be at a level sufficient for appropriate
medical care, a dignified standard of living during disability,
and to survivors upon death.
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Problems in Occupational
Disease Compensation
Leslie I. Boden
School of Public Health
Boston University

The papers presented in this section cover an important set
of issues in workers' compensation for occupational
diseases. First, we are presented with data indicating that the
current state systems have serious problems compensating
victims of asbestos-related diseases and, by inference, other
occupational diseases which are even less well understood.
Then, we are given proposals for solving the problems of
compensating occupational diseases, solutions proposed to
be implemented at the federal level.
Spatz's paper presents a "best case" picture of occupa
tional disease compensation in the United States. He chooses
a state system with no artificial barriers to compensation; the
most well-known occupational disease agent; and workers
who had been under study and were therefore likely to be
more aware of the occupational origin of their diseases. In
spite of these favorable conditions, Spatz documents serious
problems faced by survivors of insulation workers who died
from asbestos-related diseases. The issues are familiar ones,
echoing those discussed by Earth and Hunt, 1 and by Earth2
in his recent study of asbestos insulation workers. In Spatz's
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study, workers' compensation claims for asbestos-related
disease were generally controverted, resulting in long delays,
high legal expenses, and uncertain outcomes. Most claimants
were not paid the full dependency amount, but received a
smaller award, a settlement, or no award at all. Survivors of
insulators waited a median period of 19 months to have their
claims resolved.
Spatz concludes that "our current system of workers'
compensation has been inadequate" in its handling of oc
cupational disease. He and Elisburg provide suggestions for
altering state workers' compensation systems which, in their
views, will improve the compensation of occupational
disease victims and their survivors.
These comments will focus on one aspect of occupational
disease compensation, the uncertainty that leads to many of
the problems presented in Spatz's paper. Before that, I
would like to list some basic criteria by which the adequacy
of occupational disease compensation can be judged.

Criteria for Judging Occupational
Disease Compensation Systems
Elisburg presents some of the basic goals of workers' com
pensation: (1) complete coverage of injuries and illnesses
arising out of and in the course of employment, (2) prompt
delivery of benefits, (3) a "reasonable" level of benefits, in
cluding full payment for medical benefits and rehabilitation.
I would like to add to this list: (4) efficient delivery of
benefits, i.e., a low expense-to-benefit ratio, and (5) certain
ty about what injuries and illness are covered. In addition,
one could suggest: (6) minimal compensation for injuries
and illnesses that are not work-related.
Spatz's work suggests that the first five goals have not
been met for asbestos-caused deaths. Survivors often do not
apply. When they do apply, their claims are often con-
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troverted. Settlements are partial, decisions are apparently
capricious, substantial legal costs are incurred, and awards
are delayed for many months. These problems lead quite
naturally into a discussion of reforms designed to improve
compensation for occupational diseases. While Spatz does
not address the sixth goal, the history of the federal Black
Lung compensation program gives us fair warning that alter
ing the workers' compensation system does not necessarily
lead to unambiguous improvement.

The Nature of Uncertainty About
Occupational Disease Causation
There are many problems involved in occupational disease
compensation, including the artificial legal barriers to com
pensation and the apparent widespread ignorance of workers
and their spouses about the workers' compensation remedy
for occupational diseases. In these comments, however, I
would like to focus on one type of problem, the uncertainty
surrounding occupational illness compensation.
There are several types of uncertainty which affect the
ability of workers' compensation to function effectively.
Uncertainty about the agent that caused the worker's illness
appears to be the primary distinguishing factor. Uncertainty
about workplace exposures that occurred many years ago
creates additional problems. Some common characteristics
of occupational disease that contribute to this problem are:
1. The signs and symptoms of a chronic occupational
disease are usually not related to a unique occupational ex
posure. Medical and epidemiological knowledge may be in
sufficient to distinguish a disease of occupational origin
from one caused by nonoccupational exposures.
2. A disease can have several causes, both occupational
and nonoccupational. A worker who smokes and has been
exposed to ionizing radiation at work may develop lung

316

Occupational Disease Compensation

cancer. Since both cigarette smoke and ionizing radiation are
risk factors for lung cancer, neither can be considered the
unique cause. Moreover, it may not be possible to determine
the contribution of each exposure to the risk of developing
the disease.
3. Even where there is scientific evidence about disease
causation, the evidence will be presented in an adversarial
setting, and there is no guarantee about how that evidence
will be interpreted at hearing, or that all cases with the same
factual base will receive consistent decisions.
4. The disease may develop years after exposure began, or
even after exposure ceased. Because of this, records
establishing employment and exposure may be difficult or
impossible to obtain, and memories of events and exposures
may be unclear.
5. Records of exposures to occupational hazards may
never have existed. Only in recent years, with the promulga
tion by the federal government of health regulations, have
exposure data been collected regularly for health hazards
other than ionizing radiation.
Only rarely can a physician diagnose a disease as definitely
arising out of and in the course of employment. These excep
tions occur when the disease has a unique causative agent to
which there is a documented occupational exposure. Unfor
tunately, few occupational diseases fall into this category.
Mesothelioma is apparently one that does, but lung cancer
and other lung diseases, hearing loss, low back pain, etc.
may be caused by both occupational and nonoccupational
factors. It is often difficult or impossible to determine which
of these factors caused the disease in a specific case, or even
to determine their relative contribution. This is not caused
only by the inexactness of the few available epidemiological
studies of occupational disease. Even when epidemiological
studies are able to accurately determine excess risks of

Occupational Disease Compensation

317

disease in populations, they are not able to determine which
individuals in those populations would not have developed
the disease without occupational exposure. In many cases,
this uncertainty cannot be resolved.

The Impact of Uncertainty on the
Administration of Occupational Disease Claims
Because it is necessary to demonstrate that an injury or ill
ness occurred "out of and in the course of employment,"
uncertainty about the etiology of certain diseases implies
uncertainty about whether those diseases are compensable.
This uncertainty will often mean that a claim, if filed, will be
controverted. This controversion, with ensuing delays and
expenses, is the proximate cause of the symptoms of a poorly
functioning system, namely, long delays and high legal and
administrative costs.
Suppose that out of a group of 1000 workers it was known
that 30 would eventually develop stomach cancer, but that,
because of occupational exposures, 65 workers actually
developed cancers. It is not possible to determine clinically
which of the workers would have developed the cancer in the
absence of occupational exposure. There are a number of
toxicological and epidemiological studies that indicate that a
substance is a carcinogen, but estimates of its potency vary.
In addition, exposure records are not available on the
workers. Reasonable and informed workers with stomach
cancer will attempt to collect workers' compensation, and
reasonable and informed insurers will controvert their
claims. The probable outcome is that settlements will be
reached for substantially less than would have been paid if
the workers won, but much more than they would have
received if they lost. The process of negotiation may take
over a year and cost both claimants and insurers a great deal
in legal expenses. Neither side will be completely satisfied,
but both will prefer settlement to the uncertainty of a hear
ing.

318

Occupational Disease Compensation

A profit-maximizing insurer or self-insured employer will
controvert a claim when the expected gain from controversion is greater than the legal and administrative costs. As the
probability of winning at hearing increases, and as the value
of the claim increases, the advantage to the insurer of controversion grows. For occupational injuries, there is general
ly nothing to be gained from controversion. 3 For occupa
tional diseases, where uncertainty is high and disabilities are
often permanent and severe, the stakes are high. An insurer
would be poorly serving its shareholders and customers if it
did not controvert many of the cases brought.

Proposed Legislative Remedies
The extensive controversion of occupational disease
claims makes it impossible for workers' compensation
systems to meet the goals enumerated above, or to follow
Elisburg's excellent prescription: "I suggest that the
system ... be designed to keep adjudication to a minimum
and to focus on eliminating the adversary mentality."
Elisburg suggests two types of legislated changes in the ad
ministration of workers' compensation designed to reduce
adjudication by eliminating the legal uncertainty about
whether diseases are occupational in origin. These changes
are: (1) the promulgation of legal presumptions and
(2) establishing expert, impartial medical boards to deter
mine the cause of, and to evaluate the degree of impairment
due to, the claimant's illness. Spatz also suggests the use of
presumptions. He suggests rebuttable presumptions that
consider the claimant's burden to be met when "statistical
evidence shows a higher incidence of a disease among groups
of workers exposed to specific substances." 4
Occupational Disease Presumptions
Workers' compensation presumptions can specify a set of
conditions that determine when the burden of persuasion is
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shifted from the claimant to the defendant. Experience with
presumptions is not limited to the federal Black Lung pro
gram. A number of state workers' compensation systems
have presumptions linking exposure to hazardous substances
and illness, linking job and exposure, and even linking job
and illness. 5 New York law (Section 47) provides that any ex
posure to harmful dust for a period of 60 days or longer is
presumed to be harmful in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary. Thus, a worker with lung disease
who was exposed to silica dust for longer than 60 days would
be presumed to have silicosis, unless the insurance carrier or
employer could demonstrate otherwise. Kentucky has a
similar presumption, which states (Section 342.316(5)) that
for a worker with pneumoconiosis and employment ex
posure for 10 years or more to an industrial hazard that is a
cause of pneumoconiosis there is a rebuttable presumption
that the disability or death is compensable. In several states,
including New York, employees in specified jobs are presum
ed to be exposed to hazards associated with those occupa
tions, even if there is no evidence to support this assertion. In
New York, any workers who develop anthrax while working
with, or immediately after handling, wool, hair, bristles,
hides, or skins, are presumed to have anthrax caused by their
work.
The assumption of the papers by Spatz and Elisburg is that
presumptions are favorable to the claimant. This may not be
the case. Twenty states have negative presumptions for some
diseases. The typical negative presumption states that there
must be minimum exposure to the relevant hazard for com
pensation to be paid. About half of these negative presump
tions are rebuttable, while in 10 states there is no opportunity
for workers with less than the mandated exposure to receive
compensation.
Presumptions, whether stringent or liberal, should reduce
uncertainty. For claimants who meet the criteria of the
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presumption, more cases may be brought, since the
presumption will serve to educate workers and attorneys
about the possibility of successful claims. In addition, the
rate of controversion for these claims will be lower, since the
probability of the claimant's winning at hearing would be
quite high. As a result, claims should be paid more rapidly
than now, and there should be lower legal costs. Where there
are settlements, the amounts will probably be higher. The ex
istence of presumptive criteria may also serve to discourage
prospective claimants who do not qualify, even if there is no
explicit negative presumption. The criteria would reflect
legislative policy in workers' compensation, and are likely to
influence decisions even in cases to which they do not direct
ly apply.
A presumption may be relatively generous to claimants, or
quite restrictive. And herein lies the problem. Any presump
tion is likely to include in its scope workers without occupa
tional disease, and is likely as well to exclude workers with
occupational disease. Occupational disease experts can
evaluate and summarize knowledge about the relationship
between occupation, exposure, and disease, but they cannot
decide on the basis of their scientific expertise whether to
compensate fewer occupational disease victims in order to
compensate fewer "undeserving" claimants.
The fact that such political decisions must be made does
not, however, mean that future occupational disease
presumptions will suffer from the same problems as the
Black Lung program. Apparently, states with occupational
disease presumptions have not experienced an explosion of
successful claims as a result. Given current knowledge, one
can only speculate on what would happen. While the concern
of employers and insurers is understandable, most statisti
cians would be hard pressed to make predictions on the basis
of a single observation.
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Existing presumptions in state programs have not ap
peared to dramatically reduce litigation and substantially in
crease compensation of occupational disease claimants. The
Black Lung program appears not to have distinguished ade
quately between occupational and nonoccupational disease.
If any conclusion is supportable from these sparse observa
tions, it is that the drafting and administration of presump
tions is very important, and that their mere existence means
little. The politics of legislation and of implementation are
critical.

Medical Boards
The same may be said for medical boards. While the prin
ciple of impartial, expert evaluation appears to be a good
one, achieving that goal may not be easy. In the highly con
tentious climate surrounding occupational disease compen
sation, expert medical boards have several drawbacks not
shared by presumptions. First, they do not provide clear and
objective guidelines to claimants and defendants prior to the
decisions about filing and controversion. In addition, deci
sions over time and by different medical boards may not be
consistent. On the other hand, consistent decisionmaking
over time by medical boards may help to narrow the range of
dispute and thus reduce the costs of resolving occupational
disease claims.

A Bolder Approach
The development of workers' compensation early in the
twentieth century created administrative systems where legal
systems had previously existed. Certainty increased for
employers and workers; transaction costs declined. While
coverage of all workers and adequate benefit levels have re
mained important issues in the compensation of workplace
injuries, the system has clear advantages for all parties over
the tort system.

322

Occupational Disease Compensation

This argument is more difficult to make for occupational
diseases. While workers' compensation handles over 90 per
cent of injury cases administratively, with resultant certain
ty, speedy payment and efficient delivery of benefits, well
over half of chronic occupational disease cases are con
troverted. Proposed reforms are uncertain in effect and ar
bitrary in nature.
Perhaps it is time to accept this fact and consider reforms
in occupational disease compensation that focus on the most
seriously disabling and fatal diseases, creating an ad
ministrative system that reduces or eliminates the require
ment of demonstrating specific workplace causation. Such
an approach would be more like mandatory first-party
disability and medical insurance than workers' compensa
tion. As long as such a program were carefully phased-in,
with appropriate general funds, similar to second-injury
funds to handle pre-existing disease, it could greatly reduce
uncertainty and get payment quickly and efficiently to peo
ple who need them. An excellent argument for a mandatory
first-party insurance scheme for occupational diseases has
already been put forth by Peter Earth. 6 Earth proposes such
a program, but limits it only to deaths from cancer. While
this is a reasonable place to start, it is not apparent why the
same arguments for covering deaths caused by cancer should
not apply as well to cancer-induced disabilities, and to deaths
and major disabilities from other chronic illnesses with oc
cupational causes.
Removing these diseases from workers' compensation
coverage would eliminate uncertainty to workers, employers,
and insurers caused by the difficulty of determining workrelatedness. Administrative and legal expenses would be
lower than the current system, although at the cost of com
pensating workers with nonoccupational diseases. On the
other hand, such a program has several potential drawbacks.
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First, it may be very costly, if not constrained to a limited
number of chronic diseases and only to deaths and major
disabilities. Second, to the extent that there are incentives to
reduce workplace hazards in current workers' compensation
for chronic occupational diseases, such incentives would be
reduced or eliminated.
The incentive effect would be small, in my opinion, since
incentives for prevention appear ineffective under the cur
rent system of occupational disease compensation. The first
problem is potentially the more serious. In some sense, the
Black Lung program provided coverage for total disability
and death from respiratory disease similar to the plan
discussed in this section, but was more narrow in coverage of
diseases and populations. This fact alone serves as adequate
warning of the dangers of a plan that reduces or eliminates
the necessity of demonstrating work-relatedness. As in the
case of other reforms, the precise structure of the program,
its implementation and its administration, would determine
whether its costs were limited and its benefits targeted in a
manner acceptable to workers, employers, and insurers. The
political process would once again play a critical role.

Concluding Comments
The apparent unfairness and inefficiency of workers' com
pensation of occupational diseases arises in great measure
from the inherent uncertainty about whether many chronic
diseases are work-related. Changes in workers' compensa
tion that attempt to cope with this uncertainty must, by their
nature, be arbitrary. In creating legal certainty from essential
scientific and factual uncertainty, violence must be done to
both the science and the facts. Some reforms, like presump
tions, have the potential to increase efficiency and fairness.
However, the implementation of reforms occurs in the
political arena, and experience with the Black Lung program
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has left many observers with grave doubts about whether the
political process can devise any reforms that adequately ad
dress the goals described in the first section of this paper.
There may be no satisfactory resolution to the problems of
compensating occupational disease within the traditional
workers' compensation framework. Since the limitations of
the work-relatedness criterion are so great, more serious at
tention should be paid to reforms that attempt to remove oc
cupational disease compensation from the workers' compen
sation umbrella. Such a move would be in the spirit of the
change from the tort system to workers' compensation. At
first, many employers objected to the idea of automatic
payments to injured workers when the employer was
blameless. Others were probably concerned about the costs
of compensating all workplace injuries, regardless of fault.
Yet the change from the tort system to workers' compensa
tion is, I believe, a positive one. Similarly, research and ex
perience may validate the utility of an analogous step for
compensating occupational diseases.
NOTES
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occupational disease claims as well, since many of them involve perma
nent disability.
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On Efforts to Reform
Workers' Compensation
for Occupational Diseases
Peter S. Earth
Economics Department
The University of Connecticut

Background
In very recent years, the topic of occupational diseases has
become a subject of discussion at the various conferences
and seminars that are held on workers' compensation. This
reflection of the considerable interest in the adequacy of the
state workers' compensation systems in terms of diseases
associated with the workplace represents a dramatic change
from the disinterest in the subject that characterized the
period before the mid-1970s. The reasons for the remarkable
growth in attention to this subject need not occupy us here.
What is of interest, however, is that the context of these
discussions seems to be, invariably, the problems and dif
ficulties of providing a sound, adequate and fair public pro
gram to compensate victims of such disabling and killing
diseases. In the presence of such widespread concern, much
discussion has focused upon efforts to reform workers' com
pensation. The purpose of this essay is to describe the essen
tial questions that potential reformers must resolve as they
design alternative mechanisms that seek to improve the func
tioning of the compensation system. Most of the efforts to
327
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broadly change occupational disease compensation have not
been successful. This failure is partly due to the complexity
of these questions and to the broader implications of the
possible answers.
Efforts to reform occupational disease compensation can
not be analyzed in vacuo. Beginning in about 1969, a variety
of steps were taken that were designed to fundamentally alter
the nature of state workers' compensation laws. In the wake
of the Farmington, West Virginia coal mine disaster, Con
gress enacted the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act that year.
Title IV of the law dealt with the widely perceived inability of
state laws to compensate victims of coal workers'
pneumoconiosis by creating a federal compensation pro
gram, with coverage ostensibly limited to a single disease, for
a single occupation, and with eligibility limited in several im
portant respects. For example, benefits were to be paid only
for death or permanent total disability, thereby totally ex
cluding any direct involvement with temporary disability or
partial disability.
The Black Lung program initially attempted to split up
compensation by paying benefits out of federal general
revenues to victims with "old cases," and by turning over to
the states newly developing cases after a short period of tran
sition. The law was significantly amended in 1972, 1977 and
1981. For our purposes, it is sufficient to observe that it has
become a permanent federal program, one whose presence
serves as a constant reminder of federal activity in the
workers' compensation field.
The second major impetus for reform in that era was the
Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's
Compensation Laws issued in 1972. The Commission owed
its existence to Section 27 of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970. More specifically, it was the product of
several persons in the Congress who believed that such a
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body would unlock the gates that historically had kept the
federal government out of the domain of state compensation
systems (Black Lung aside). It is a mark either of this group's
optimism, or of its total frustration born of an inability to
breech these gates till then, that its hopes rested with an
essentially conservative Commission appointed by President
Richard Nixon.
The Commission found many areas in need of overhaul.
Of its 84 recommendations for reform, 19 were deemed to be
essential ones. Most significant for our needs, the Report
urged the states to act as soon as possible to clean up their
laws and to comply at least with the "essential recommenda
tions." Issued on July 1, 1972, the Report added that the
Congress should step in and act if the states had not com
plied (at least broadly, presumably) by July 1975. The Com
mission supported the principle that the Congress should im
pose a set of minimum standards on each of the states if
there was a lack of compliance with the "essential recom
mendations" in the three years. The 19 recommendations
were the key to the potential standards.
It is instructive to observe the reform experience since July
1972. Clearly, no federal legislation of any sort dealing
directly with state workers' compensation laws has come
close to congressional passage. State-by-state progress has
not been the cause of federal inaction. While many states did
enact legislation since 1972 that moved them closer to the
Commission's goals, the average state still meets only about
two-thirds of the "essential recommendations." The hope
that states would largely comply of their own accord by July
1975, obviating the need for federal minimum standards, has
clearly not been met. What factors explain this apparent in
ability to achieve full-scale reform, either through voluntary
state action or by the federal government?
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At the state level I would point to several developments
that made full compliance with the "essential recommenda
tions" particularly difficult to achieve. First, the reforms
were seen as being expensive, thereby raising insurance costs
to employers. Such increases were difficult for state
legislatures to justify in the decade following the Commis
sion's Report, when state unemployment rates were reaching
and holding levels not experienced since the outbreak of the
Second World War. Interstate competition for jobs made
such reforms unattainable on a state-by-state basis.
Many states did at least partially implement some reforms,
and a number of these changes led to higher employer com
pensation costs. These changes, occurring as system utiliza
tion expanded, served to place limits on the extent of reform
by the various states. The unexpected cost increases even led
some advocates of the "essential recommendations" to
withdraw their support of them.
At the federal level, efforts to enact minimum standards
failed even more completely. The same fears about costs,
particularly in the economically stagflated environment of
the 1970s and early 1980s, contributed to congressional inac
tion. That aside, three other factors in particular deserve
some note, though the list of the causes of failure is longer
than this. First, any effort to enact federal legislation must
contend with the various interest groups that have developed
within the states during the decades that these programs ex
isted. The issue goes beyond simply the reluctance to accept
change by those individuals and organizations accustomed to
earning a living from the compensation system. It is the sheer
number of such groups and the inability to fashion com
promises when so many parties have a stake that makes any
federal reform legislation so difficult to achieve. Recall that
substantial clout can rest with not only labor and manage
ment, but that it may reside also with state administrators,
the plaintiff and defense bars, several elements within the in-
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surance industry, the health professions, municipal officials
and others. This is not to suggest that this kind of numbers
problem exists solely when federal reform efforts emerge. It
also exists as a problem when efforts for reform are made at
the state level.
A second source of difficulties is the nature of the stan
dards that can be administered by the federal government. It
is quite apparent that those types of standards that are quan
tifiable are simpler to set, easier to target on for states, and
less likely to be controversial when their compliance is
evaluated. By contrast, a variety of possible standards in
volving a qualitative character would pose considerable dif
ficulty in monitoring for a federal agency. As an example,
employers and insurers that might be attracted to some
federal involvement as a means of achieving reform often
speak of the need for an improved "delivery system" in
workers' compensation. Whatever is meant by this, it
represents a qualitative sort of change that the federal
government is not well equipped to impose on the states.
Consequently, the relative ease of raising benefit levels, and
the difficulty of assuring a better delivery system, have
meant that orchestrating compromises aimed at legislating
federal standards are necessarily harder to achieve.
The greatest stumbling block en route to any federal
minimum standards has been the inability to find a
mechanism whereby the federal government can enforce
compliance. The experience under OSHA and Black Lung
apparently have left many persons somewhat wary of "tem
porary" federal takeovers of existing state programs. Since
there is no existing federal support of state compensation
agencies or programs, the threat of a withdrawal of federal
government monies has no meaning for the states. Moving
claims into the already overburdened federal courts from
state agencies or courts is also highly problematic.
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Behind all these difficulties is the obvious aversion of Con
gress to making workers' compensation a federal program.
It is hard to believe that the widespread extent of this view in
Congress does not derive, in part at least, from the problems
encountered in administering the three federal workers' com
pensation programs, Black Lung, the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Act and the Federal Employees Compensation
Act. These programs serve as a constant reminder that
nothing guarantees that a federal compensation program will
operate more effectively than a state program.

The Need for Reform
in Occupational Disease
While a large variety of potential reforms have been pro
posed, the most frequently cited ones are relatively few. Sur
prisingly, there appears to be little disagreement among most
of the parties about the nature and the desirability of these
most obvious areas of reform. This is not to minimize the
differences of views when one leaves the general for the
specific, nor the reluctance of the parties to hold back their
endorsement of reforms as part of a bargaining strategy. In
stead, this is to suggest that the substance of the reforms that
have been and will be proposed are well understood.
There exist a variety of limitation rules in some state laws
that can serve to bar otherwise obviously worthy claims. As
such, they render affected workers or survivors unprotected
under this social insurance program. Such rules take several
forms. One such barrier requires that a claim be filed within
some time period after the last workplace exposure to the
source of the disease. A second sort of unrealistic require
ment might deny eligibility unless the worker has been
employed and exposed to the hazard for at least a minimum
specified and arbitrary period of time. The limitation may be
medically unsound, having no justification in terms of how
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the disease is contracted. A third barrier involving timing
may require that a claim be filed within a relatively short
period of time subsequent to the development of the disease,
even if the worker is not immediately disabled by the illness
or aware of its presence. Such statutes of limitation may also
bar claims from survivors who are not immediately aware of
the work-relatedness of the killing disease.
A second cluster of barriers arises from the character of
workers' compensation historically, as a mechanism for
dealing with injuries caused by accidents. Such limitations
have made it more difficult to receive compensation, and
have even eliminated the possibility where the claimant could
not demonstrate that an "accident" gave rise to the disabili
ty. Related to such barriers has been the denial of claims
where a disease is thought to be an "ordinary disease of
life," providing the claimant with little or no opportunity to
prove that the specific instance was work-caused.
Another area in need of change involves the benefit struc
ture. It is hardly possible to justify differential benefits for
victims of industrial injuries and diseases, either in terms of
compensation or medical-health treatment. It is also difficult
to justify benefit payments for workers or survivors that are
based on earnings levels at the time of (last) exposure, when
the disease develops one or two decades later. The combina
tion of inflation and productivity gains render such
historically-based benefit levels hardly worthy of the extend
ed and costly controversy that can follow the filing of a
claim.
Another set of problems that is widely acknowledged to
exist for certain claimants involves the burden of proof need
ed to sustain a claim. It is not possible in so short a space to
indicate the myriad difficulties that (potential) claimants
may have in establishing what hazard caused the disease, or
that the disablement or death from disease arose out of and
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in the course of employment. In many instances the problem
of proof relates even to the diagnosis of the impairment.
This was the foremost issue that led to the passage of the
Black Lung law, and this remains a central problem in claims
for asbestosis and byssinosis.

Problems in Reforming
Occupational Disease Compensation
Earlier in this paper a number of reasons were cited as to
why workers' compensation reform efforts have en
countered difficulties and why no federal legislation has been
adopted of the sort recommended by the National Commis
sion on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. All of these
reasons exist as well, and impede progress toward reform in
occupational diseases. Additionally, a variety of other prob
lems exist that must be resolved if the process of reform is to
be successful. In this section of the paper four sets of issues
on which there is little agreement are described. They are
treated in the context of possible federal legislation.

A. Coverage Issues
Any attempt to reform workers' compensation for oc
cupational diseases immediately confronts issues of equity,
costs and politics as it relates to coverage. At one pole are
those proposals that would specify a single disease, or set of
diseases attributable to a single hazard, or a single occupa
tion or industry as the target of legislation. The advantages
of so narrow a focus are thought to be political. By strictly
limiting coverage in some such a manner, the costs of such a
program will likely be more modest, an unambiguous virtue
in an era of governmental austerity, at least as it might affect
new programs. The other principal political virtue is that
narrow and tightly bounded programs are seen as less
threatening in the long run to those who advocate the reten-
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tion of fully state-controlled workers' compensation
systems.
The most obvious disadvantage of such narrow coverage is
the inability to provide horizontal equity (equal treatment of
equals) to those not covered. For example, the same disease
that is compensable to a worker who loads a train with coal
at a mine may not be compensable under the federal law for
the worker unloading it at the electric utility or steel mill.
How does one justify compensating an insulation worker
with lung cancer but not a worker with the same disease who
was formerly employed on the top side of a coke oven? The
answer, clearly, is based primarily on the pragmatic assess
ment of what might get through the U.S. Congress, and not
on the disparate excesses in standard mortality rates for the
two groups of employees.
At the other pole in terms of proposed coverage are the
schemes that would pull all occupational disease cases out of
existing state workers' compensation systems and put these
under some federal program. This proposal also violates the
principle of horizontal equity, as it differentiates between
workers with work-caused injuries being covered by the dif
ferent state programs, leaving those with diseases subject to
the federally determined criteria for eligibility and benefits.
Far more problematic is the question of how and where
the line is drawn between disease and injury. It takes almost
no effort to identify the many areas of ambiguity that arise
when one seeks to cover all occupational diseases with a
separate statute. In which grouping would one place the
disabilities resulting from cumulative trauma? Are "back
cases" instances of injury or disease? Where would hearing
loss cases fit? Even where these grey areas are anticipated by
the drafters of a statute, what logical criteria would they
employ so as to explicitly place a category of harms under or
outside of coverage? A wealth of experience exists to suggest
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that no reasonable degree of foresightedness will be suffi
cient to prevent considerable litigation and uncertainty from
arising over the issue of the appropriate jurisdiction for
specific cases.
Somewhere between these polar positions on coverage is
the one whereby the statute would cover only one or two
diseases initially, but would allow for possible expansion
subsequently, without the need of new legislative action. An
approach of this sort, as found in Congressman Miller's pro
posed bill, has the apparent political virtue of compromising
between those who would support occupational disease
reform legislation only if coverage were very limited and
specific, and those who would opt for very wide if not allinclusive coverage. By initially moving only asbestos-caused
(work-connected) diseases to the federal arena, but leaving
open the possibility of future expansion of coverage of other
specific classes of disease, the question of appropriate
coverage is not eliminated but is simply transferred to a less
direct and obvious position.
Once one allows for possible future enlargement of scope,
the subsidiary issues begin with determining who shall decide
when and if coverage is to be broadened. Shall it be the
Secretary of Labor, the head of an autonomous commission,
the National Institute of Health? Presumably, congressional
veto will not be available to assure those who fear that deci
sions about future expansion could run amok if left ex
clusively in the hands of the executive branch. The U.S.
Supreme Court has made this sort of assurance useless. In
any case, the core of the question is, shall the expansion of
future coverage be primarily in the hands of scientists and
health professionals, or will it be left to those more sensitive
to the political winds. One could design such a scheme where
both types have an input, but one cannot avoid confronting
the final step of some such process where it will be either the
politicians or the epidemiologists who must decide.
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Aside from the question of who shall decide what future
coverage will be, a number of secondary questions must also
be faced in preparing such reform legislation. Given some
decision about who shall decide, one has to define what
possible issues can be considered. For example, suppose the
Secretary of Labor is given the responsibility to decide what
new coverage may be. Would the Secretary be empowered to
consider specific areas based solely on his/her own discre
tion? Could others force the Secretary to review certain
issues? Could anyone block the Secretary from considering
the review of possible areas of extension? Would the same
rules apply for expanding coverage as for cutting it back? To
what extent would possible expansion parallel the protracted
and litigation-filled model of the OSHA standard-setting
process?
Behind all these questions is the accumulated experience of
all the interest groups in dealing with the federal government
in the areas of workers' compensation and in occupational
health. From the vantage point of organized labor, there is
the frustration of not having been able to get any sort of
federal involvement in state workers' compensation pro
grams (Black Lung aside). Additionally, there is a sense that
OSHA standards have been too few, too slow and difficult
to develop, and too timid. All the parties are aware also, that
since the passage of OSHA in 1970, the law has not been
amended at all. For labor this suggests that the need is to do
more than to pass a marginally acceptable piece of legislation
with the hope of accomplishing one's basic goals in subse
quent amendments.
From the vantage point of industry, the asbestos sector
aside, there is considerable concern about the federal govern
ment's possible expansion into broader areas of disease. The
Black Lung experience is repeatedly cited as an example of
politics dominating sound judgment. The extent to which
Congress allowed the program to expand in the 1972 and
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1977 amendments serves as a red flag to those who would
prefer either no federal role in occupational disease or a nar
rowly defined one with no opportunity to widen it.
A different question regarding coverage that any reform
must tackle is the range of exigencies for which benefits can
be paid. While most proposals call for benefits to survivors
in deaths from occupational disease, as well as benefits for
permanent total disability, there is less agreement among
supporters of reform beyond this. Potential areas for
benefits include "medical only," temporary disabilities, and
permanent partial disability. If a federal occupational
disease bill provides coverage for any of these, the ad
ministrative burdens become far greater as the potential
number of claimants is much larger in any of these categories
than in death or permanent total disability. Further, com
pensating permanent partial disabilities can be especially dif
ficult, whether it be for diseases or for injuries. If one takes
the expedient route and does not cover such cases, however,
serious problems develop in aligning the federal and the state
programs where jurisdiction is based on subjective and wide
ly varying estimates of the extent of impairment or disability.
A final question of coverage that needs resolution is the
treatment of "old cases." Specifically, to what extent would
a new federal reform law seek to deal with deaths and
disabilities that occurred in earlier years? By covering such
old cases, one is assured both that the costs will be higher
and that problems of available evidence and proof become
more complicated. Organized labor seems adamantly com
mitted to having old cases covered.
If one decides to cover old cases, are all cases formerly
under state jurisdiction to be opened or reopened? The
Miller bill opts for some compromise by extending coverage
to old cases only where no benefits have been previously
paid. The potential for problems and for questions of equity
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are too numerous to detail, but some must be noted. For ex
ample, suppose a worker had earlier received a "medical on
ly" benefit through the state law, but was denied any
benefits at a later date when claiming to be permanently and
totally disabled. Suppose a worker received $500 for a tem
porary total disability. If the worker later dies, allegedly
from the disease, will the survivor be able to claim federal
benefits when state benefits are denied in the death claim?

B. Medical Issues
Once the questions of coverage are decided, a variety of
issues emerge regarding eligibility. Specifically, aside from
any potential federal legislation operating without the ar
tificial barriers to compensation that have existed in some of
the states, what would make a federal program more accessi
ble to claimants than some of the state systems? Essentially,
the answer would have to be that more rational or
manageable (from the applicant's view) standards of
evidence be required in such claims than exist currently.
Several sorts of changes are likely under any federal
reform. Most likely there would be some resort to presump
tions that would ease the claimant's evidentiary burden.
While the presence of presumptions seems likely to be found
in almost any reform proposals, a host of questions about
them needs to be resolved before incorporating them in new
legislation. Just as in the case of coverage, support for
reforms will hang on how these are answered.
The most significant questions parallel those raised about
coverage. Are presumptions to be limited to what is placed in
the original statute, or is there some way of adding to or
modifying them administratively? Who is to determine what
the presumptions are to be, who can initiate the process of
changing them, what is the process to be of setting them, and
what challenges to them will be permitted? Are presumptions
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to be limited to medical issues and exposure questions? Can
the presumptions be rebutted or not? The constitutionality
of an irrebuttable presumption has been upheld, but the
clamor over the single one found under Black Lung has
never subsided. In the presence of rebuttable presumptions,
the administrative agency will likely determine in the regula
tions that it sets, precisely how academic it may be to seek to
rebut. One possibility is that rebuttable presumptions are de
facto impossible to rebut. Alternatively, they may be written
in such a way that they are of little help to the claimant. In
large measure, this issue depends upon whether it is a
government agency that is in a position to rebut an invoked
presumption, or if it is a private sector employer or insurer
that is defending the claim.
A second set of health issues involves the use of medical
panels. To what extent is it appropriate to use such panels of
objective and technically qualified experts in cases where
there is some dispute about a medical question? One of the
most controversial issues that arose under Black Lung was
the use made by the government of "B" readers to evaluate
the quality of and diagnoses from chest X-rays.
There are three basic sets of medical problems that may
arise in occupational disease claims. Disputes about them are
not equally well dealt with by impartial medical persons.
Questions of diagnosis are probably the best ones to be set
tled by such specialists. Issues relating to etiology are prob
ably much less amenable to resolution by a panel. The third
area depends upon the principle of compensation used by the
agency in question. Medical panels are ideal for settling
disputes regarding the extent of impairment, but they are not
at all suited to deciding whether the claimant's degree of
disability has been fairly assessed.
Aside from issues of how to use such experts, questions
arise regarding their selection, remuneration and tenure. Ad-
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ditionally, some decisions must be made about the ability of
the parties in a claim to challenge the findings of such ex
perts.

C. Financing Issues
Any federal occupational disease legislation that goes
beyond simply requiring the states to meet certain standards
implies that a new financial obligation will be incurred by
some party or other. The need for new funding sources is
especially significant where old cases are to be covered.
Presently, there appears to be a universal antipathy to having
this burden fall on the U.S. Treasury, as was done in the case
in the Part B segment of Black Lung.
A variety of possible options have been weighed. On one
side are those who wish to apply some variant of experience
rating to a funding scheme so as to make only "responsible
employers" pay where their employees developed disease.
Such an approach has appeal to those who view this as fur
thering the safety and health goals of a compensation system
through the use of appropriate incentives. This sort of fund
ing plan also satisfies the needs of some who want to mete
out punishment to responsible employers. A variation of
this, as found in the Miller bill, would seek needed funding
from an entire industry but not try to establish who the
responsible employer was on a case-by-case basis, nor
employ any experience rating at the level of the firm.
There are several grounds for objection to either of these
funding approaches. The experience under the Black Lung
Act demonstrated the enormity of the task of identifying
responsible employers, particularly in older cases. Alleged
responsible parties challenged and fought almost every single
old case attributed to them. In many of the cases the only
possible employer (where the worker had been exposed to
coal dust) was no longer in business or unable to pay the
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compensation. Where the workers had been employed by
several different employers, the choice of the liable party
often could appear to be capricious or a matter of conve
nience, but not justice. (In a building trade such as insulation
work, asbestos workers can work for several different
employers within a single year!)
To overcome some of these problems, the Miller bill opts
for a sort of superfund, financed by a tax levied on the entire
industry from which the disease originated. This approach
immediately encounters some immense problems. First, on
what basis does one allocate the tax on the industry? Does
one use current levels of employment, sales, profits? What
criteria are employed to split these among importers,
manufacturers, distributors, fabricators, and possibly cer
tain users? What of firms that were formerly in the asbestos
industry, for example, but are now no longer involved? And
unlikely though it may be, new firms could enter the industry
without any past history of usage, thereby having no
reasonable probability of generating claims against the fund
in the next few years. Are they to be absolved of the tax, and
accordingly given a competitive edge on the industry?
Aside from the question of who, specifically, is to pay,
there are a number of questions regarding the nature of the
fund itself. Either a fund of this sort builds up reserves prior
to or as future obligations develop, or it operates on a payas-you-go basis. The former approach pushes many of the
costs onto the front end of the program and is not attractive
to existing firms that would bear the brunt of these costs.
The latter approach shifts some of these direct tax burdens
into the future and could thereby shift them to other
employers. With no basis for determining what the costs of
an occupational disease bill will be under a pay-as-you-go
basis, revenues would need to be adjusted frequently,
perhaps annually, in order to avoid significant surpluses or
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shortfalls in the fund. All this implies a highly flexible
scheme of taxation. Understandably, employers, members
of Congress and others are loathe to provide this sort of
discretion to set tax rates to a Secretary of Labor or any
other political appointee, especially where the rate may not
be made uniform in the industry, where the industry is dif
ficult to define, and where exit and entry to the industry by
some firms may have an immense impact on the costs borne
by other firms therein.
The superfund approach is also not likely to be endorsed
by those who seek to use the tax as the source of incentives to
employers to maintain a healthy and safe workplace. So long
as each taxed employer pays the same rate as other firms in
that sector, there is no reason for the firm to reduce the ex
posure to the hazard in question.

D. Exclusive Remedy Issues
Efforts to achieve reform of workers' compensation prac
tices in cases of (occupational) disease owe much to the dif
ficulties spilling over from the tort system. It is no coin
cidence that those employers who have shown some will
ingness to move toward federal reforms are those now facing
huge costs from tort actions brought by (alleged) victims of
occupational diseases. Their support for such change
emanates from a realization that any options to bar further
suits must be accompanied by the guarantee that the remain
ing remedy, workers' compensation, be made more accessi
ble to potential users. If such a quid pro quo were not possi
ble, there would be no reason for those employers who sup
port federal action to do so. Similarly, without such a
bargain, organized labor would never willingly accept the
principle that workers' compensation be the exclusive
remedy in disease cases. Indeed, it will be a challenge for
reform-minded parties to move some elements of organized
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labor to this compromise. If labor cannot be budged from its
current public position of seeking to retain the right to sue
third parties, however, the prospects for federal reform are
reduced considerably.
The difficulty of achieving a compromise between labor
and at least some employers is complicated by other factors.
Organized labor, particularly at the state level, has never in
vested significantly in the development of an understanding
of the workers' compensation system. There was little ap
parent need to do so as long as expert opinion was available
to them, typically provided by plaintiffs' attorneys familiar
with state practices and issues. The interests of such practi
tioners were generally consonant with those of the unions
and their members. On this issue, however, there is con
siderably less overlap of mutual needs. The trial bar has no
apparent interest in having future lawsuits by workers or sur
vivors barred in disease cases. Any promise of a more effec
tive workers' compensation system holds less interest for
them than maintaining and expanding the opportunity to
sue. If organized labor is to move towards the quid pro quo,
they will have to do so without guidance or support from
their traditional ally and source of expertise.
At the time of this writing, it is probably true that only a
small proportion of U.S. employers, weighted by any
criterion, are attracted to the quid pro quo of reforming
workers' compensation through federal intervention, and
being absolved of liability under tort in future occupational
disease cases. This small group consists primarily of
businesses involved with asbestos. There exist, however,
firms in other industries that are very sensitive to these issues
out of a concern that other industries will eventually be drag
ged down by third party suits for occupational diseases. For
a number of reasons, these firms are loathe to identify
themselves or the basis for their interest.
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Other Needs
One of the principal shortcomings of how compensation
systems have dealt with occupational diseases is the
underutilization of this remedy by potential applicants. The
problem is one that appears to be large and well identified.
None of the potential reforms noted above bear directly on
this issue, at least so far as underutilization has resulted from
worker (or survivor) ignorance of their rights to compensa
tion for diseases, or of the cause or nature of the illness. If
this matter is not addressed in reform efforts either at the
state or the federal level, the reforms will have relatively little
impact on the usage people make of the system. Much more
is known about the existence of underutilization for these
reasons than how to ameliorate it. Perhaps that is why pro
posed reforms regularly seem to avoid confronting the mat
ter.

15
Accident Compensation
as a Factor Influencing
Managerial Perceptions
and Behavior in New Zealand
Barbara Mclntosh
School of Business
University of Vermont

Governments legislate remedies when other segments of
society fail, or are perceived to fail, to respond to a par
ticular need. A prime example is in the area of health and
safety. The belief that there were excessive industrial ac
cidents was taken as evidence that the private sector was not
doing enough with health and safety in the work environ
ment, and remedies were not only insufficient but difficult to
secure. Throughout the 1970s sensitivity to the suffering
caused by industrial accidents and the lack of recourse led
many countries to direct more attention to the problem. In
New Zealand, this response resulted in the most extensive
no-fault accident compensation legislation in existence to
day. All persons who suffer a personal injury by accident are
compensated, regardless of whether or not the injury is
employment-related.
Certainly the intent of New Zealand*s legislation is
laudable, but it is critical to examine the manager's ex347
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perience within such a system because legislation does not
always result in the intended consequences. For example,
rather than reducing lost time from industrial accidents,
comprehensive compensation provisions may, in fact, have
the opposite effect. Since compensation becomes the acci
dent victim's entitlement and right, there may be an increase
in the number of accidents reported and/or the duration of
time off resulting from an accident. If the legislation results
in this behavior, the economic burden on the employer is
greater and this shift may, in turn, cause the employer to
reduce prevention program initiation and/or compliance. In
this case, the number of accidents may go up and the out
come is opposite the original intent of the legislation to
reduce suffering.
Obviously, employers are a critical link in implementing
and financing the provisions of health and safety compensa
tion legislation. Thus, one must determine to what extent
health and safety legislative provisions influence manage
ment's perceptions concerning employee behavior and their
subsequent decisionmaking in the health and safety area. Do
employers perceive that the provisions facilitate or hinder
organizational health and safety activities? Do the legislative
provisions shift a greater economic burden onto the
employer because employee behavior changes? Are other in
stitutions or groups more influential than the government in
the firm's administration of health and safety programs?
The answers to these questions obviously have both
management and public policy implications. Management's
response within the context of multiple external pressures
will affect future legislation as it is modified to achieve the
intent of the original law and vice versa. Understanding the
influence exerted by other factors, including other firms,
unions, employee groups, and other government rules and
regulations, will also provide insight into the most effective
implementation approaches. Not only the government but
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the employers themselves may be able to use these groups to
cooperatively improve health and safety records.
This paper examines employer perceptions and behavior in
response to New Zealand's comprehensive accident compen
sation legislation. In the first section the background of the
Accident Compensation Act is briefly reviewed, followed by
a discussion of the provisions of the legislation. Provisions
for levy rates and incentive rebates under the Safety Incen
tive Scheme are outlined. The second section examines the
current data on industrial accidents in New Zealand,
highlighting the data on seven high-risk industries. The third
section then outlines the methodology used in collecting
survey data on management's perceptions and responses
within these high risk industries. The data are reported and,
finally, conclusions are drawn.
New Zealand's Accident Compensation Act
Prior to the 1972 Accident Compensation Act, New
Zealand's personal injury remedies under the law were
fragmented and generally considered insufficient.
• A victim was entitled to a limited form of compensation
payable under workers' compensation legislation but
only if the accident or disease arose out of work and in
the course of employment.
• A victim could claim damages in the Courts if
negligence on the part of some other person could be
established.
• A victim could draw on funds administered by the
Crimes Compensation Tribunal if the injury was caused
by the criminal acts of others.
• A victim could receive social security1 if none of the
above remedies was available.
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• Owners of motor vehicles were required under the
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1928 to insure against
death or injury liability (Fahy 1982).
The litigation and inequitable treatment resulting from
this fault-based approach (i.e., that an action in law for
damages arising out of personal injury or death could only
be sustained if negligence on the part of the defendent was
proven or admitted) ultimately led to a Royal Commission of
Inquiry on Compensation for Personal Injury in New
Zealand report in December 1967 (the Woodhouse Report)2
and passage of the Accident Compensation Act (ACA) in
1972. The 1972 Act and its Amendments were supplanted by
the Accident Compensation Act of 1982 which became effec
tive April 1, 1983. The 1982 Act did not alter the concept of
the system but rather simplified previous complex wording
and improved administrative provisions (Fahy 1983).
The Royal Commission set down several principles upon
which the legislation rests:
• Community responsibility;
• Comprehensive entitlement;
• Complete rehabilitation, which would be encouraged by
an award not being revisable downward after an initial
assessment;
• Real compensation (adequate benefits); and
• Administrative efficiency (Royal Commission 1967).
The purpose of the Accident Compensation Act is thus to
provide accident prevention, compensation, and rehabilita
tion for every man and woman, and protection 24 hours a
day. The compensation itself is governed by the personal cir
cumstances of the accident victim. If there is a loss of earn
ings or a loss of earning power, the compensation payable
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under the accident compensation scheme is related to that
loss of earnings and earning power. Rehabilitation assistance
is also tailored to meet the actual and continuing needs of the
accident victim, so the nonearner is covered in this way (Inglis 1982).
To insure this coverage, three schemes have been im
plemented: An Earners' Scheme for employed or selfemployed persons, a Motor Vehicle Scheme for persons in
jured in accidents involving motor vehicles, and a Sup
plementary Scheme for persons not covered under the first
two schemes, including homemakers and visitors to New
Zealand (Dahl 1976). Broadly, the Earners' Fund and the
Motor Vehicle Fund are independently financed and selfsupporting, and each is charged with all amounts paid in
claims which arise under the respective schemes. 3 The Sup
plementary Fund is financed from money appropriated for
that purpose by Parliament.

Employer's Contributions
Since the focus of this paper is on employer costs and fac
tors influencing their behavior, it is important to examine the
Earners' Fund, which is financed by levies on employers and
self-employed persons. Through this fund employers finance
the earnings-based compensation which is paid to employees
who suffer an injury, whether or not such injury arises in the
course of employment. The levy paid by the employer is paid
at a rate specified for that particular industry activity
classification or classifications. All industry, trade, business
and professional activities are classified so that the amount
of levy collected for each class and the amount of compensa
tion, medical expenses, and other payments provided can be
recorded. Work accident accounts are kept by industrial ac
tivity classification. A separate nonwork accident account is
kept and the costs (compensation, medical expenses and
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other payments) are spread equally over all industrial ac
tivities. It should be noted that industrial activity refers to
the employer, not the occupation of the employee. Thus, the
nature of the goods produced or services rendered deter
mines the industrial activity under which the leviable earn
ings of the employees are classified. The levy rate per $100 of
wages ranges from $.50 for the provision of actuarial ser
vices, the practice of accountancy, the services of ad
ministrative agencies, clerical, management activity, etc. to
$5.00 for mining underground, exploring, prospecting and
development works (natural gas, minerals, oil) in, on, or
above the continental shelf, and tunneling (Accident Com
pensation Corporation 1983). While higher rates are set for
more dangerous activities by the ACC Board, there is not a
strict multiplicative relationship between the degree of
danger and the levy. In other words, as evidenced in the in
jury rate (see tables 2 and 3) mining is more than 10 times
more dangerous than actuarial services. To some extent
then, "safe" activities subsidize more dangerous activities.
The Accident Compensation Act does fix a maximum
amount of individual earnings on which the levy is payable.
The Accident Compensation Order of 1981 (S. 1981/338)
raised this maximum to $39,0004 applicable to payments due
May 31, 1983. Prior to this, the maximum amount of in
dividual earnings on which the levy was payable was
$18,720. The leviable earnings include wages and salaries,
overtime pay, holiday pay, piecework payments, longservice leave pay, bonuses or gratuities, gross commissions,
honoraria and allowances for boarding, lodging or housing.
The Earners' Fund gross levy revenue ($149,317,624)
made up 62 percent of the total income ($242,388,617)
received by the Accident Compensation Corporation for the
year ending March 31, 1982. At this time there was a credit
balance of $218.2 million in the Earners' Fund, but forecasts
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indicated that the fund would be inadequate to meet the long
term run-off of claims in years ahead. The shortfall was
$62.7 million (Fahy 1982). The financial implications of this
for employers may be very serious.
While a financing deficit is projected, it is interesting to
note, as indicated in table 1, that the number of work acci
dent claims remained fairly constant from 1975 through
1981. The proportion of claims on the Earners' Fund for
nonwork accidents, however, has been steadily increasing,
from 31 percent in 1975 to 43 percent in 1981.
Table 1
Claims Received by Fund
Claims received

1975

1978

1981

Total claims

105,018

132,438

128,747

Earners' Fund
Work accidents
Nonwork accidents
Motor Vehicle Fund
Supplementary Fund

91,337
(63,212)
(28,125)
9,405
4,276

103,481
(62,826)
(40,655)
11,563
17,394

96,652
(55,607)
(41,045)
11,771
20,324

SOURCE: ACC Statistics, Wellington, Accident Compensation Corporation Vol. 1, No.
1, March 1982, p. 12.
NOTE: Not all claims result in compensation being paid—especially those made to protect
the claimant's entitlement in the future.

In addition to paying levies into the Earners' Fund, an
employer is also responsible for directly compensating
employees 100 percent of their earnings on the day of the ac
cident and during the following six days if the employee is
unable to work because of an injury arising out of and in the
course of employment (ACA& 112). Effective April 1,1983,
the employer's first week compensation liability also in
cludes any overtime the employee would have worked (Fahy
1983). In practical terms, this means the employer must pay
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the employee the full amount he/she would have received
had he/she been working. In 1982 it was reported that the
cost of this first week's compensation still averaged about 10
cents per $100 of the leviable payroll (Fahy 1982, p. 32). If
the earner is incapacitated for more than seven days the
Commission pays the compensation regardless of whether or
not the accident arose out of and in the course of
employment5 (ACA & 113).

Safety Incentive Scheme
The Safety Incentive Scheme rewards those employers
whose work-related accident records are significantly better
than other employers paying the same industrial activity
levy. This is not a no-claims bonus system, but rather is bas
ed on actual performance relative to expected performance.
In other words, an employer with a perfect record (no ac
cidents for which claims are filed in the period) does not
necessarily receive a bonus. If the employer is engaged in low
accident activities, no claims would be expected. A signifi
cant improvement is thus more likely from employers engag
ed in activities where the accident rate is expected to be high.
In 1982 the ACC paid out 190 Safety Incentive Bonuses
totaling $1,145,661, based on accident and wages informa
tion for the period of April 1, 1978 to March 31, 1981. The
bonuses were calculated at 12.5 percent of the net work levy
paid for the year ending March 31, 1981.
Accident Rate Data
It is logical to hypothesize that the first week provisions
and the Safety Incentive Scheme would provide the employer
with an incentive to actively seek health and safety im
provements and reduce the accident frequency rate. Unfor
tunately, it is not possible to make valid comparisons be-
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tween data published preceding and following the passage of
the Accident Compensation Act. Unlike current provisions,
claims made under the old Workers' Compensation Act, for
example, included first-week incapacities but excluded in
juries to the self-employed (notably farmers). Injuries receiv
ed traveling to and from work were also not included in
previous statistics but are now deemed to be
"work-related." These last two factors are significant con
tributors to the "fatalities" now recorded. The exclusion of
the first-week incapacity also means that injury frequency
and severity statistics are not compiled as in the past (Acci
dent Compenstion Corporation 1982). As shown in tables 2
and 3, an "injury rate" is currently calculated based on the
number of compensated accidents per 1000 workers, which
does allow comparisons across industries and occupational
groups, however.
The industry data in table 2 shows that while the injury
rate averages 35 for all industries, it ranges from 86 for min
ing and quarrying to 5 for finance, insurance, real estate and
business services. Manufacturing had the second highest in
jury rate in 1981, 60, with a total 18,672 compensated ac
cidents. More than one-third of all compensation paid went
to manufacturing workers. The highest number of fatalities,
44, was in forestry and fishing but this industry did not have
the highest accident rate (compensated claims per 1000
workers) as previously discussed.
By occupation group, the highest injury rate and number
of fatalities were recorded for transport equipment operators
and laborers as shown in table 3. This occupational group
also received nearly two-thirds of the compensation paid in
1981, $21.2 million. Forest workers, fishermen and hunters
had the second highest injury rate, 43, with 45 fatalities.
Compensation paid to this occupational group totaled only
$5.1 million, however.
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Table 2
New Zealand's Accidents, Injury Rates and Compensation • 1981
Industry group
All industries
Agriculture, hunting, forestry
and fishing
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas and water
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade,
restaurants and hotels
Transport, storage
and communication
Finance, insurance, real estate
and business services
Community, social and
personal services

Fatal

Labor force

O

Nonfatal

Total

178

46,117

46,295

1,332,339

35

33,578

44
2
22
0
13

6,237
397
18,650
774
3,411

6,281
399
18,672
774
3,424

144,249
4,656
311,130
15,123
85,737

44
86
60
51
40

5,084
428
11,719
485
3,203

14

3,055

3,069

218,439

14

2,390

N
o

28

4,392

4,420

107,829

41

3,769

CL

6

421

427

91,638

5

382

26

6,637

6,663

307,575

22

4,526

Injury rate*

Compensation**

SOURCE: Derived from Summary Report—Compensated Accidents, 1981, Accident Compensation Corporation, Wellington, New Zealand,
1982.
•Compensated claims per 1000 of labor force (1981 census).
**Reported in thousands as of May 31, 1982.
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Table 3
Compensated Work Accidents by Occupation -1981
Occupational group
All occupations
Professional, technical and
related workers
Administrative and managerial
Clerical and related workers
Sales
Service workers
Agricultural, husbandry, forest
workers, fishermen and hunters
Production and related workers,
transport equipment operators
and laborers

Labor force

Injury rate*

Compensation**

Nonfatal

Total

178

46,117

46,295

1,332,339

35

33,578

16
5
6
6
11

2,033
196
1,334
1,135
2,911

2,049
201
1,340
1,141
2,922

183,969
45,993
214,761
127,101
106,626

11
4
6
9
27

54
249
977
959
2,077

45

6,296

6,341

146,295

43

5,143

70

30,455

30,525

457,932

67

21,227

Fatal

O
O

SOURCE: Derived from Summary Report—Compensated Accidents, 1981, Accident Compensation Corporation, Wellington, New Zealand,
1982.
Compensated claims per 1000 of labor force (1981 census).
**Reported in thousands as of May 31, 1982.
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Employer Decisionmaking
Given the universal coverage of the Accident Compensa
tion Act, the levy system, the employer's responsibility for
compensation during the first week, and the presence of an
incentive scheme, it is important to examine the employer's
response to this legislative initiative. Specifically, four ques
tions need to be addressed:
• To what extent does the availability of accident compen
sation and government legislation, in general, influence
management's response to health and safety compared
to other factors such as the union, other firms,
employee concerns, and other government rules and
regulations?
• To what extent do employers believe that the provisions
of the AC A change employee behavior? That is, does
the existence of compensation prolong the absence of
injured workers, or are more accidents reported as a
result of the compensation?
• To what extent do employers believe that their expen
ditures in the health and safety area are offset by lower
accident rates?
• To what extent are the influencing factors and the
employer's cost benefit assessment correlated with ac
tual accident behavior in the organization?
The answers to these questions are all related to one
another. In terms of cost considerations, price competition
and the employment relationship, the employer is going to be
influenced by other firms in the industry, government rules
and regulations (as distinct from compensation provisions),
unions, and other employee groups. Employee behavior can
be expected to be influenced by the benefits provided
through the government's accident compensation legislation.
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This behavior will in turn affect the employment relation
ship. The interactive relationship between these factors is
shown in figure 1.
Figure 1
External and Internal Factors
Influencing Employer Perceptions and Behavior
in the Health and Safety Area
External

Other firms
Accident compensation
Government rules
and regulations

Employees

Internal

Employer

Unions
Employee groups

As suggested in the questions above, it is hypothesized that
factors influencing an employer's reaction do not have a
direct impact; this influence is instead filtered through the
employer's overall assessment of the costs and benefits of
health and safety activities. This relationship is illustrated in
figure 2.
Figure 2
Influencing
factors

Cost benefit
assessment

Employer
behavior

Accident
record

Employer cost benefit analysis moderates the effect of factors influ
encing employer behavior and resultant accident record.
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With respect to costs, economic theory suggests that
organizations assume a proprietary strategy and seek to max
imize their return. This classical assumption about economic
self-interest does not automatically prescribe a particular
treatment of health and safety within the organization,
however. On one hand, the employer driven to minimize
costs has no incentive to invest in safety programs, machine
safeguards, new selection procedures, etc. Accident preven
tion has explicit costs which can be avoided. On the other
hand, accidents themselves are an expense. Accidents may
involve disrupted production, damaged equipment, lowered
morale resulting in overall lower productivity, compensation
payments, recruiting and selection replacement costs, and
the payment of wage differentials. The employer may thus
choose to invest in accident prevention because "the benefits
derived from the safety expenditure are costs which are not
incurred" (Berkowitz 1979, p. 53). Certainly some invest
ment in health and safety is economically rational, and it is
assumed that these expenditures will have an impact on the
organization's accident record.
Methodology
In order to assess the impact of New Zealand's accident
compensation provisions in the context of other factors in
fluencing an employer's cost benefit assessment and accident
record, intensive information was collected within seven in
dustries, including forestry, pulp and paper, construction,
steel, rubber, oil exploration, and chemicals. The distribu
tion of firms between industries was balanced, and within
each industry the number of foreign-owned versus domestic
firms was also balanced. Data were collected from 19 cor
porations, as well as from their respective plant operations,
for a total of 38 organizations. Eighteen of these organiza
tions were foreign-owned. Six were headquartered in
Australia, six in Britain, two in the U.S., two in Holland and
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two in Japan. Twenty of the surveyed organizations were
domestic enterprises.
Two- to three-hour structured interviews were conducted
with the corporate president or chair of the board and/or the
senior executive responsible for health and safety within the
organization. A second copy of the questionnaire was sent to
the general manager of one of the organization's operating
facilities. This questionnaire was returned directly to the in
vestigator. Employers responded to detailed questions on
organization structure and behavior, and perceptions of fac
tors influencing health and safety administration. Health
and safety performance was measured by the level of ac
cidents. Employer response was measured by the hierarchical
level of the position of the individual charged with primary
responsibility for health and safety, and the percent of this
individual's time spent on health and safety issues. Percep
tual questions about influential factors, union relations, etc.,
were measured on a 7-point scale.

Results
It has been suggested that multiple factors moderate the
effect of legislation on management's behavior and their
perceptions of this effect. Across the industries sampled,
government rules and regulations and the provisions of acci
dent compensation legislation were reported as having a very
high influence on health and safety decisionmaking within
the firm. The mean influence rating for each of these factors
was X = 5.21 and X = 3.77, respectively, as shown in table 4.
Evaluated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all influenced,
7 = influenced to a great extent), employers also reported be
ing influenced by employee concerns and demands (X=4.08)
and to a slightly lesser extent, the union in the plant
(X=3.52). Employers did not indicate that employee turn
over (X=1.79) had an impact on the decisionmaking. The
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impact of other firms in the industry (X = 2.78) was also low.
This may be explained, however, by the fact that when
employers were asked to compare themselves with other
firms in the industry, the mean response was X = 5.49, with 7
indicating that they believed they placed much more em
phasis on health and safety than did other firms.
Table 4
Overall Mean Score Evaluation of Factors Influencing
Organizational Health and Safety Perceptions and Behavior
Influence factor
National union
Plant union
Employee concerns and demands
Employee turnover
Other firms in industry
Accident compensation
Government rules and regulations

Mean response
X
2.13
3.52
4.08
1.79
2.78
3.77
5.21

An analysis of these influential factors by industry, as
shown in table 5, revealed that government rules and regula
tions were most important across all industries. In both rub
ber and forestry, the accident compensation and the govern
ment rules and regulations were linked as the top two in
fluential factors. In the remaining industries, employee con
cerns and demands constituted the second most important
factor. The oil and chemical industries indicated that other
firms in the industry was the third most important factor in
fluencing their health and safety decisionmaking, while the
other industries, steel, construction, pulp and paper and rub
ber, rated the union as being the third most influential factor
in their respective industries. The mean response in forestry
indicated that employee concerns and demands was the third
most important factor in that industry.

Table 5
Extent to Which Factors Influence Health and Safety Decisionmaking
by Industry (mean response on 7-point scale)
Rubber

Pulp & paper

Forestry

Construction

Steel

Oil

Chemicals

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

National union

1.67

1.00

2.71

4.00

3.00

5.00

2.00

Plant union

4.50

3.17

2.80

4.00

3.33

5.00

3.00

Employee concerns

4.33

3.66

3.57

4.25

3.33

6.50

4.25

Turnover

1.33

1.00

2.88

2.75

1.00

NA

1.33

Other firms in industry

2.40

1.66

2.88

3.33

2.33

6.00

3.50

Potential law suits

1.00

1.33

2.86

3.25

1.33

2.00

2.50

S3
5"

Accident compensation

4.50

3.00

5.63

3.25

2.66

1.00

2.66

Government rules and regulations

4.83

5.16

5.38

4.75

6.00

7.00

5.00
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In order to assess the nature of this perceived influence,
the question was asked whether the influence exerted by
these factors was positive or negative. In other words, did
the managers believe that other firms, the union, employees,
etc., facilitated or hindered their efforts in the area of health
and safety administration. Certainly it would be possible for
one of these factors to be exerting a great deal of influence,
but in a counterproductive fashion. In fact, in no case did
the 34 employers respond that these factors hindered their
health and safety efforts. With the exception of the response
to government rules and regulations (X=5.49), employers
viewed these factors as fairly neutral, that is, neither
facilitating nor hindering their health and safety efforts. The
mean ratings on the other factors were between X = 3.64 for
employee turnover and X = 4.97 for employee concerns.

Cost-Benefit Assessment
Obviously one or two factors, whether internal or external
to the organization, will not in and of themselves change an
employer's behavior with respect to health and safety decisionmaking. These factors interact with each other and
organizational factors such as the amount of time spent on
health and safety and the position level of the individual with
primary responsibility for health and safety within the
organization. The employer then considers these aspects and
screens their impact in the context of the economic return to
the organization.
As previously discussed, legislation affects not only
employer compliance behavior but also employee behavior,
which in turn has an economic impact on the firm. One
reservation about the accident compensation legislation, for
example, is the fear that the system will be abused. If
employees view the provisions as benefits to which they are
entitled, which in fact they are, more accidents which the
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employee would previously have simply worked through
may be reported. It is also possible that the employee will be
absent from work longer with a given accident because he or
she is receiving compensation. In fact, when the employers
were asked, "To what extent do you believe that more ac
cidents are reported as ajesult of accident compensation?,"
the mean response was X = 5.31, with 1 indicating "not at
all" and 7 indicating "to a great extent." The mean response
to the question, "To what extent does the existence of acci
dent compensation prolong the absence of injured workers,"
was also high (X= 5.00).
In order to assess the overall economic impact of accident
compensation legislation and other influential factors,
employers were asked "To what extent do you believe that
your expenditures in the health and safety area are offset by
your accident rates?" The perception of worker's absence,
given the presence of a compensation system, was not
significantly correlated with this overall cost-benefit assess
ment, but was significantly correlated with beliefs about the
number of accidents reported. The greater the extent to
which employers felt more accidents were reported, the less
likely they felt that their costs in the health and safety area
were offset by the benefits. As shown in table 6, the overall
assessments of the influence of accident compensation
legislation and government rules and regulations were not
significantly correlated with the employer's cost-benefit
analysis. Other factors influencing health and safety decisionmaking which are significantly correlated with the
employer's cost-benefit assessment include the union and
employee turnover.
Organizational characteristics which were positively cor
related with the manager's cost-benefit analysis at a
significance level less than .05 included the size of the cor
poration measured in terms of number of full-time
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employees (r= .28 p< .05). If the firm was headquartered in
New Zealand, the employer was also more likely to feel that
the costs were offset by the benefits or lower accident rates
(r=.27p<.05).
Table 6
Correlation Between Factors Influencing Health and Safety
Decisionmaking and Employer Cost-Benefit Analysis
(Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficients)
Influence
National union
Plant union
Employee concerns
Employee turnover
Other firms
Accident compensation
Government rules and regulations

Cost-benefit
coefficient
.30**
.27*
-.0
-.22*
.21
-.04
-.01

*p<.10
**p<.05

Influencing Factors, Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Accident Record
The impact of legislation and other factors is important
not only in terms of the degree of influence on decisionmaking and the employer's subjective assessment of the costs and
benefits. More significant is the relationship between these
elements and actual accident behavior in the organization.
Given the number of factors influencing health and safety
outcomes, is accident compensation correlated with lower
accident rates, or is the direct effect erased by the economic
impact of unintended consequences, i.e., more accidents be
ing reported and longer absences by those who claim com
pensation?
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Table 7 shows that accident compensation legislation, as a
factor influencing employer decisionmaking, is positively
correlated with the accident rate (r= .33 p< .05). This find
ing may simply reflect the fact that the more accidents in an
organization, the more likely it will have transactions with
the Accident Compensation Corporation. The relationship
between government rules and regulations and the accident
rate in 1982 was significant and in the expected direction
(r = -.39 p<.05). The greater the reported influence of the
government, the lower the accident rate. Another external
factor significantly correlated with the accident rate was the
influence of the national union (r = .55 p < .05). The relation
ship is not in the expected direction. The coefficient indicates
that the national union influence was stronger in those
organizations with higher accident rates.
Table 7
Correlation Between Factors Influencing Employer Health and Safety
Decisionmaking and the Accident Rate in 1982
(Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficients)
Accident rate
___________Influence__________in 1982_______
National unions
Plant unions
Employee concerns
Employee turnover
Other firms
Accident compensation
Government rules and regulations
Other structural variables:
Locus of ownership
Responsibility level
*p<.10
**p<.05

.55**
.09
.0
.29*
.14
.33**
-.39**
-.34**
-.25*
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As an internal influencing factor, employee turnover
(r=.29 p<.10) was positively correlated with the accident
rate in 1982. In other words, the greater the influence of
employee turnover, the higher was the accident level and vice
versa. Other organizational structural variables which were
significantly correlated with the level of accidents in 1982 in
cluded the locus of ownership and the position level of the
person given primary responsibility for health and safety.
The locus of ownership variable revealed that New Zealand
organizations were more likely than foreign-owned organiza
tions to have accidents (r = -.34 p<.05). The position level
of the individual primarily responsible for health and safety
also indicated that for the organizations sampled, the higher
this assignment, the higher the number of accidents
(r = -.25 p<.10).
Conclusion
Accident compensation legislation does not always result
in intended consequences. Survey research conducted in 38
organizations shows that the New Zealand Accident Com
pensation Act is not, in and of itself, perceived as a major in
fluence on employers' health and safety decisionmaking.
Government rules and regulations are a major influence,
however, along with employee concerns and demands and
the plant union.
The impact of the accident compensation legislation is evi
dent in employers' assessments of resultant employee
behavior and their own subsequent cost-benefit analyses of
health and safety expenditures within the organization.
Employers reported that they believe more accidents are now
reported as a result of accident compensation (X = 5.31 on a
7-point scale) and that the existence of accident compensa
tion prolongs the absence of injured workers (X = 5.00 on a
7-point scale). The employer's overall assessment of the costs
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and benefits of health and safety activities within their
organization was significantly correlated with the employers'
beliefs about the number of accidents reported, but not with
the employers' beliefs about extended absences. This finding
supports the notion that the overall benefits derived from
comprehensive compensation provisions outweigh the cost.
Despite the belief that more accidents may be reported,
employers felt that their expenditures in the health and safety
area (including the first week compensation requirement) are
offset by lower accident rates.
Further evidence of the impact of accident compensation
legislation is found in the significant correlation between the
influence of this legislation and the level of accidents in the
firm. Government rules and regulations and national unions
were also significantly related to the number of accidents
reported in 1982.
The policy implications of the findings reported here are
that government agencies and the Accident Compensation
Corporation may be able to strengthen their influence on
health and safety in the firm even further, through increased
cooperation with the unions. The data show that this effort
would be best directed toward the individual plant union
organization rather than the national federations. The find
ings further indicate that efforts to help employers address
employee concerns should also prove useful. Across all in
dustries, employers reported a high level of influence exerted
by perceived employee concerns and demands. An example
of such an involvement would be facilitating policy formula
tion, such as the New Zealand Employers Federation policy
statement on health and safety in the workplace adopted in
1983 ("NZEF Adopts Policy" 1983).
From the employer's perspective, the finding that the
stronger the union influence on health and safety decisionmaking the more likely the employer reported that the
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benefits outweighed the costs in health and safety ad
ministration, suggests that employers may also find it useful
to strengthen the union's role in this area. A second recom
mendation, which fits with working more closely with the
workers, is to place management responsibility for health
an'i safety administration at lower levels within the organiza
tion. This suggestion flows from the finding that the higher
the assignment of responsibility for health and safety within
the organization, the higher the level of accidents. A third
recommendation is that employers may find it useful to work
with other firms on resolving health and safety problems.
The majority of firms reported that they believed that they
placed more emphasis on health and safety than did other
firms. This suggests that organizations may be able to learn
from one another. The unions may also be able to provide a
mechanism for this linkage.
NOTES
1. Under Part 1 of the Social Security Act of 1964, injured persons able
to qualify under the relevant means test had modest monetary benefits,
and all New Zealand residents normally had access to medical, hospital
and other related benefits under Part 2 of the Act (Fahy 1982).
2. The Woodhouse Report characterized the adversarial fault system as
being cumbersome, erratic, and extravagant in operation. The negligence
action was labeled a lottery producing an adequate indemnity for only a
relatively small group of injured persons.
3. Prior to the revisions effective in the Accident Compensation Act
1982, the Earners' Fund was charged with all amounts on claims where
workers suffered injury in motor vehicle accidents in New Zealand aris
ing out of and in the course of the injured person's employment. Now all
compensation resulting from motor vehicle accidents is financed through
levies on vehicle owners.
4. New Zealand dollars are reported. The NZ/US exchange rate was ap
proximately $.64 (NZ) per $1.00 (US) as of April 1984.
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5. For the individual, the legislation stipulates that the earnings related
compensation for all periods of incapacity extending beyond the first
week is calculated by reference to the amount of "relevant earnings"
(ACA & 104). In December 1978, the limit on relevant earnings deter
mined under S. 104 was removed, however. Instead a limit was placed on
the amount of weekly compensation paid. In December 1981, the max
imum amount of earnings-related compensation was increased from
$288 per week to $600 per week. The ACC may at its discretion fix a
minimum amount of earnings for the self-employed, and for the period
March 1983 to March 1984 this minimum was set at $12,324 or
$2377week. Earnings-related compensation may in general be paid until
a claimant reaches the age of 65 years, but where the injured earner is
over 60 special provisions apply.
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